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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
“Intergroup relations represent in their enormous scope one of the most 
difficult and complex knots of problems which we confront in our times.” 
Henri Tajfel, 1982 
 
The topic of intergroup relations is all around us; it seems to be an inevitable 
and ubiquitous part of social life nowadays. Indeed, themes such as the refugee 
influx, the Muslim veil, racial profiling, and terrorist threats repeatedly cover the 
news headlines. Politicians and the public engage in heated arguments on these 
issues, and opinions are shared in every newspaper we open, on every television 
channel we watch, and on every social media platform we log onto. It seems that the 
present multicultural society, consisting of various ethnic and cultural groups, 
literally divides its citizens’ attitudes and ideas, leaving some to perceive an 
immanent threat where others see an opportunity to get to know other cultures and 
habits. The aim of the current project is to add nuance to this polarized debate by 
scientifically examining the antecedents and consequences of intergroup dynamics 
in various domains of life within contemporary communities. 
Renown social psychologist Gordon Allport is credited for summarizing the 
earliest and perhaps most comprehensive body of research on intergroup relations. In 
his book The Nature of Prejudice (1954), he provided a foundation for the study of 
intergroup dynamics. Since that time, a great deal of work in social sciences has 
helped to improve our understanding of intergroup relationships.  
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The classic definition of intergroup relations was originally provided by 
Muzafer Sherif (1966), who suggested that “whenever individuals belonging to one 
group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in 
terms of their group identification, we have an instance of intergroup behavior” (p. 
12). Hence, intergroup relations (i.e., relationships between different groups of 
people) can comprise a large range of social groups (e.g., gender-, age-, language-, 
or sexual orientation-based groups), the most prominent and most-studied being 
ethnicity-based relations between ethnic-cultural minority and majority members.  
Henri Tajfel, a survivor of a World War II prisoner-of-war camp, further 
highlighted that the potential problem for intergroup relations lies in the overarching 
natural tendency of human beings to make social categorizations (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Tajfel 1982). Because of its complexity, individuals are inclined to divide the 
social world into separate categories. According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), this process of designating people as a member of one’s own group 
(i.e., the ingroup; “us”) or as member of another group (i.e., the outgroup; “them”) 
occurs almost automatically, and identification with one’s ingroup is almost 
unavoidable.  
Attitudes towards such outgroups can range along a broad spectrum from 
blatant pronouncements of bigoted sentiment in the form of dehumanization and 
prejudice, to broad-minded openness, acceptance, and tolerance (Pettigrew, 
1969). Whether one’s stances towards intergroup relations are negative or positive 
depends on an array of factors, and insights from the fields of social psychology, 
personality psychology, political sciences, and sociology all add a piece to this 
complex and multifaceted attitudinal puzzle. In that respect, the claim of Tajfel 
(1982) that intergroup relations represent a “Gordian knot” might still be true thirty-
odd years later…  
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
3 
Intergroup Relations: Conflict or Harmony? 
As some of the most pressing, complex, and compelling intergroup 
phenomena in contemporary Western societies, diversity, multiculturalism, 
immigration, and integration have become central themes of social science research. 
Rooted in larger questions concerning the origins of prejudice, stereotypes, 
discrimination and exclusion, the question of how to predict and explain ethnic 
majority members’ attitudes, feelings, and behaviors towards minorities is of key 
relevance to social psychologists. 
Psychology has often addressed this question from an individual differences 
framework, investigating the role of personality traits (e.g., Hodson, Hogg, & 
MacInnis, 2009; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), cognitive styles and motivated cognition 
(e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and 
social-ideological attitudes (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Whitley, 1999). This last 
category of individual differences has proven to be among the most robust and 
reliable predictors of prejudice and outgroup attitudes (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, 
2010). Within his Dual Process Model, John Duckitt (2001) put forward that 
individuals seem to differ in their propensity to adopt prejudiced and ethnocentric 
attitudes, and these differences originate from their more general views, beliefs or 
ideas about how a society should be organized and should function.  
Indeed, individuals anchor their outgroup stances in their social-ideological 
values and beliefs, and these social-ideological attitudes can be divided into two 
broad and interrelated dimensions. In the social-cultural domain, individuals differ in 
the value they attach to conformity to traditional norms and values, social cohesion, 
and collective security (versus openness to experience and individual autonomy). 
This dimension is often labelled Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 
1981, 1988). In the economic-hierarchical domain, individuals differ in their 
preference for intergroup dominance, social and societal hierarchy, and (ingroup) 
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status, superiority, and power (versus egalitarianism and equality; Middendorp, 
1978). This dimension is often labeled Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The ‘conservative’ poles of both dimensions 
of social-ideological attitudes are related to less harmonious and more conflict-
oriented views towards outgroups in particular, and more negative intergroup 
relations at large. Throughout this project, it thus seems warranted to take into 
account the role of such individual differences in social-ideological attitudes. 
Yet, individuals do not live in an isolated societal vacuum. Instead, they are 
embedded in their everyday environments and communities – the neighborhoods, 
municipalities, states, or countries in which they live and make sense of their social 
world. Sociology has often argued that these contexts color individuals’ experiences 
with and their perceptions of outgroups. Addressing the Gordian knot of intergroup 
relations from a contextual difference framework, sociologists have proposed a 
variety of social-environmental and situational factors that may lead individuals to 
propagate prejudice towards outgroups (e.g., Branton & Jones, 2005; Oliver & 
Mendelberg, 2000).  
For instance, Relative Deprivation Theory (Davis, 1959; Smith, Pettigrew, 
Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012) holds that individuals living in dangerous, 
disadvantaged, and impoverished areas as opposed to safe, prosperous and affluent 
areas, may perceive threat in terms of their safety and welfare, which primes 
intergroup hostility (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Objective environmental markers 
such as crime and unemployment might thus yield a negative impact on intergroup 
dynamics. Even the mere presence of outgroups might evoke conflict, though this 
claim has been contested fiercely (Hewstone, 2015; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & 
Hewstone, 2014; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014).  
Fifty-odd years ago, Allport (1954) concluded his chapter on the size and 
density of minority groups stating: “Growing density [of an ethnic-cultural minority 
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group], therefore, is not in itself a sufficient principle to explain prejudice. What it 
seems to accomplish is the aggravation of whatever prejudice exists” (p. 229). This 
statement was not given much scholarly attention until political scientist Robert 
Putnam (2007) refuted this proposition, and posited that more ethnic diversity was 
associated with less trust and more prejudice between and within ethnic groups. This 
constrict claim, also called the “hunkering down” hypothesis, as such specified that 
individuals “pull in like a turtle” (Putnam 2007, p. 149), withdraw from others and 
from social life at large in the face of diversity.  
But does diversity inevitably have such devastating consequences for social 
cohesion within communities? In a comprehensive review of 90 post-Putnam 
studies, van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) concluded that, at best, evidence for 
Putnam’s claim is mixed. Nonetheless, the academic debate on how ethnic diversity 
in society affects social cohesion has had significant impact on the public sphere, 
and still remains a hot topic to examine with no clear answers yet. As such, one of 
the key issues that this project sets out, is to examine the impact of diversity 
(proportion of outgroup members) on majority members’ attitudes across various life 
domains. 
Finally, objective environmental features do not stand alone, they are 
inextricably intertwined with social environmental features. Indeed, our the 
objective environment - and our perceptions thereof - as well as norms, values, and 
the beliefs of the ones surrounding us permeate all spheres of our social lives. 
Furthermore, such ideological contextual climates provide individuals with 
normative reference knowledge that guides their positioning towards social objects, 
and hence might bear an effect on our outgroup attitudes. As such, a final key issue 
that we address within this project, is the question of how strongly the perception of 
these norms and normative climates guide individuals in their stances on various 
facets of intergroup relations. 
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Towards a Contextual Social Psychology 
The study of intergroup relations has greatly benefited from both the 
individual differences approach and the contextual differences approach. Yet, the 
role of individual and of society has often been meticulously (and artificially) 
separated due to field specialization. Psychology has claimed the individual as unit 
of analysis whereas sociology focused mainly on societal factors. An integration of 
individual and contextual/societal antecedents of attitudes and behavior has long 
been lacking. Rather, a person versus situation debate was dominant, in which both 
fields competed against each other for a clean shot at “true” variance in social 
phenomena. Social psychology, however, can benefit greatly from being at the 
intersection between psychology and sociology. Indeed, the Gordian knot of 
intergroup relations seems hard, if not impossible, to capture and unravel from a 
single standalone perspective.  
Luckily, although both approaches diverge in their views on the role of the 
individual or the social context in shaping attitudes, they complement each other and 
together they can provide a useful theoretical framework for an integrated study of 
social psychological phenomena. According to Doise (1986), it is a core 
responsibility of social psychology to bridge these levels of analysis. Furthermore, 
Thomas Pettigrew (1991) argued that within the arena of social psychology, 
examining variation across individuals and across situations should be the norm, and 
systematic research attention should be paid to a Person X Context approach. 
Importantly, he maintained that such integration should not be limited to the 
simultaneous consideration of individual and societal characteristics, but should 
expand across levels, that is, by applying a so far largely under-explored interaction 
approach (e.g., Mischel, 2004).  
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This project is therefore the product of a journey taken along two major 
fronts (i.e., the individual at the one hand, and the social context at the other hand), 
thereby aiming to integrate and reconciliate both in order to yield a more complete 
understanding of intergroup relations. This aim neatly builds upon the growing 
scholarly interest in applying this Person X Context interplay to the field of 
intergroup dynamics (Hodson & Dhont, 2015). Furthermore, to examine such 
interactions across levels of analyses, Oliver Christ and Ulrich Wagner have 
advocated and demonstrated the importance of multilevel analyses (Christ, Sibley & 
Wagner, 2012; Christ & Wagner, 2013). Multilevel research (typically using large-
scale survey data; see Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin, 2010) is based on the assumption 
that individuals are embedded (i.e., nested) in territorial or geo-political contexts 
such as neighborhoods, municipalities, states, or even countries.  
As such, parameters within the statistical model may vary at more than one 
level, and one can investigate main effects of predictors at the individual level of 
analysis, at the contextual level of analysis, and even cross-level interactions 
between predictors at both levels. Applied to our domain of interest, we will 
examine outgroup attitudes as a function of individual social-ideological attitudes, 
contextual ethnic diversity, and the combination of both. 
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Galvanizing and Mobilizing Effects 
A most interesting perspective for the interplay between individual and 
situational processes in intergroup dynamics was provided by Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004). They maintained that situational triggers may exert 
either a galvanizing or a mobilizing effect. In particular, galvanizing contexts have a 
strong effect on those already concerned about a particular issue, whereas mobilizing 
effects evoke strong reactions among those citizens that were originally not 
concerned about the problem. For example, cues of contextual social threat have 
been shown to elicit more prejudice especially among individuals with authoritarian 
predispositions (Stenner, 2005). This could be considered a galvanizing prime. On 
the other hand, in nations with more exclusionary policies, increased levels of 
opposition against immigration were found across the board, with mobilizing effects 
among individuals with conservative as well as egalitarian values (Schwartz, 2007). 
Throughout this project, we examine whether various contextual features have a 
galvanizing or mobilizing influence on intergroup relations. 
In Chapter 2, we start from the assumption that ethnic diversity might not 
be as generally detrimental for intergroup relations as Putnam (2007) put forward. 
Rather, as Allport (1954) mentioned, the presence of ethnic minority members might 
aggravate the already-present prejudice in majority members. Following this 
reasoning and the rationale of Sniderman and colleagues (2004), we expect that 
ethnic diversity as a situational trigger might galvanize negative outgroup attitudes, 
particularly (or even exclusively) in individuals already prone to viewing ethnic-
cultural minority members as threatening.  
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To test this, we investigate the role of right-wing authoritarianism in shaping 
the association between diversity and outgroup attitudes. To examine the interplay 
between individual and contextual characteristics in the prediction of outgroup 
attitudes, we also take into account social threat in the local neighborhood. 
Moreover, we assess diversity and social threat in the neighborhood with both 
subjective and objective measures. As such, we are able to cross-validate our 
findings, and investigate whether the person x context (and context x context) 
interaction effects are not merely driven by people’s perceptions of the social 
context. 
In Chapter 3, we apply Putnam’s (2007) constrict claim to the field of 
political psychology and the domain of political attitudes. Indeed, Putnam suggested 
that, apart from its repercussions for intergroup attitudes, diversity might yield a 
negative impact on political attitudes as well. This chapter attests to this claim by 
including political cynicism and political mistrust as side effects of diversity. 
Moreover, we nuance this claim by considering citizens’ right-wing authoritarianism 
and social dominance orientation as social-ideological attitudes that might moderate 
diversity’s effects. In other words, we investigate if the galvanizing effect of ethnic 
diversity “spills over” to people’s stances on politics, making especially those 
already prone to the alleged threat of diversity reacting distrustful and leery towards 
politics and politicians. 
Again, we assess both objective and perceived diversity measures and we 
test whether diversity is related to more cynicism and less trust in politics and 
politicians, particularly so among those high in right-wing social-ideological 
attitudes. By including both dimensions of right-wing social-ideological attitudes, 
we will be able to test the robustness of the person x context interactions, and to test 
the unique moderating influence of right-wing authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation. Finally, we consider political cynicism and lack of political 
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trust as predictors of greater populist party support, as such extending the 
implications of our findings to the ongoing debates on the rise in diversity and 
populist political parties. 
Whereas Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 consider objective and perceived markers 
of ethnic diversity simultaneously, Chapter 4 examines how the association 
between objective and perceived diversity itself might be moderated by social-
ideological attitudes. More specifically, we investigate the role of right-wing 
authoritarianism in the association between the actual proportion of ethnic minorities 
(objective diversity) within a neighborhood, and majority members' subjective 
perception thereof (perceived diversity). Additionally, we test how right-wing 
authoritarianism affects the direct and indirect relationships between objective 
diversity and outgroup negativity (i.e., outgroup threat, intergroup anxiety, and 
outgroup mistrust).  
We expect that higher levels of right-wing authoritarianism would have a 
dual effect. Firstly, the association between objective and perceived diversity will be 
particularly pronounced among high authoritarians. Secondly, this differential 
impact of objective diversity would further relate to greater levels of perceived 
threat, anxiety, and mistrust towards ethnic-cultural outgroups. In particular, 
authoritarianism should boost the indirect relationship between objective diversity 
and greater outgroup negativity through perceived diversity, and should curb the 
direct association of objective diversity with outgroup negativity.  
As such, we aspire to shed light on how majority members with different 
levels of authoritarianism differentially perceive diversity in their neighborhood, and 
how this relates to their responses to ethnic minorities. Put differently, we turn away 
from the political domain back into the intergroup domain, and show how ethnic 
diversity galvanizes more specific expressions of negative outgroup attitudes in a 
complex person x context model, using both mediation and moderation analyses. 
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Chapter 5 further expands the person x context approach by integrating 
different frameworks on the positive and negative consequences of ethnic diversity 
for intergroup dynamics. Since Putnam’s infamous article (2007), over 90 studies 
including no less than 170 samples have investigated the potential associations 
between diversity and intergroup outcomes (see Schaeffer, 2014). The result has 
been a “cacophony” of empirical findings (see van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014), 
yielding ambiguous and even contradictory results. Firstly, this has been explained 
by the so-called “population ratio paradox” (Pettigrew, Wagner, & Christ, 2010). It 
seems that while diversity instills feelings of threat (which further relate to more 
prejudice), diversity also offers more contact opportunities between members of 
different ethnic groups, as such leading to more tolerance and positivity towards 
outgroups. Those two major competing processes, intergroup contact and intergroup 
threat, appear to cancel each other out, yielding no overall effects of diversity. 
Secondly, as examined in the Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, we 
propose that not everyone is equally sensitive to diversity, and diversity’s 
repercussions will most likely to depend on the characteristics of the perceiver 
(Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). Notably, this galvanizing effect of diversity 
might also apply to its association with intergroup contact and threat. Hence, the net 
effect of diversity might be a result of high authoritarians perceiving more threat and 
engaging in more (positive and negative) contact with minority members, and low 
authoritarians not perceiving more threat and not engaging in more contact in the 
face of diversity. 
Using a large, nested, cross-sectional sample from the 50 largest cities in the 
Netherlands, Study 1 investigates the associations of objective and estimated 
diversity with prejudice and generalized, ingroup, and outgroup trust, through more 
positive and more negative contact, and potentially more perceived outgroup threat. 
These indirect effects should all be stronger for high versus low authoritarians.  
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Study 2, using a longitudinal sample of German majority members nested 
within districts, aims to replicate the cross-sectional results regarding diversity and 
prejudice. Additionally, longitudinal analyses will examine whether diversity 
predicts more positive and more negative contact two years later, for individuals 
with different levels of right-wing authoritarianism.  
Hence, we aim to integrate a mediation framework stemming from 
intergroup contact theories (Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 
1998, 2008) and intergroup threat theories (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 
1999; Stephan et al., 2002) and a moderation framework stemming from a person x 
context approach designating a specific role to individual differences in social-
ideological attitudes. This integration offers a most comprehensive – though 
complex – view on intergroup relations. Furthermore, the use of both multilevel and 
longitudinal analyses allows us to further shed light on the particular processes at 
play with different individuals living within different local contexts over time. 
In Chapter 6, we aim to go beyond the previous chapters by using a 
different yet also important moderator (i.e., positive neighborhood norms), and by 
applying the person x context interaction approach to the field of neighborhood 
attitudes. Positive neighborhood norms, such as strong local networks, are critical to 
people’s satisfaction with, perceived disadvantage of, and intentions to stay in their 
neighborhood. At the same time, local ethnic diversity is said to be detrimental for 
these community outcomes. Integrating both frameworks, we examine if the 
galvanizing effect of diversity spills over to people’s views and behaviors within 
their local neighborhood life, making especially (or even exclusively) those who 
perceive negative local norms react to diversity with lower neighborhood 
satisfaction, greater perceived neighborhood disadvantage, and greater moving 
intentions. 
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In other words, we test whether the negative consequences of diversity also 
occur when perceived social norms are positive. In a first study among German 
adults, we explore whether perceptions of positive neighborhood norms buffer 
against the effects of perceived diversity on moving intentions via neighborhood 
satisfaction and perceived neighborhood disadvantage. In a second study among 
Dutch adults, we intend to replicate and extend this moderated mediation model 
using other characteristics of diversity (i.e., objective and estimated minority 
proportions). Multilevel analyses will again examine the buffering effects of positive 
neighborhood norms. As such, our findings aspire to contribute to the ongoing 
public and political debate concerning diversity and social and communal life. 
In Chapter 7, we focus more elaborately on the role of norms and norm 
setting. We start from Sniderman and colleagues’ (2004) understanding of 
mobilizing effects as situational triggers that evoke strong reactions among all 
citizens, their largest effects being on those who were originally not concerned about 
the particular problem. In this final empirical chapter, we examine whether right-
wing climates (i.e., the socially shared stances on social-cultural and economic-
hierarchical dimensions of ideology within a certain societal context) can provide 
social groups, organizations, and even whole societies with a set of unifying, 
collectively shared norms and values. These shared norms are said to guide how 
individuals within these contexts think about, understand, and evaluate other social 
groups (Cohrs, 2012).  
This “higher-level” and “normative” character of ideology consequently 
implies that prejudice can be fueled more broadly in a right-wing context, with the 
greatest leverage on those least likely to express prejudice. A “mobilizing” 
perspective holds that in low right-wing ideological climates, only people high in 
right-wing social-ideological attitudes (i.e., right-wing authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation) would be prejudiced, whereas in high right-wing ideological 
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climates, almost all individuals (also those with low levels of right-wing social-
ideological attitudes) might be elicited to show more negative outgroup attitudes 
(because of conservative norm setting). 
The seventh chapter thus investigates a multilevel person x context 
interactionist framework for the relationship between right-wing ideological 
attitudes and prejudice, which we expect to be moderated by right-wing ideological 
climates. In two large, representative samples (i.e., the European Social Survey in 
Study 1; and the World Values Survey in Study 2), we test several cross-level 
interactions across three different operationalizations of right-wing social-
ideological attitudes (i.e., authoritarianism-like social-cultural attitudes, social 
dominance-like economic-hierarchical attitudes, and left-right political placement), 
two contextual levels (i.e., regional and national) of right-wing ideological climate, 
and three types of outgroup attitudes (i.e., age-, ethnicity-, and gender-based 
prejudice).  
We examine whether a strong association between right-wing social-
ideological attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes at the individual level appears 
in contexts with a low right-wing ideological climate, and whether this relationship 
is weaker or even absent in contexts with a high right-wing ideological climate. 
Within this large multilevel design, we will correct for statistical artefacts (i.e., 
restriction of range and outliers) and we propose norm setting as the mobilizing 
mechanism through which a right-wing climate develops and curbs the influence of 
individual right-wing social-ideological attitudes on outgroup attitudes.  
In sum, across six empirical chapters, we aim to apply a systematic person x 
context interaction approach to shed light on the intriguing interplay between ethnic 
diversity, ideological climates, and various facets of intergroup relations. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Diversity and outgroup attitudes in the 
Netherlands: The role of authoritarianism and 
social threat in the neighborhood 
 
 
Abstract 
Previous studies have obtained divergent findings for the association between ethnic 
diversity and majority members’ attitudes towards immigrants, suggesting that this 
relationship is moderated by individual or contextual difference variables. In a 
community sample of Dutch citizens (N = 399), we investigated the role of two 
potential moderators: right-wing authoritarianism and social threat in the local 
neighborhood. Moreover, we assessed diversity and social threat in the 
neighborhood with both subjective and objective measures. The results indicated 
that diversity was negatively related to positive attitudes towards immigrants among 
high authoritarians and among people experiencing their immediate environment as 
threatening. Conversely, diversity was positively related to outgroup attitudes among 
low authoritarian individuals and among people residing in more secure 
neighborhoods. The theoretical and practical implications of these person-
environment and environment-environment interactions are discussed. 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Van Assche, J., Roets, A., Dhont, K., & Van Hiel, A. (2014). Diversity 
and out-group attitudes in the Netherlands: The role of authoritarianism and social threat in the 
neighbourhood. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(9), 1414-1430. 
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Introduction 
Over the past decades, there has been an increase in immigration and a 
growing representation of varied ethnic groups in Western societies. Not 
surprisingly, the host community’s perception towards this rise in ethnic diversity 
has become a focal topic of research in social sciences (see e.g., Coenders, 2001; 
Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Putnam, 2007). However, previous research investigating 
the relationship between ethnic-cultural diversity and attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities has yielded ambiguous results (see Wagner et al., 2006).  
Some studies have shown that higher proportions of ethnic minorities in a 
community are associated with more negative feelings and higher levels of prejudice 
towards minorities (e.g., Cernat, 2010; Quillian, 1995). In particular, majority 
members living in neighborhoods with high ethnic diversity have been found to 
show increased levels of prejudice compared to majority members residing in areas 
with less immigrants (Coenders, 2001; Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Scheepers, 
Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002). High (perceived) diversity may heighten perceived 
outgroup threat in those communities, which, in turn, may result in less positive 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Semyonov et al., 2004).  
By contrast, several studies have found no significant relationship (Evans & 
Need, 2002; Hjerm, 2007; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010), while others have found a 
positive association (e.g., Wagner et al., 2003, 2006) between the relative size of the 
minority population and positive outgroup attitudes. For this positive relation, 
Wagner and colleagues have argued that diverse neighborhoods may provide more 
opportunities for positive intergroup contact, which can decrease citizens’ negative 
attitudes.  
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Together, these divergent findings suggest that outgroup size in itself does 
not determine animosity towards the outgroup. Third variables likely moderate the 
diversity-attitude relationship and thus determine whether diversity is associated 
with either less or more positive attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. 
In the present research, we explore the role of two potential moderators. First, we 
consider the moderating role of social-ideological attitudes, i.e., right-wing 
authoritarianism, and, second, we investigate the moderating role of social threat in 
the neighborhood, measured both as individuals’ perception of their immediate 
environment as threatening and by objective indicators of threat in the local 
neighborhood.  
Authoritarianism as a Possible Moderator  
One approach, drawing on individual-difference theories, holds that attitudes 
towards ethnic minorities are (partly) determined by individual differences in 
authoritarianism. The seminal work in this domain was advanced in the 1950s with 
the introduction of ‘The Authoritarian Personality’ (Adorno et al., 1950). Although 
originally proposed as a fixed personality trait, recent accounts usually describe 
authoritarianism as a social-ideological attitude that might show some changeability, 
although it is partially driven by core personality traits (e.g., low Openness, Duckitt, 
2001; Cohrs, Kämpfe-Hargrave, & Riemann, 2012; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Van 
Hiel, Cornelis, & Roets, 2007).  
This particular social-ideological attitude has most frequently been 
operationalized in terms of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), 
which is defined as the covariation of authoritarian aggression, submission and 
conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1988). According to Duckitt (2001; see also, Van Hiel, 
Cornelis, & Roets, 2007), people high in authoritarianism generally perceive the 
world as a dangerous place.  
Chapter 2 
 
 
24 
Therefore, they want to maintain social and collective security, order and 
cohesion, and they tend to perceive the presence of ethnic minorities as a threat to 
traditional norms and values (see also, Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011; Kauff et al., 2013). 
Experimental studies by Cohrs and Ibler (2009) and Cohrs and Asbrock (2009) 
showed that RWA is most strongly associated with prejudice when the immigrant 
group itself is presented as a threat to societal norms. In line with these findings, 
Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) recently presented a meta-analysis indicating that in 
countries where immigrants are perceived as a threat to the societal structure (i.e., 
responsible for increased crime rates and not contributing to the economic health of 
the country) authoritarianism is a particularly strong predictor of anti-immigrant 
attitudes.  
As such, people high in authoritarianism - typically holding dangerous 
world views - who live in an ethnically diverse or multicultural environment are 
likely to see diversity as a threat to society and consequentially hold rather negative 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities (cf., Sibley et al., 2013). Conversely, people low 
in authoritarianism - who generally believe that the social world is relatively safe 
and secure - might perceive ethnic diversity as an enrichment to society. As a result, 
they might hold rather positive attitudes towards immigrants. In this regard, Kauff et 
al., (2013) have shown that authoritarianism moderated the relationship between 
expressions of multiculturalism and attitudes towards ethnic minorities. They found 
that, compared to low authoritarians, high authoritarians perceived a multicultural 
ideology as a threat to cultural traditions, which led to an increase in negative 
outgroup attitudes. Therefore, we predict that diversity will be associated with less 
positive attitudes towards immigrants among high authoritarians, compared to 
people low in authoritarianism. 
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Social Threat in the Neighborhood as a Possible Moderator  
Another approach focusses on the influence of the social environment. 
Indeed, besides individual differences in social-ideological attitudes, a variety of 
social-environmental and situational factors may lead people to experience greater 
threat (e.g., Branton & Jones, 2005; Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Stephan & Renfro, 
2002), which in turn may propagate prejudice towards outgroups (e.g., Oliver & 
Mendelberg, 2000).  
Relative deprivation theory (Davis, 1959; Smith et al., 2012) assumes that 
people living in dangerous and impoverished areas as opposed to safe and affluent 
areas, perceive realistic threat in terms of their safety and welfare, which leads to 
more intergroup hostility (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). This specific threat in the 
neighborhood is assumed to be reality-based, rather than reflecting a general 
dangerous worldview belief, which according to Duckitt (2001) lies at the basis of 
authoritarianism. Whereas previous studies (e.g., Sibley et al., 2013) focused on the 
interaction between diversity and a general belief that the social world is dangerous 
in the prediction of outgroup attitudes, we examine the moderating influence of 
one’s immediate living environment. According to Bobo (1988), this realistic threat 
is in fact the most direct determinant of unfavorable attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities. Moreover, an experimental study by Vorauer and Sasaki (2011) 
confirmed that under unsafe, threatening conditions, high salience of 
multiculturalism is associated with increased hostile intergroup behavior. Similarly, 
Hjerm (2009) found that anti-minority attitudes are strongest in poor municipalities 
with a large proportion of immigrants.  
These findings indicate that (the perception of) threatening factors in the 
environment can affect the influence of diversity on intergroup behavior and 
prejudice. As such, we expect that diversity will be associated with less positive 
attitudes towards immigrants in high-threat areas, compared to low-threat areas. 
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The Present Study 
In the present study, we aim to investigate the interactions between diversity 
and authoritarianism, and between diversity and social threat in the neighborhood in 
the prediction of positive outgroup attitudes. In previous studies, the interplay 
between diversity, ideology, social-environmental factors and racial attitudes has 
been studied in either a lab-context (e.g., Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009), or through 
respondents’ subjective assessments of the social context (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 
1997). Both approaches, however, have their drawbacks; laboratory experiments 
tend to be low in ecological validity, whereas subjective assessments may be subject 
to biased responses (see Sibley et al., 2013).  
Therefore, in the present research, we operationalize the environmental 
characteristics (i.e., both diversity and social threat in the neighborhood) through 
respondents’ subjective assessment as well as through available objective indicators 
of each respondent’s particular community of residence. Taking into consideration 
the real-life variation in ethnic diversity and social threat between different 
neighborhoods, we test the moderating effects of authoritarianism and social threat 
in the neighborhood in an ecologically valid setting, and try to cross-validate the 
findings with both subjective and objective measures.  
We hypothesize that diversity will be associated with less positive attitudes 
towards immigrants in high authoritarian individuals, but not in people low in 
authoritarianism. An analogous interaction is expected between diversity and social 
threat in the neighborhood, indicating that ethnic diversity would be related to less 
positive attitudes towards immigrants under high levels of social threat in the 
neighborhood, but not when social threat in the neighborhood is low. Moreover, we 
hypothesize that these interactions will emerge with subjective as well as objective 
indicators of diversity and social threat in the neighborhood. 
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Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The data for the present study were collected online in collaboration with an 
independent survey company as part of a larger multi-wave panel study. A 
community sample of 399 Caucasian, Dutch respondents from 365 different 
neighborhoods completed an internet survey. Five hundred and seventy-nine people 
were originally contacted (all Caucasian, Dutch nationals), which renders a response 
rate of 69%. All participants completed all relevant measures of the questionnaire, 
yielding no missing data. At least one person from every zip-code region
1
 in the 
Netherlands was recruited, providing us with a heterogeneous sample of adults from 
all regions in the Netherlands. The mean age of the sample was 46 years (SD = 
14.64) and 47% were men. Thirty-one per cent of the participants had completed 
primary school, 42% had completed high school, and 27% had a college or 
university degree. Annual gross household income showed a fairly normal 
distribution, with 7% earning less than €11000, 11% between €11000 and €23000, 
29% between €23000 and €34000, 19% between €34000 and €56000, and 14% 
earned more than €56000. Twenty per cent of the respondents chose not to disclose 
this information. 
Self-report Measures 
Perceived Diversity.  
We assessed two items tapping into subjectively perceived diversity in one’s 
direct environment (see also Semyonov et al., 2004). These items read ‘In the 
municipality/region where I live, there are a lot of people from immigrant origin’ 
and ‘Compared to the number of native Dutch citizens, there are few immigrants 
living in my municipality/region (reverse scored)’. Respondents answered five-point 
Likert scales ranging from one (Totally disagree) to five (Totally agree). Cronbach’s 
alpha of this scale was .82, with M = 2.78 (SD = 1.18).  
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Perceived Social Threat in the Neighborhood.  
We administered six indicators of perceived threat in one’s immediate living 
environment, presented as follows: ‘Below, a number of societal problems are listed. 
Please indicate for each of the problems to what extent they occur in the 
municipality/region where you live: street crime; vandalism; poverty; community 
demise and degradation; drug abuse; unemployment’. Respondents answered five-
point Likert scales ranging from one (Not a problem at all) to five (Definitely a 
problem). An exploratory factor analysis with the principal-axis extraction method 
on these six indicators of social threat in the neighborhood showed that, based on the 
eigenvalues and scree plot, all items loaded on a single factor. Cronbach’s alpha was 
.87, with M = 2.76 (SD = 0.82).  
Right-wing Authoritarianism.  
Four items from the RWA-scale (Altemeyer, 1981; see also Onraet et al., 
2013) were administered on seven-point Likert scales anchored by one (Totally 
Disagree) and seven (Totally Agree). A sample item is ‘Obedience and respect for 
authority are the most important virtues children should learn’. Cronbach’s alpha 
was .87, with M = 5.08 (SD = 1.33).  
Attitudes Towards Immigrants.  
We assessed a modified version of the General Evaluation Scale (Wright et 
al., 1997; see also Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011) asking participants to describe 
their overall feelings about immigrants on four seven-point differential scales: cold-
warm, positive-negative, hostile-friendly, contemptuous-respectful. The items were 
coded so that higher scores indicated more positive attitudes, resulting in a reliable 
index (α = .85), with M = 4.40 (SD = 1.12). 
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Objective Measures 
Objective Diversity.  
We assessed the percentage of non-Western minorities within a specific 
neighborhood (i.e., zip-code) as an objective indicator of diversity. We used 
available data from the Dutch CBS (Central Bureau for Statistics; the Netherlands 
2010) indicating the number of individuals per zip-code from non-Western origin
2
, 
and calculated the percentage as a function of the total number of registered 
inhabitants per zip-code to get a measure of relative objective diversity (M = 8.61%, 
SD = 9.74).  
Objective Social Threat in the Neighborhood.  
Objective indicators of social threat in the neighborhood were retrieved from 
data provided by the Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e.,’Leefbaarometer’ 
[Livability barometer] (Leidelmeijer et al., 2008). This website 
(www.leefbaarometer.nl) provides biennial data for 49 indicators on six dimensions 
that reflect Quality of Life. We used the data from 2010 for the dimension 
‘Security’, representing an objective indication of the safety in Dutch neighborhoods 
and districts. The various indicators of the security-dimension are ruination, 
disruption of public policy, violent felonies, car thefts and nuisance. Note that these 
tangible indicators are similar to those included in our perceived social threat in the 
neighborhood measure. Every zip-code is graded with a number between -50 and 50, 
with zero being the national average. Scores were reversed accordingly to obtain an 
objective indication of regional threat (instead of regional security). The mean of the 
scale was -5.84 (SD = 23.22). Ninety-one per cent of the respondents in our sample 
had a unique zip-code (N = 365). Therefore, objective diversity and objective social 
threat in the neighborhood, measured at the zip-code level, could be considered as 
variables at the individual level. Moreover, the data do not represent a nested 
structure and therefore do not warrant multilevel analyses. 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses  
Independent ANOVA-analyses showed no significant effects of gender, age, 
education, or income on attitudes towards immigrants, all Fs < 2.94, all ps > .09. 
Consequently, we did not include those variables in our main analyses. In Table 1, 
the correlations between all study variables are displayed. Subjective and objective 
diversity were highly positively interrelated (see also Semyonov, Raijman, & 
Gorodzeisky, 2008), and perceived and objective social threat in the neighborhood 
were moderately positively interrelated. Also, moderate to high, positive correlations 
were found between both indicators of diversity and social threat in the 
neighborhood, respectively. Finally, authoritarianism and positive racial attitudes 
were negatively interrelated, but did not correlate with the measures of diversity and 
social threat in the neighborhood.  
 
Table 1. Correlations among variables 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Perceived Diversity -      
2. Objective Diversity .50*** -     
3. Perceived Threat .35*** .28*** -    
4. Objective Threat .43***  .54*** .27*** -   
5. RWA .00 -.01 .03 -.06 -  
6. Positive Attitudes -.08 .00 -.06 -.01 -.16** - 
Note: *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Main Analyses  
Interaction between Diversity and Authoritarianism.  
To test whether the relationship between diversity and attitudes towards 
immigrants is moderated by authoritarianism, we conducted two hierarchical linear 
regression analyses: one considering perceived diversity and one considering 
objective diversity. In the first regression analysis, the centered scores (Aiken & 
West, 1991) of perceived diversity and authoritarianism were included in step one, 
and their interaction term was entered in step two. Perceived diversity did not yield a 
significant main effect on positive outgroup attitudes (β = -.08, p = .13 in step one, 
and β = -.06, p = .25 in step two). A significant main effect of authoritarianism was 
obtained (β = -.16, p = .001, in both step one and step two). Most importantly, a 
significant interaction effect (see Figure 1, Panel A) between perceived diversity and 
authoritarianism emerged (β = -.13, p <.01). Simple slope analyses showed that 
perceived diversity was negatively related to attitudes towards immigrants among 
high authoritarians (β = -.19, p < .01), whereas this relationship was slightly positive 
but non-significant among low authoritarians (β = .07, p = .32). 
 
Figure 1. Interactions between perceived diversity and authoritarianism (Panel A, left), and 
between objective diversity and authoritarianism (Panel B, right), on positive outgroup 
attitudes 
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Next, we conducted a similar hierarchical regression analysis with objective 
diversity instead of perceived diversity. Objective diversity was not associated with 
outgroup attitudes (β = . -.01, p = .91 and β = .00, p = .40, for step one and two 
respectively), whereas a significant main effect of authoritarianism was obtained (β 
= -.16, p = .001, in both step one and two). Similar to the results of the analyses with 
perceived diversity, a significant interaction effect between objective diversity and 
authoritarianism emerged (β = -.16, p <.01; see Figure 1, Panel B).  
Simple slope analyses revealed that objective diversity was significantly 
negatively related to positive ethnic outgroup attitudes for individuals high in 
authoritarianism (β = -.13, p < .05), while for low authoritarians, this association was 
significantly positive (β = .21, p = .01). 
Interaction between Diversity and Social Threat in the Neighborhood.  
To test whether diversity relates differently to attitudes towards immigrants 
for people living in a low-threat vs. high-threat environment, we conducted four 
hierarchical linear regression analyses: one considering the perceived indicators of 
diversity and social threat in the neighborhood, one considering the objective 
indicators of both context variables and two additional cross-method combinations 
(perceived diversity × objective threat and objective diversity × perceived threat). 
All independent variables were first centered and the same analytic procedure for 
moderated regression analyses was used as in the previous analyses. 
Perceived diversity and perceived social threat in the neighborhood had no 
main effects on outgroup attitudes (β = -.06, p = .25 in step one and step two for 
perceived diversity; β = -.04, p = .43 in step one, and β = -.02, p = .67 in step two for 
perceived social threat in the neighborhood). A significant interaction effect between 
perceived diversity and perceived social threat in the neighborhood was obtained (β 
= -.10, p <.05), which is depicted in Figure 2, Panel A.  
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Simple slope analyses indicated that subjective diversity was negatively 
associated with positive outgroup attitudes under high levels of perceived social 
threat in the neighborhood (β = -.16, p < .05), while perceived diversity was not 
significantly related to ethnic outgroup attitudes under low levels of perceived social 
threat in the neighborhood (β = .04, p = .61).  
A similar hierarchical regression analysis with objective indicators of our 
contextual factors was conducted. Objective diversity did not yield a significant 
main effect on ethnic outgroup attitudes (β = .00, p = .96 for step one, and β = .11, p 
= .16 for step two), and neither did objective social threat in the neighborhood (β = -
.01, p = .84 for step one and β = -.04, p = .50 for step two). Analogous to the results 
of the analyses with the perceived indicators, we obtained a significant interaction 
effect between objective diversity and objective social threat in the neighborhood (β 
= -.14, p <.05; see Figure 2, Panel B).  
Simple slope analyses revealed that objective diversity was not significantly 
related to positive outgroup attitudes for individuals living in an objectively high-
threat neighborhood (β = .01, p = .90), whereas this relationship was slightly positive 
and marginally significant among people residing in a more secure district (β = .21, 
p = .07). Additionally, we tested the interactions combining subjective and objective 
indicators. For the combination of perceived diversity and objective social threat in 
the neighborhood, no main effects for perceived diversity (β = -.09, p = .11, both in 
step one and two), and for objective social threat in the neighborhood (β = .03, p = 
.62, both in step one and two) were found. Also, no interaction effect was found (β = 
-.01, p = .88; see Figure 2, Panel C). For the combination of objective diversity and 
perceived social threat in the neighborhood, no main effects were found for 
objective diversity (β = .02, p = .77 in step one and β = .07, p = .23 in step two), and 
for perceived social threat in the neighborhood (β = -.07, p = .20 in both step one and 
two).  
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However, the interaction effect was significant (β = -.12, p < .05; see Figure 
2, Panel D). Simple slope analyses indicated that objective diversity was unrelated to 
positive outgroup attitudes for high perceived social threat in the neighborhood 
levels (β = -.01, p = .85), while this relationship was slightly positive and marginally 
significant among individuals perceiving less threat in their environment (β = .15, p 
= .08).  
Finally, we tested whether any of the obtained two-way interactions are 
further qualified by a three-way interaction. For both the objective and the subjective 
measures, the three-way interactions were not significant, all βs < .07, all ps > .30. 
 
Figure 2. Interactions between perceived diversity and perceived threat (Panel A, upper left), 
objective diversity and objective threat (Panel B, upper right), perceived diversity and 
objective threat (Panel C, lower left), and objective diversity and perceived threat (Panel D, 
lower right), on positive outgroup attitudes 
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Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate whether the relationship between 
(objective and perceived) ethnic diversity within a community and the attitudes 
people hold towards immigrants is moderated by individual differences in 
authoritarianism as well as by social threat in the neighborhood (either objectively 
measured or perceived as such). In line with our hypotheses, the results confirmed 
that diversity was negatively related to positive outgroup attitudes among high 
authoritarians, whereas this association was positive among low authoritarians. 
Furthermore, diversity was generally negatively associated with positive attitudes 
towards immigrants under high levels of social threat in the neighborhood, while 
diversity was not significantly related to ethnic outgroup attitudes under low levels 
of social threat in the neighborhood. These interaction effects may, at least partly, 
explain the inconsistent findings in previous research examining whether ethnic 
diversity and outgroup attitudes are unrelated (e.g., Hjerm, 2007), negatively 
interrelated (e.g., Quillian, 1995), or positively interrelated (e.g., Wagner et al., 
2006).  
According to Oliver and Mendelberg (2000), majority members' racial 
opinions are partly shaped by informational cues from their social environment such 
as the presence of ethnic minorities and multiculturalism. While people low in 
authoritarianism perceive the presence of immigrants as an enrichment to the local 
neighborhood, for high authoritarian individuals, these cues of diversity are 
experienced as a direct threat to the dominant culture (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Duckitt, 
2001; Kauff et al., 2013), and are therefore associated with negative feelings towards 
ethnic-cultural minorities (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). This person-environment 
interaction is consistent with Sibley and colleagues (2013) who demonstrated that 
people who perceive the world as dangerous and live in an ethnically diverse or 
multicultural environment hold rather negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities. 
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This finding is also in line with the results of previous studies conducted by 
Cohrs and colleagues (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Cohrs & Stelzl, 
2010), who reported such two-way interactions. These authors used a single measure 
of ‘immigrant threat’, which explicitly links environmental threat to (the presence 
of) immigrants. In the present study, we extended these previous findings by using 
1) a broad and well-established individual difference variable, i.e., authoritarianism, 
and 2) a more context-based approach to threat, i.e., specific indicators of threat in 
the local community, rather than generalized worldviews concerning danger and 
threat, or threat explicitly linked to and imposed by the outgroup.  
In addition to the ideological individual differences aspect of dangerous 
world perceptions, we thus considered perceived and objective social threat in the 
immediate environment, and we investigated its interaction with diversity. Indeed, 
whereas authoritarianism typically relates to higher threat sensitivity, living in an 
environment that is (perceived as) unsafe can be considered as an external source of 
increased threat salience. In this respect, the sheer presence of a high proportion of 
immigrants in a community could be regarded by its residents as a contributing 
factor to the dangerous environment one lives in. Such an attribution may lead to 
greater negative outgroup attitudes (McLaren, 2003; Semyonov et al., 2004). 
Conversely, when people live in a safe environment, threat is low and ethnic 
minorities are likely to be evaluated positively within this benign social context. 
Under these conditions, the social environment may facilitate the development of 
positive social that increase the recognition and appreciation of different social 
identities. Such an improved intergroup context, in turn, is likely to relate to more 
positive attitudes towards ethnic minorities (e.g., Aberson, 2010, Wagner et al., 
2006).  
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We found that there are individual as well as contextual moderators in the 
diversity-attitude relationship. Although one might expect these influences to 
operate at the same time (e.g., authoritarians reacting especially negative towards 
immigrants when living in a neighborhood that is both highly diverse and high in 
social threat), no significant three-way interactions were found. Importantly, these 
results indicate that high authoritarians respond to high ethnic diversity with 
increased outgroup rejection, even when the local neighborhood is not threatening. 
Similarly, higher diversity in threatening neighborhoods decreases positive attitudes 
towards immigrants, even for people that are low in authoritarianism. Hence, we 
suggest that both broader ideological beliefs, based on a view of the world as 
dangerous, and specific threatening characteristics of the local neighborhood 
simultaneously but independently determine the relationship between diversity and 
attitudes towards immigrants in a very similar way.  
A first important merit of the present study pertains to the inclusion of both 
subjective and objective measures, not only of local ethnic diversity but also of 
social threat in the neighborhood. In particular, we were able to demonstrate that the 
interactions obtained with subjective variables could be replicated with objective 
markers of local neighborhood diversity and threat. Indeed, for both the subjective 
and the objective indicators, the interactions between diversity and authoritarianism 
were significant, as were the interactions between diversity and social threat in the 
neighborhood, and one cross-method interaction between objective diversity and 
perceived social threat. Importantly, this replication with objective measures also 
indicates that the effects found with subjective measures could not merely be 
attributed to biased or extreme responding.  
A second specific merit is the fine-grained level of analysis (i.e., zip-code) 
to measure the specific ethnic and social environment of the respondents. 
Previously, the country-level study of Hjerm (2007), the region-level study of Evans 
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and Need (2002), and the municipality-level study of Schlueter and Scheepers 
(2010) have indicated that perceived as well as actual minority proportion have no 
straightforward link with attitudes towards ethnic minorities. Semyonov and 
colleagues (2004), however, found a main effect for subjective (but not for 
objective) diversity at the district-level. Based on these previous findings, one might 
infer that the lack of direct associations in some studies may be due to too broad of a 
level of analysis. However, the present study, using a very fine-grained level of 
analysis, also showed no main effects of diversity, which is at odds with the ‘level-
of-analysis’-explanation for the divergent findings in prior research. Instead, to 
understand this diversity-attitude relationship, it is important to look at interactions 
as diversity can be associated with either more negative or more positive outgroup 
attitudes, dependent on individual and contextual moderators such as 
authoritarianism and social threat in the neighborhood.  
This interaction approach that simultaneously takes psychological and socio-
structural variables into account to explain social phenomena also responds to 
Pettigrew’s (1991) call for a ‘contextual social psychology’. In line with this 
perspective, the present findings indeed demonstrate that the link between ethnic 
diversity and the majority's attitudes towards immigrants is complex and determined 
by third variables at the individual as well as at the contextual level. 
Implications and Directions for Future Research 
The present results also suggest several potential directions for improving 
intergroup relations and may help to identify specific individuals for whom 
particular interventions may be most efficient. Firstly, positive contact with different 
ethnic groups has the capacity to reduce intergroup anxiety and threat perceptions, 
which in turn leads to more positive outgroup attitudes (e.g., Pettigrew et al., 2007; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Tausch et al., 2007). These effects are most pronounced 
among high authoritarians, so they might especially benefit from specific contact-
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based interventions (e.g., Asbrock et al., 2012; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009, 2011; 
Hodson, 2011). As high ethnic diversity is associated with threat perceptions among 
high authoritarians, future studies may investigate the role of intergroup contact in 
the interaction effect of diversity and authoritarianism on attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities.  
Secondly, from a social-environmental perspective, certain neighborhoods 
and communities can then be targeted for specific intervention purposes. Aberson 
(2010) has argued that a safe and secure social environment offers an optimal 
intergroup context that facilitates the development of positive social norms. In 
contrast, in impoverished regions with high criminality and unemployment rates 
(i.e., high social threat in the neighborhood), attitudes towards immigrants are likely 
to be based on fear and threat (McLaren, 2003). Hence, in highly diverse and 
disadvantaged districts, negative attitudes towards immigrants may be effectively 
reduced by implementing neighborhood-level interventions that address real-life 
threat and lower the (perception of) threat and danger in the local environment.  
Finally, a growing body of research on generalized prejudice has shown that 
individuals who hold negative attitudes towards a particular ethnic group also tend to 
be less favorable towards other ethnic groups, and even towards other minority 
groups that are not based on ethnicity (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Bergh, 2011; 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; McFarland, 2010; see also Allport, 1954), as such 
supporting the use of measures referring to immigrants as a single group for the 
purpose of our study. Nevertheless, future studies might focus on individual 
immigrant groups concentrated in specific areas, considering how the distribution of 
specific minority groups relates to group-specific attitudes (e.g., Fleischmann et al., 
2012).  
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Such studies may also investigate the influence of change in the ethnic 
composition over time rather than the momentarily ethnic composition. Hjerm 
(2009) already found that people were more likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes if 
they lived in a poor municipality with a large proportion of foreign-born people, and 
similarly, if a high influx of foreign-born people (i.e., change in diversity) was 
accompanied by poor economic development over time. These findings suggest that 
the same contextual factors may moderate the diversity-attitude relationship at a 
specific time, as well as in the long run.  
Longitudinal studies taking into account overall development in ethnic 
composition over time and sudden upsurges in immigration (see e.g., Coenders & 
Scheepers, 2008) may therefore be useful to further investigate the role of the 
proposed moderating factors. 
Conclusion 
To understand the relationship between ethnic diversity and outgroup 
attitudes, it is crucial to take into account both individual and contextual influences 
in this relationship. The current results indicate that authoritarianism as well as 
perceived and objective social threat in the neighborhood are moderating factors in 
the association between diversity and attitudes towards immigrants. These findings 
may therefore also contribute to the on-going public and political debate about the 
impact of the changing ethnic composition in multicultural societies and the 
challenges for improving intergroup relations and attitudes (see also, Kauff et al., 
2013). 
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Notes  
1
 A zip-code region in the Netherlands is comprised of all zip-codes that share the 
first two digits (for example: zip-code region one consists of all zip-codes 
between 1000 and 1099, zip-code region two consists of all zip-codes 
between 1100 and 1199, …, zip-code region 90 consists of all zip codes 
between 9900 and 9999). A zip-code region covers about 82 square 
kilometers.  
2
 Non-Western ethnic minorities are defined as immigrants whose ethnic background 
(or that of at least one parent) is in Africa, South America or Asia 
(excluding Indonesia or Japan). Most non-Western minorities are Turks 
(23,2%), Moroccans (21,1%) and Surinamese (20,7%; CBS; the 
Netherlands, 2010). Notice that in the Dutch context, the category ‘non-
western minorities’ is generally referred to as ‘ethnic minorities’ 
(Guiraudon, Phalet, and ter Wal 2005). For that reason, we use both terms 
interchangeably.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Ethnic diversity and support for populist parties:  
The “right” road through political cynicism and 
mistrust 
 
 
Abstract 
Putnam’s (2007) constrict claim states that ethnic diversity has serious consequences 
for social cohesion, making people distrustful and leery. The present contribution 
extends this claim by including political cynicism and mistrust as side effects of 
diversity. Moreover, we nuance this claim by considering citizens’ social-ideological 
attitudes as moderators of diversity effects. Using a Dutch nationally stratified 
sample (N = 628), we showed that both objective and perceived diversity were 
associated with more political cynicism and less trust, but only for those high in 
right-wing attitudes (i.e., social dominance orientation and particularly 
authoritarianism). Furthermore, only political cynicism was a unique predictor of 
greater populist party support. Implications for the ongoing debates on the rise in 
diversity and populist parties are discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on Van Assche, J., Dhont, K., Van Hiel, A., & Roets, A. (in press). Ethnic 
diversity and support for populist parties: The “right” road through political cynicism and lack of 
trust. Social Psychology. 
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Introduction 
Based on data from over 30,000 people in 41 different U.S. communities, 
the renowned political scientist Robert Putnam concluded that - other things being 
equal - more ethnic diversity is associated with less trust between and within ethnic 
groups (Putnam, 2007). In addition to the devastating consequences for social 
cohesion within communities, Putnam also suggested that higher diversity has 
repercussions on people’s ideas about and engagement in politics. In particular, 
Putnam found that greater diversity was related to less confidence in local 
government and leaders, less belief in own political efficacy, and lower expectations 
of politics. Following Putnam’s infamous claims, numerous studies tested the 
‘hunkering down’ hypothesis with regards to general and intergroup trust (see 
Hewstone, 2015; Schaeffer, 2014; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). However, very 
little attention has been given to the proposed political consequences of diversity. 
This is remarkable, especially because citizens’ disillusionment in politics and 
politicians may lie at the basis of increased support for populist parties; an issue that 
has become increasingly important in many Western countries (e.g., Koopmans & 
Muis, 2009; Rydgren, 2008).  
Political Trust and Cynicism 
Considering the political repercussions, an important question is whether 
diversity within communities merely erodes political trust and engagement among 
citizens, or whether diversity also instills a more ‘active’ and ‘angry’ expression of 
political disillusionment in the form of political cynicism, leading people to actively 
reject traditional politics and political parties. As such, our first hypothesis pertains 
to the negative relation between diversity on the one hand, and lower political trust 
and greater political cynicism on the other.  
 
THE POLITICAL CORRELATES OF DIVERSITY 
 
51 
Fifty-odd years ago, the concept of political cynicism was introduced as “the 
extent to which people hold politicians and politics in disrepute” (Agger, Goldstein, 
& Pearl, 1961, p. 477). Pattyn, Van Hiel, Dhont, and Onraet (2012) showed that 
political cynics’ suspicion towards politic(ian)s can be empirically distinguished 
from mere lack of political trust. Indeed, although political cynicism and (mis)trust 
share communalities, as evinced by their high correlation, cynicism has unique 
elements as well. Political cynicism is an active, antagonistic form of contempt, with 
captious anger and hostility as two of its core elements, whereas political mistrust 
merely captures discontent and lack of faith in the (performance of the) current 
regime (Eisinger, 2000). Exactly because of the powerful negative emotions 
embedded in political cynicism, it may be more consequential in shaping political 
support and behavior, compared to the more ‘passive’ lack of trust and 
disengagement described by Putnam (2007).  
Political cynicism, rather than mere lack of trust in traditional political 
leaders, may push people to populist parties rejecting the political establishment and 
emphasizing the contrasts between the “common people” and the “privileged elites” 
(see Bergh, 2004). These populist ‘protest’ parties can be located at the far-right as 
well as the far-left end of the political continuum, though the majority of populist 
movements are clearly right-wing in most Western countries (McClosky & Chong, 
1985). Our second hypothesis predicts a substantial relative contribution of political 
cynicism above and beyond mere lack of trust in the prediction of support for 
(right)-populist parties. 
Individual Differences Shape Diversity Effects 
Although Putnam (2007) proposed that diversity has negative overall effects 
within communities, many subsequent studies found rather inconsistent evidence 
(Hewstone, 2015). As a result, various researchers suggested that diversity effects 
are not generalizable, but rather depend on individual difference variables because 
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not everyone reacts in similar ways to diversity (e.g., Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 
2008). Specifically, diversity should trigger negative reactions especially (or even 
exclusively) in people who feel most threatened by diversity, based on their social-
ideological beliefs and underlying motivations (e.g., Asbrock & Kauff, 2015; Van 
Assche, Roets, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014, 2016).  
According to Duckitt’s (2001) Dual-Process Model, social-ideological 
attitudes fall apart into two broad and relatively independent dimensions. The first 
dimension, often operationalized as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; 
Altemeyer, 1981), encompasses a set of conservative sociopolitical and cultural 
attitudes including a strict adherence to conventional norms and values (i.e., 
conventionalism), an uncritical subjection to authority (i.e., authoritarian 
submission), and feelings of aggression towards norm violators (i.e., authoritarian 
aggression). The second dimension taps into the economic-hierarchical domain and 
is often operationalized as Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which reflects acceptance of inequality and the belief 
that social groups should be hierarchically organized. 
Recent studies corroborated that RWA moderates (i.e., strengthens) the 
relationship between diversity and negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., Kauff, 
Asbrock, Thorner, & Wagner, 2013; Van Assche et al., 2016), and similar 
interaction patterns were found for individual differences in dangerous worldviews 
(Sibley et al., 2013) and conformity values (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013), two 
concepts closely related to authoritarianism (Duckitt, 2001). For SDO, no such 
studies are currently available and, therefore, the role of SDO in shaping diversity 
effects is yet unknown. However, especially when it comes to diversity and 
(political) trust, we expect that RWA should play a more central role compared to 
SDO, given that maintaining social cohesion and security is an underlying 
motivation for RWA, but not for SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Kessler & Cohrs, 
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2008). Hence, our third hypothesis states that the erosion of political trust and the 
upsurge in political cynicism in diverse communities applies especially to people 
high in RWA and SDO. Finally, our fourth hypothesis states that when RWA and 
SDO are considered simultaneously, only RWA substantially moderates the 
association of diversity with political trust and cynicism, with particularly cynicism 
further relating to populist party support. 
The Present Study 
Extending Putnam’s (2007) claim that higher ethnic diversity makes people 
less trusting of political leaders and disengaged from politics, Hypothesis 1 states 
that diversity also relates to a more vigorous expression of political disillusion in the 
form of political cynicism. Moreover, we expect that cynicism, due to its “active” 
and “arousing” nature is a more potent basis of support for extremist-populist parties 
compared to the rather “passive” state of mistrust (Hypothesis 2). Based on recent 
research demonstrating the role of social-political attitudes as moderators of 
diversity effects, Hypothesis 3 states that especially among individuals high in RWA 
(and potentially SDO), diversity will be related to more political cynicism, less trust, 
and more populist party support.  
Finally, we test a moderated mediation model in which social-ideological 
attitudes simultaneously moderate the association of diversity with political 
attitudes, which further relate to populist party support (expecting a more prominent 
role for RWA as a moderator and cynicism as a mediator; Hypothesis 4). To 
investigate these issues, Koopmans and Schaeffer (2016) highlighted the importance 
of taking into account objective as well as subjective diversity. Indeed, where some 
studies (e.g., Semyonov, Raijman, Tov, & Schmidt, 2004) indicated that especially 
perceptions of diversity have detrimental effects, other studies (e.g., Van Assche et 
al., 2014; 2016) showed that objective and perceived diversity yield similar effects 
on intergroup attitudes. 
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Method 
Participants 
A nationally stratified sample of Dutch citizens (N = 628) without migration 
background from 531 neighborhoods across the Netherlands completed an online 
survey.
1
 All participants completed all relevant measures, yielding no missing data. 
The mean age of the sample was 54 years (SD = 15.88) and 51% were men (see 
Appendix A for more information).  
Measures  
Respondents answered the items for perceived diversity, social-ideological 
attitudes and populist party support on seven-point scales ranging from one 
(none/totally disagree) to seven (a lot/totally agree). The items for political attitudes 
were administered on five-point scales anchored by one (totally disagree) and five 
(totally agree).  
Diversity.  
We assessed the percentage of non-Western minority members within a 
specific neighborhood (i.e., zip code) as an objective diversity indicator. Two items 
tapping into subjectively perceived diversity in one’s direct environment (Semyonov 
et al., 2004): ‘How many people from immigrant origin live in your 
municipality/city?’ and ‘How many people from immigrant origin live in your 
street?’. Both items were highly positively interrelated (r = .57). 
Social-ideological Attitudes.  
Funke’s (2005) 12-item RWA-scale was administered (e.g., ‘Obedience and 
respect for authority are the most important virtues children should; α = .67). SDO 
was measured with eight items (see Pratto et al., 1994); e.g., ‘Some groups of people 
are simply not the equals of others’; α = .80). 
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Political Attitudes.  
The 10-item political cynicism and 10-item political trust scales of Pattyn 
and colleagues (2012) were administered. An example item for cynicism is ‘Most 
politicians are willing to throw their ideals or promises overboard if this increases 
their power’. Cronbach’s alpha was .91. A sample item for trust is ‘One can 
confidently trust politicians’; α = .93. 
Populist Party Support.  
In the Netherlands, the ‘Partij Voor de Vrijheid’ (PVV; Party for Freedom) 
is the prime example of a populist, anti-establishment party that has achieved a 
prominent place in the country’s political landscape. PVV can be considered a right-
populist party, and left-populist parties are rather marginalized in modern-day Dutch 
politics. Respondents completed the item ‘To what extent do you support the 
program and/or ideas of PVV’. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among all 
variables.
2
 We investigated whether multilevel analyses were warranted because our 
data were somewhat nested (individuals were located within zip codes), though 73% 
of the respondents in our sample had a unique zip code (N = 457). These analyses 
indicated that objective neighborhood diversity could be considered as an individual-
level variable in the present study (Appendix A).  
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among variables 
 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Objective Diversity 11.02 11.41 -      
2. Perceived Diversity 3.38 1.47 .59*** -     
3. RWA  3.91 0.77 -.06 .02 -    
4. SDO 3.05 1.06 .01 .07 .32*** -   
5. Political Cynicism 3.35 0.73 .01 .07 .30***  .13** -  
6. Political Trust 2.74 0.68 -.04 -.08* -.18*** -.08* -.75*** - 
7. Populist Support 3.07 2.15 .04 .11* .45*** .32*** .32*** -.27*** 
Note: 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
 
Simple Regression Analyses 
 Next, we investigated whether social-ideological attitudes moderated the 
associations of diversity with our political outcomes (Table 2). We conducted twelve 
regression analyses, testing the effects of either objective or perceived diversity on 
political cynicism, political trust and PVV-support, with RWA or SDO as 
moderator, followed up by simple slope analyses, testing the significance of the 
regression slopes at low (< 1SD below the mean) and high (> 1SD above the mean) 
levels of the moderator. All predictors were centered before running the analyses 
(Aiken & West, 1991). In line with our expectations, all interaction effects for RWA 
were significant. Objective and perceived diversity were only associated with more 
political cynicism, less trust and more PVV-support among people high in RWA, 
and not among those low in RWA.  
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Table 2. Standardized and unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) 
of regression analyses for political cynicism, political trust, and populist party support 
 
 
 
Political Cynicism Political Trust Populist Party Support 
 
β b (CI95) β b (CI95) β b (CI95) 
Objective Diversity (OD) .05 
0.30 
(-0.29; 0.88) 
-.07 
-0.44 
(-1.01; 0.12) 
.08 
1.56 
(-0.06; 3.17) 
RWA .22*** 
0.21 
(0.13; 0.30) 
-.16*** 
-0.14 
(-0.23; -0.06) 
.44*** 
1.23 
(1.01; 1.45) 
OD X RWA .10* 
0.88 
(0.10; 1.67) 
-.09* 
-0.74 
(-1.50; -0.02) 
.13*** 
3.32 
(1.28; 5.36) 
OD effect for low RWA -.06 
-0.38 
(-1.20; 0.44) 
.02 
-0.13 
(-0.67; 0.92) 
-.06 
-1.06 
(-3.40; 1.27) 
OD effect for high RWA .15* 
0.98 
(0.12; 1.83) 
-.17** 
-1.01 
(-1.84; -0.18) 
.22*** 
4.18 
(1.95; 6.41) 
Perceived Diversity (PD) .04 
0.02 
(-0.02; 0.07) 
-.10* 
-0.04 
(-0.09; 0.00) 
.10* 
0.14 
(0.01; 0.28) 
RWA .18*** 
0.17 
(0.08; 0.26) 
-.13** 
0.12 
(-0.20; -0.03) 
.44*** 
1.22 
(0.96; 1.46) 
PD X RWA .17*** 
0.10 
(0.04; 0.17) 
-.14** 
-0.09 
(-0.14; -0.03) 
.12** 
0.23 
(0.06; 0.40) 
PD effect for low RWA -.12 
-0.06 
(-0.13; 0.01) 
.04 
0.02 
(-0.05; 0.08) 
-.02 
-0.03 
(-0.24; 0.17) 
PD effect for high RWA .20*** 
0.10 
(0.04; 0.16) 
-.24*** 
-0.11 
(-0.17; -0.05) 
.22*** 
0.32 
(0.15; 0.50) 
Objective Diversity (OD) .02 
0.15 
(-0.41; 0.72) 
-.05 
-0.31 
(-0.85; 0.23) 
.07 
1.25 
(-0.50; 2.99) 
SDO .13** 
0.09 
(0.03; 0.15) 
-.08a 
-0.05 
(-0.11; 0.00) 
.32*** 
0.64 
(0.47; 0.82) 
OD X SDO .09* 
0.58 
(0.03; 1.12) 
.00 
0.00 
(-0.52; 0.52) 
.06 
1.04 
(-0.57; 2.65) 
OD effect for low SDO -.07 
-0.46 
(-1.23; 0.31) 
-.05 
-0.31 
(-1.04; 0.42) 
.01 
0.13 
(-2.19; 2.45) 
OD effect for high SDO .12a 
0.77 
(-0.08; 1.62) 
-.05 
-0.31 
(-1.11; 0.50) 
.13a 
2.36 
(-0.22; 4.94) 
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Perceived Diversity (PD) .06 
0.03 
(-0.01; 0.07) 
-.08a 
-0.04 
(-0.08; 0.01) 
.09* 
0.13 
(0.00; 0.26) 
SDO .13** 
0.09 
(0.03; 0.15) 
-.07a 
-0.05 
(-0.10; 0.01) 
.31*** 
0.63 
(0.46; 0.81) 
PD X SDO .06 
0.03 
(-0.01; 0.07) 
-.02 
-0.01 
(-0.05; 0.03) 
.07 
0.10 
(-0.02; 0.21) 
PD effect for low SDO -.01 
0.00 
(-0.06; 0.06) 
-.05 
-0.03 
(-0.08; 0.03) 
.02 
0.03 
(-0.15; 0.21) 
PD effect for high SDO .12* 
0.06 
(0.00; 0.12) 
-.10a 
-0.04 
(-0.10; 0.01) 
.16** 
0.23 
(0.06; 0.41) 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
 
For SDO, only the interaction term with objective diversity on cynicism was 
significant. Nonetheless, a closer look at the simple slopes indicated that, similar to 
the results for RWA, only among those high (versus low) in SDO, objective and 
perceived diversity tended to be negatively related to political trust, and positively 
related to political cynicism and PVV-support. 
Moderated Mediation Analyses: RWA and SDO Separately  
To test the conditional indirect effects of diversity on PVV-support via 
political cynicism and trust, we conducted four bootstrap analyses (5,000 bootstrap 
samples) using Hayes’ Process macro (2013, Model 7) in which the associations 
between the predictor (either objective or perceived diversity) and both mediators 
(political cynicism and trust) were moderated by RWA (Figure 1) or SDO (Figure 
2). The model tests revealed that the indirect associations of diversity with PVV-
support through political cynicism were only significant for those high in RWA, not 
for low authoritarians (Table 3; Figures 1a and 1b).  
The indirect associations of diversity with PVV-support through political 
trust were not significant, neither for high nor for low authoritarians. Similarly, the 
model tests revealed that the indirect associations of diversity with PVV-support 
through political cynicism were only significant for those high in SDO (Table 3; 
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Figures 2a and 2b). The indirect associations of diversity with PVV-support through 
political trust were not significant for people both high and low in SDO. 
 
Table 3. Standardized and unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) 
of indirect effects of objective or perceived diversity on populist party support via political 
cynicism and political trust at high and low levels of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) or 
social dominance orientation (SDO) 
 
  
Indirect Effect via  
Political Cynicism 
Indirect Effect via  
Political Trust 
  β b (CI95) β b (CI95) 
Objective Diversity  
For low RWA -.02 
-0.34 
(-1.53; 0.50) 
.00 
-0.02 
(-0.45; 0.15) 
For high RWA .05* 
0.85 
(0.13; 2.02) 
.01 
0.16 
(-0.31; 0.92) 
Objective Diversity 
For low SDO -.02 
-0.34 
 (-1.20; 0.32) 
.00 
-0.02 
(-0.45; 0.15) 
For high SDO .03* 
0.65 
(0.06; 1.69) 
.01 
0.16 
(-0.31; 0.92) 
Perceived Diversity  
For low RWA -.03 
-0.05 
(-0.09; 0.02) 
.00 
0.00 
(-0.04; 0.01) 
For high RWA .06** 
0.08 
(0.03; 0.18) 
.01 
0.01 
(-0.04; 0.09) 
Perceived Diversity  
For low SDO .00 
0.00 
(-0.06; 0.06) 
.00 
0.01 
(-0.01; 0.05) 
For high SDO .03* 
0.05 
(0.01; 0.12) 
.01 
0.02 
(-0.01; 0.07) 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
 
Moderated Mediation Analyses: RWA and SDO Simultaneously  
Interestingly, two final models (one for objective and one for perceived 
diversity) considering both RWA and SDO as moderators simultaneously (Hayes, 
2013; Model 9) indicated that only RWA was a unique moderator for the diversity 
effects.  
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Finally, as expected, political cynicism (all βs > 0.25, all ts > 3.45, all ps < 
.001), but not political trust (all βs < -0.09, all ts < -1.54, all ps > .12), further related 
to more PVV-support in all six moderated mediation models. Hence, when included 
together, only political cynicism turned out to be a unique predictor of right-populist 
party support.
3
 
 
Figure 1. Standardized results of the models testing the associations of objective diversity 
(1a, left panel) and perceived diversity (1b, right panel), with populist party support via 
political cynicism and trust, at high and low levels of RWA 
 
  
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
 
Figure 2. Standardized results of the models testing the associations of objective diversity 
(2a, left panel) and perceived diversity (2b, right panel), with populist party support via 
political cynicism and trust, at high and low levels of SDO 
 
 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
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Discussion 
The current research focused on psychological and socio-structural factors 
that are thought to play a fundamental role in individuals’ views on politics and 
politicians. Building on previous findings, our primary objective was to delineate the 
interplay between neighborhood ethnic diversity and social-ideological attitudes to 
predict right-populist party support via political cynicism and trust.  
The Political Correlates of Diversity  
Corroborating our expectations, our analyses revealed positive associations 
between diversity and political cynicism and negative associations between diversity 
and trust (Hypothesis 1) which, importantly, were dependent upon individual 
differences. Indeed, we found that, exclusively among those who held right-wing 
attitudes, diversity was related to lower political trust and greater cynicism 
(Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, political cynicism, but not political trust, was in turn 
uniquely predictive of more right-populist party support (Hypothesis 2).  
Hence, these results indicate that, although diversity does not inevitably 
relate to support for populist, anti-establishment parties, the combination with pre-
existing social-ideological attitudes seems to produce a potent cocktail for political 
cynicism and stronger support for right-populist parties. These findings add to the 
growing insight in the differential effects of diversity for people low versus high in 
right-wing social-ideological attitudes, which is commonly explained in terms of the 
latter individuals being most sensitive to the perceived cultural threat posed by 
diversity (e.g., Sibley et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2014; 2016). 
The moderation effects were always significant for authoritarianism and 
often non-significant for SDO (Hypothesis 4).
4
 Previous studies already showed 
differences between RWA and SDO in their moderating effects (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2010), and our findings align with the rationale that ethnic diversity particularly 
threatens authoritarians’ underlying motivation to maintain social order and security, 
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but it is less relevant for social dominators’ motivation to maintain social hierarchy 
(see also Sibley et al., 2013). 
The Future of Diversity Studies 
With the rise of ethnic diversity in Western-European communities, the 
question of whether and how this diversity affects social and political life has 
become an increasingly prominent and contested topic of academic and political 
debate. Since Putnam’s article (2007), over 90 studies have investigated the 
association between diversity and societal mistrust (Schaeffer, 2014; van der Meer & 
Tolsma, 2014). However, in addition to pointing out the key role of individual 
differences in this association, the present results also demonstrated that cynicism 
may be a relevant variable to include when studying the political repercussions of 
diversity. Indeed, diversity showed similar relations with political cynicism and trust 
among right-wing individuals, but only political cynicism further explained the 
relation between diversity and right-populist party support in these individuals.  
In response to (perceived) growing local minority proportions, right-wing 
individuals might thus act upon their feelings of cynicism by casting a populist vote. 
Future studies investigating the consequences of diversity would therefore benefit 
from including political cynicism in addition to trust, especially when focusing on 
political party support. Such studies could also explore the longitudinal and 
potentially bidirectional associations between populist party support and political 
attitudes over time.  
An important merit of the present study is the inclusion of both the actual 
and the perceived diversity within the respondents’ direct environment. Indeed, the 
similar patterns of results for objective and perceived diversity refute alternative 
interpretations in terms of biased or extreme responding that may apply to studies 
only measuring perceived diversity.  
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Moreover, our interaction approach of simultaneously taking into account 
psychological and socio-structural variables in the prediction of political phenomena 
aligns with Pettigrew’s (1991) call for a ‘contextual social psychology’. As such, 
this study offers an empirically substantiated view on the additive and interactive 
influence of contextual differences in ethnic diversity and individual differences in 
social-ideological attitudes on relevant contemporary topics such as political 
cynicism, trust, and right-populist party support. Nevertheless, it remains relatively 
unknown how our findings generalize to other political contexts, particularly in 
those rare countries where left-populist parties gain a substantial share of votes (e.g., 
Greece). In such countries, it would be possible to examine the tentative hypothesis 
that diversity relates to more left-populist support, perhaps especially among people 
scoring low on authoritarianism. 
Conclusion 
The present study shows that bringing together hitherto dissociated research 
lines into one coherent political-psychological model provides a valuable 
perspective to understand the mechanisms through which high levels of ethnic 
diversity may push citizens with right-wing social-ideological attitudes to support 
populist and anti-establishment political agendas.  
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Notes 
1 Power analyses, conducted with the ‘pwr’ package (Champely, Ekstrom, Dalgaard, 
Gill, & De Rosario, 2015) in R (version 3.3.1; R Core Team, 2015), 
indicated that we needed a sample of at least 612 participants in order to 
obtain a power of approximately 95% to detect a small-to-medium sized 
interaction effect. The dataset was collected through an independent ISO 
26362-certified survey company as a part of a larger multi-wave panel 
study. We analyzed data from the second wave, which specifically tapped 
into political attitudes. From every zip code region, at least five respondents 
were recruited, providing us with a heterogeneous sample of adults from all 
regions in the Netherlands. A zip code region in the Netherlands is 
comprised of all zip codes that share the first two digits (for example: zip 
code region one consists of all zip codes between 1000 and 1099, zip code 
region two consists of all zip codes between 1100 and 1199, …, zip-code 
region 90 consists of all zip codes between 9900 and 9999). A zip code 
region covers about 82 square kilometers.  
2 
In order to check the distinctiveness of political cynicism and political trust, we 
conducted a principal component analysis with direct oblimin rotation 
including the items of both scales. The pattern matrix clearly showed two 
factors, with each item loading primarily on its specific factor (Appendix B; 
see also Pattyn et al., 2012). Moreover, further analyses indicated that there 
were no multicollinearity issues (all VIFs < 2.84). 
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3 
Running the analyses with age, gender, education, and income level as control 
variables yielded similar results. Additionally, a test of a model investigating 
the conditional effects of objective diversity on perceived diversity revealed 
that the strong and positive associations between objective and perceived 
diversity were especially pronounced among individuals with high RWA 
and SDO levels. Detailed results of these additional analyses are available in 
Appendix C. 
4
 Notably, although the interaction effects with RWA were significant and those with 
SDO were not, the interaction effects themselves were not significantly 
different from each other. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
66 
References 
Agger, R. E., Goldstein, M. N., & Pearl, S. A. (1961). Political cynicism: 
Measurement and meaning. The Journal of Politics, 23, 477-506. 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting 
interactions. London: Sage. 
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. Winnipeg: University of 
Manitoba Press. 
Asbrock, F., & Kauff, M. (2015). Authoritarian disbeliefs in diversity. Journal of 
Social Psychology, 155, 553-558. 
Bergh, J. (2004). Protest voting in Austria, Denmark, and Norway. Scandinavian 
Political Studies, 27, 367-389. 
Champely, S., Ekstrom, C., Dalgaard, P., Gill, J., Wunder, J., & De Rosario, H. 
(2015). Basic Functions for Power Analysis. Retrieved from: 
<https://cran.rproject.org/web/packages/pwr/pwr.pdf> 
Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and 
prejudice. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology 
(Vol. 33, pp. 41-113). New York: Academic Press. 
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). Personality, Ideology, Prejudice, and Politics: A 
Dual‐Process Motivational Model. Journal of Personality, 78(6), 1861-1894. 
Eisinger, P. (2000). The politics of bread and circuses: Building the city for the 
visitor class. Urban Affairs Review, 35(3), 316-333. 
Fasel, N., Green, E. G., & Sarrasin, O. (2013). Facing cultural diversity. European 
Psychologist, 18(4), 253-262. 
Funke, F. (2005). The dimensionality of right-wing authoritarianism: Lessons from 
the dilemma between theory and measurement. Political Psychology, 26, 
195-218. 
THE POLITICAL CORRELATES OF DIVERSITY 
 
67 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). An introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional 
process analysis: A regression-based approach. New York: Guilford Press. 
Hewstone, M. (2015). Consequences of diversity for social cohesion and prejudice: 
The missing dimension of intergroup contact. Journal of Social 
Issues, 71(2), 417-438. 
Kauff, M., Asbrock, F., Thörner, S., & Wagner, U. (2013). Side Effects of 
Multiculturalism The Interaction Effect of a Multicultural Ideology and 
Authoritarianism on Prejudice and Diversity Beliefs. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 39, 305–320. 
Kessler, T., & Cohrs, J. C. (2008). The evolution of authoritarian processes: 
Fostering cooperation in large-scale groups. Group Dynamics: Theory, 
Research, and Practice, 12(1), 73-84. 
Koopmans, R., & Muis, J. (2009). The rise of right‐wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the 
Netherlands: A discursive opportunity approach. European Journal of 
Political Research, 48(5), 642-664. 
Koopmans, R., & Schaeffer, M. (2016). Statistical and perceived diversity and their 
impacts on neighborhood social cohesion in Germany, France and the 
Netherlands. Social Indicators Research, 125(3), 853-883. 
McClosky, H., & Chong, D. (1985). Similarities and differences between left-wing 
and right-wing radicals. British Journal of Political Science, 15(03), 329-
363. 
Pattyn, S., Van Hiel, A., Dhont, K., & Onraet, E. (2012). Stripping the political 
cynic: A psychological exploration of the concept of political 
cynicism. European Journal of Personality, 26(6), 566-579. 
Pettigrew, T. F. (1991). Normative theory in intergroup relations: Explaining both 
harmony and conflict. Psychology and Developing Societies, 3, 3-16.  
Chapter 3 
 
68 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance 
orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741-763. 
Putnam, R. D. (2007). E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty‐first 
century: the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. Scandinavian Political 
Studies, 30, 137-174. 
Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right‐wing 
voting in six West European countries. European Journal of Political 
Research, 47(6), 737-765. 
Schaeffer, M. (2014). Ethnic diversity and social cohesion: Immigration, ethnic 
fractionalization and potentials for civic action. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., Tov, A. Y., & Schmidt, P. (2004). Population size, 
perceived threat and exclusion: a multiple-indicators analysis of attitudes 
toward foreigners in Germany. Social Science Research, 33, 681-701. 
Sibley, C. G., Duckitt, J., Bergh, R., Osborne, D., Perry, R., Asbrock, F., Barlow, F. 
K., Robertson, A., Armstrong, G., & Wilson, M. S. (2013). A dual process 
model of attitudes towards immigration: Person× residential area effects in a 
national sample. Political Psychology, 34, 553 -572. 
Stolle, D., Soroka, S., & Johnston, R. (2008). When does diversity erode trust? 
Neighborhood diversity, interpersonal trust and the mediating effect of 
social interactions. Political Studies, 56, 57-75. 
Van Assche, J., Roets, A., Dhont, K., & Van Hiel, A. (2014). Diversity and out-
group attitudes in the Netherlands: The role of authoritarianism and social 
threat in the neighbourhood. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(9), 
1414-1430. 
 
THE POLITICAL CORRELATES OF DIVERSITY 
 
69 
Van Assche, J., Roets, A., Dhont, K., & Van Hiel, A. (2016). The association 
between actual and perceived ethnic diversity: The moderating role of 
authoritarianism and implications for outgroup threat, anxiety, and mistrust. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 807-817. 
van der Meer, T., & Tolsma, J. (2014). Ethnic diversity and its effects on social 
cohesion. Annual Review of Sociology, 40, 459-478.  
Chapter 3 
 
70 
Supplementary Materials 
 
Appendix A. Additional Sample Information 
Demographics.  
Males were slightly overrepresented (49.00% in our sample was female 
versus 50.49% in the general population). As for age, younger adults were slightly 
underrepresented. In our sample, 8.60% was between 18 and 24 years old (versus 
12.07% between 15 and 24 in the general population), 45.80% was between 25 and 
54 years old (versus 39.52% in general), 18.00% was between 55 and 64 years old 
(versus 13.28% in general), and 19.60% was older than 65 (versus 18.73% in 
general).  
Further, thirty-five percent of the participants had completed primary school, 
40% had completed high school and 24% had a college or university degree. Annual 
gross household income showed a fairly normal distribution, with 6% earning less 
than €11,000, 13% between €11,000 and €23,000, 23% between €23,000 and 
€34,000, 22% between €34,000 and €56,000, and 12% earned more than €56,000. 
Twenty-four percent of the respondents chose the option “I do not want to disclose 
this information”. Finally, 47% of the participants was Christian, 41% did not have a 
religious denomination, 5% was atheist, 2% was agnostic, and 4% categorized 
themselves as belonging to an ‘other religion’. 
Preliminary Analyses.  
We estimated empty (intercept-only) models, which provide insight in the 
variances in our outcomes at the individual and contextual level. We also assessed 
the intraclass correlations (ICCs) to explore if there was substantial between-level 
variance, which would warrant the use of multilevel modeling.  
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Taking into account the higher-level structure did not improve the goodness-
of-fit statistics of each model significantly (i.e., changes in -2 * log-likelihood were 
χ²(1) = 0.00, p > .250 and χ²(1) = 0.00, p > .250 for the mediators political cynicism 
and trust, and χ²(1) = 3.31, p = .079 for the outcome PVV-support, respectively). 
Additionally, the ICC’s were small in size (0.00 for political cynicism, 0.01 for trust, 
and 0.09 for PVV-support). 
 
Appendix B. Pattern Matrix Coefficients among Cynicism and Trust Items  
 
Item 
Factor 1: 
Cynicism 
Factor 2:  
Trust 
Almost all politicians will sell out their ideals or break their promises if it will 
increase their power 
.79  
Politicians pretend to care more about people than they really do .78  
Politicians primarily act out of self-interest .77  
No man can hope to stay honest once he enters politics .76  
Politicians are only interested in getting and maintaining power .75  
Our political leaders are prepared to lie to us whenever it suits their purposes .70  
If a politician sticks to his ideals and principles, he is unlikely to reach the top 
of his profession 
.68  
All politicians are bad – some are just worse than others .65  
People are very frequently manipulated by politicians .48  
Corruption is a serious issue in our political system .39 .30 
It is often possible to trust politicians with a restful heart  .86 
Most politicians are confident without having to be much controlled  .83 
In general, one can rely on politicians to do the right thing  .83 
Most politicians are honest and in no way corrupt  .78 
Politicians put the interests of the people over the interests of their own party  .77 
Politicians usually have good intentions  .77 
When politicians make statements on television or other media, they usually 
tell the truth 
 .70 
I have good faith in the political system  .67 
Politicians usually try to keep the promises they made during the elections  .66 
Most politicians care about their constituencies  .65 
Note: Factor coefficients are shown only if > 0.30. Cross-loadings in italics. 
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Appendix C. Additional Analyses (Table A, Table B, and Table C) 
 
Table A. Unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) of regression 
analyses controlling for age, gender, education, and income level 
 
 
Political Cynicism Political Trust Populist Party Support 
 
b (CI95) b (CI95) b (CI95) 
Objective Diversity (OD) 
0.38 
(-0.23; 0.98) 
-0.51a 
(-1.10; 0.08) 
1.80* 
(0.20; 3.41) 
RWA 
0.13** 
(0.04; 0.22) 
-0.10* 
(-0.19; -0.01) 
1.10*** 
(0.86; 1.33) 
OD X RWA 
0.82* 
(0.01; 1.64) 
-0.61a 
(-1.41; 0.09) 
2.74** 
(0.71; 4.77) 
OD effect for low RWA 
-0.25 
(-1.10; 0.59) 
-0.05 
(-0.87; 0.78) 
-0.37 
(-2.70; 1.97) 
OD effect for high RWA 
1.01* 
(0.11; 1.90) 
-0.98* 
(-1.85; -0.18) 
3.97*** 
(1.76; 6.17) 
Perceived Diversity (PD) 
0.03 
(-0.01; 0.08) 
-0.06* 
(-0.10; -0.01) 
0.18** 
(0.05; 0.32) 
RWA 
0.12** 
(0.03; 0.21) 
-0.09* 
(-0.17; 0.00) 
0.95*** 
(0.68; 1.23) 
PD X RWA 
0.09** 
(0.03; 0.15) 
-0.08** 
(-0.14; -0.02) 
0.23** 
(0.05; 0.41) 
PD effect for low RWA 
-0.04 
(-0.10; 0.03) 
0.01 
(-0.06; 0.07) 
0.00 
(-0.21; 0.22) 
PD effect for high RWA 
0.10*** 
(0.04; 0.16) 
-0.12*** 
(-0.17; -0.06) 
0.37*** 
(0.19; 0.54) 
Objective Diversity (OD) 
0.17 
(-0.37; 0.72) 
-0.32 
(-0.85; 0.21) 
1.58a 
(-0.10; 3.27) 
SDO 
0.09** 
(0.04; 0.15) 
-0.05* 
(-0.11; 0.00) 
0.58*** 
(0.40; 0.75) 
OD X SDO 
0.46a 
(-0.06; 0.99) 
-0.07 
(-0.58; 0.44) 
0.74 
(-0.81; 2.30) 
OD effect for low SDO 
-0.32 
(-1.06; 0.42) 
-0.25 
(-1.04; 0.55) 
0.79 
(-1.46; 3.04) 
OD effect for high SDO 
0.66a 
(-0.15; 1.48) 
-0.40 
(-1.12; 0.32) 
2.38a 
(-0.11; 4.87) 
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Perceived Diversity (PD) 
0.04a 
(-0.01; 0.08) 
-0.04a 
(-0.11; 0.01) 
0.15* 
(0.02; 0.28) 
SDO 
0.09** 
(0.03; 0.15) 
-0.05* 
(-0.08; 0.00) 
0.56*** 
(0.39; 0.73) 
PD X SDO 
0.02 
(-0.02; 0.06) 
0.00 
(-0.04; 0.03) 
0.07 
(-0.04; 0.19) 
PD effect for low SDO 
0.02 
(-0.04; 0.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.10; 0.02) 
0.07 
(-0.11; 0.25) 
PD effect for high SDO 
0.06* 
(0.00; 0.12) 
-0.05a 
(-0.10; 0.01) 
0.23** 
(0.06; 0.40) 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
 
 
Table B. Unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) of indirect effects 
of objective or perceived diversity on populist party support via political cynicism and 
political trust at high and low levels of RWA or SDO, controlling for age, gender, education, 
and income level 
 
  
Indirect Effect 
via Political Cynicism 
Indirect Effect 
via Political Trust 
  b (CI95) b (CI95) 
Objective Diversity  
For low RWA 
-0.09 
(-1.02; 0.48) 
0.04 
(-0.35; 0.63) 
For high RWA 
0.58* 
(0.04; 1.70) 
0.19 
(-0.01; 1.59) 
Objective Diversity 
For low SDO 
-0.19 
(-0.94; 0.32) 
0.08 
(-0.14; 0.74) 
For high SDO 
0.43a 
(-0.01; 1.30) 
0.11 
(-0.09; 0.75) 
Perceived Diversity  
For low RWA 
-0.01 
(-0.07; 0.02) 
0.00 
(-0.04; 0.02) 
For high RWA 
0.05** 
(0.02; 0.12) 
0.03 
(-0.01; 0.09) 
Perceived Diversity  
For low SDO 
0.01 
(-0.03; 0.06) 
0.01 
(-0.01; 0.06) 
For high SDO 
0.04* 
(0.01; 0.10) 
0.02 
(-0.01; 0.07) 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
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Table C. Unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) of regression 
analyses for perceived diversity 
 
 RWA 
as moderator 
SDO 
as moderator 
 
 
b (CI95) b (CI95) 
 
Objective Diversity (OD) 
7.73*** 
(6.80; 8.67) 
7.84*** 
(6.90; 8.79) 
 
Social-Ideological Attitude (SIA) 
0.09 
(-0.04; 0.23) 
0.10* 
(0.00; 0.20) 
 
OD X SIA 
1.97** 
(0.01; 1.64) 
0.66 
(-0.25; 1.58) 
 
OD effect for low SIA 
6.21*** 
(4.82; 7.60) 
7.14*** 
(5.85; 8.43) 
 
OD effect for high SIA 
9.26*** 
(7.95; 10.57) 
8.55*** 
(7.13; 9.97) 
 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
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Chapter 4  
 
The association between actual and perceived 
ethnic diversity: The moderating role of 
authoritarianism and implications for outgroup 
threat, anxiety, and mistrust 
 
Abstract 
The present study investigated the role of authoritarianism in the association 
between the actual proportion of ethnic minorities (objective diversity) within a 
neighborhood and majority members' subjective perception thereof (perceived 
diversity). Additionally, we tested how authoritarianism affects the direct and 
indirect relationships between objective diversity and outgroup threat, anxiety, and 
mistrust. Analyses in a nationally stratified sample of Dutch citizens (N = 848) 
without migration background from 706 different neighborhoods showed that higher 
levels of authoritarianism have a dual effect on the relationship between objective 
diversity and negativity towards outgroups. In particular, authoritarianism (i) boosts 
the indirect relationship between objective diversity and greater outgroup negativity 
through perceived diversity, and (ii) curbs the direct association of objective 
diversity with reduced outgroup negativity. These findings shed light on how 
majority members with different levels of authoritarianism differentially perceive 
diversity in their neighborhood, and how this relates to their responses to ethnic 
minorities. 
 
This chapter is based on Van Assche, J., Roets, A., Dhont, K., & Van Hiel, A. (2016). The 
association between actual and perceived ethnic diversity: The moderating role of 
authoritarianism and implications for outgroup threat, anxiety, and mistrust. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 46(7), 807-817. 
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Introduction 
Due to incoming migration, Western European societies are becoming more 
and more ethnically and culturally diverse. This rise in diversity has received ample 
media coverage, and has moved to the forefront of scholarly debate (Hewstone, 
2015). As a result, a growing body of research has investigated the associations 
between diversity and several relevant intergroup outcomes, focusing on variables 
such as trust (e.g., Putnam, 2007; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; Uslaner, 
2012; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014), social capital (e.g., Laurence, 2009; Letki, 
2008), and prejudice (e.g., Pettigrew, Wagner, & Christ, 2010; Quillian, 1995; Van 
Assche, Roets, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014).  
Despite this recent scholarly attention to diversity, studies have remained 
largely silent about the association between the actual proportion of ethnic 
minorities within a specific area and residents’ subjective perception of this 
diversity. Yet, the perception of diversity likely plays a crucial role in the 
relationships between actual diversity and people’s responses to outgroups. Indeed, 
several studies (e.g., Semyonov, Raijman, Tov, & Schmidt, 2004; Hooghe & De 
Vroome, 2013) reported stronger effects of perceived diversity compared to 
objective diversity on intergroup attitudes. Moreover, the perception of diversity is 
likely to depend not only on the actual proportion of immigrants, but also on the 
characteristics of the perceiver.  
Recent studies have demonstrated a moderating role of authoritarianism in 
the relationship between (objective and perceived) diversity and outgroup attitudes 
(e.g., Kauff, Asbrock, Thorner, & Wagner, 2013; Van Assche et al., 2014). In the 
present study, we investigate whether people relatively high vs. low in 
authoritarianism systematically differ in their perceptions of neighborhood diversity, 
and whether these perceptions correspond with the actual diversity in their 
neighborhood to different degrees. If this were the case, these differential relations 
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between objective and perceived diversity may, in turn, result in a different impact 
of diversity on feelings of outgroup threat, anxiety, and mistrust for those high 
versus low in authoritarianism. 
Diversity: Conflict and Contact Theories  
Several theoretical models have been proposed concerning how diversity 
may affect intergroup attitudes. A first important framework can be referred to as 
conflict theories, which encompasses ethnic competition theory (Blumer, 1958; 
Bobo & Hutchings, 1996) and group threat theory (Quillian, 1995). These theories 
propose that higher proportions of ethnic minorities in a community are associated 
with heightened feelings of outgroup threat (Semyonov & Glikman, 2009), and more 
negative feelings towards minorities (e.g., Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; 
Schneider, 2008). In this respect, scholars have suggested that diversity “erodes” 
social capital and outgroup trust (e.g., Alesina & Ferrara, 2002; Laurence, 2009; 
Putnam, 2007). Furthermore, Koopmans and Veit (2014) found that experimental 
primes of neighborhood ethnic diversity caused lower levels of trust in neighbors 
among majority group members.  
However, a second perspective, grounded in intergroup contact theory 
(Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006) offers a more optimistic outlook, arguing that diverse neighborhoods may 
provide more opportunities for positive contact with individuals from other social 
groups. Diversity therefore has the potential to reduce outgroup anxiety and threat, 
and to boost empathy and positive outgroup attitudes (see, Wagner, Christ, 
Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006; Wagner, Van Dick, Pettigrew, & Christ, 
2003). In line with this perspective, Kunovich and Hodson (2002) showed that 
higher diversity was related to decreased prejudice levels in former Yugoslavia, and 
Oliver and Wong (2003) found a similar positive association between diversity and 
positive outgroup perceptions in U.S. neighborhoods.  
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Obviously, conflict and contact theories differ in their predictions 
concerning diversity, with the former framework stressing the negative 
consequences, whereas the latter theory emphasizes the positive outcomes (cf., the 
“population ratio paradox”, Pettigrew et al., 2010). Recently, various scholars 
integrated both theoretical frameworks (e.g., Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma, & 
Hagendoorn, 2011; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; Schlueter & Wagner, 2008; 
Schmid et al., 2014). For example, Schmid and colleagues (2014) tested the 
diversity-trust association in the United Kingdom and demonstrated that diversity as 
such had no substantial overall effects on outgroup trust and outgroup attitudes, 
because the positive effect of higher intergroup contact and the negative effect of 
higher threat cancelled each other out. These opposing processes may thus explain 
why many studies reported non-significant overall effects of diversity on societal 
outcomes, such as social cohesion (Gijsberts, van der Meer, & Dagevos, 2012; 
Tolsma, van der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009), ethnic polarization (Evans & Need, 
2002), outgroup trust (van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014), anti-immigrant attitudes 
(Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin, 2010; Hjerm, 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2011; Schlueter & 
Scheepers, 2010; Schlueter & Wagner, 2008), and even specific expressions of 
prejudice, such as opposition to antiracism laws (Sarrasin et al., 2012).  
The Potential Role of Individual Differences in Authoritarianism  
Diversity not only instills distinct processes related to threat and contact, but 
its effects also seem to depend on the characteristics of the perceiver. In this regard, 
Van Assche and colleagues (2014; see also Kauff et al., 2013) proposed a key role 
for Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981, 1988), which is defined 
as the covariation of a) strict adherence to conventional norms and values 
(conventionalism), b) uncritical subjection to authority (authoritarian submission), 
and c) feelings of aggression towards norm violators (authoritarian aggression).  
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Ever since Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford’s (1950) 
seminal work, authoritarianism has been considered as an important predictor of 
outgroup attitudes, and recent studies have shown that it also shapes diversity beliefs 
(Asbrock & Kauff, 2015) and reactions to multicultural policies (Kauff et al., 2013). 
Moreover, Van Assche and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that 
authoritarianism moderates the relationship between diversity and majority 
members’ attitudes towards ethnic minorities. Specifically, while neither perceived 
nor objective diversity had an overall, direct effect on outgroup attitudes, they both 
were associated with less positive attitudes towards immigrants among high 
authoritarian majority members, but with more positive attitudes among low 
authoritarian individuals. Other studies used constructs that are closely related to 
authoritarianism and found similar moderation effects. In particular, individuals 
living in diverse environments who also endorse dangerous worldviews (Sibley et 
al., 2013) or conformity values (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013) typically hold more 
negative attitudes towards minorities (or minority symbols) than those who do not 
hold such worldviews or values.  
Towards a Mediated Moderation Model  
In addition to the observation that different people react differently to 
diversity, previous research has also shown that there is meaningful variation in 
people’s estimates of diversity in their environment. Although some studies revealed 
moderate to strong correlations between actual diversity and rating scales tapping 
into perceived diversity (Pettigrew et al., 2010; Van Assche et al., 2014), other 
studies showed weak to moderate correlations between actual figures and perceived 
estimates of diversity (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2004; Hooghe & De Vroome, 2013). 
People’s accuracy in making such estimates thus seems less than perfect and there is 
also meaningful individual variation in the sensitivity to detect diversity (Stolle, 
Soroka, & Johnston, 2008).  
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Such sensitivity differences may arise because some individuals are more 
vigilant of minority group members. Deviant or threatening stimuli are known to 
elicit attention (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & 
Royzmann, 2001; Trawalter, Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008) and especially people 
high in authoritarianism tend to perceive ethnic minorities as different, deviant in 
terms of norms and values, and therefore threatening (e.g., Ford, 2011; Green et al., 
2010; Kauff et al. 2013). Hence, we hypothesize that an individual’s level of 
authoritarianism will affect the association between the actual proportion of ethnic 
minorities in the neighborhood and the perception of this diversity.  
Putting together these different pieces of the literature, we argue that, for a 
more complete understanding of the association between diversity and outgroup 
negativity, it is important to investigate actual minority size as well as perceived 
ethnic diversity and to take into account the relationship between actual and 
perceived diversity. Moreover, one should acknowledge that characteristics of the 
individual, in particular differences in authoritarianism, can influence this 
relationship between actual and perceived diversity, as well as the relationship 
between diversity and outgroup negativity.  
A better understanding of how (i.e., mediating processes) and for whom 
(i.e., individual differences moderators) diversity is harmful or beneficial for these 
intergroup outcomes, has recently been identified as one of the core future avenues 
for social psychological research on intergroup relations (Hodson & Dhont, 2015). 
We thus hypothesize that authoritarianism plays a moderating role in a) the 
association of actual diversity with outgroup negativity, and b) the association of 
perceived diversity with outgroup negativity (see Van Assche et al., 2014), but also 
in c) the relationship between objective and perceived diversity itself.  
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This perspective yields the conceptual model depicted in Figure 1 in which 
the relation between objective minority proportion and outgroup negativity (i.e., 
feelings of threat, anxiety, and mistrust in the present study) is mediated by 
perceptions of diversity, with the strength of each of these relationships potentially 
moderated by right-wing authoritarianism. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of the associations between diversity, authoritarianism, and 
outgroup negativity 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
We used a nationally stratified sample of citizens (N = 848, response rate 
71.62%) without migration background from 706 different neighborhoods across the 
Netherlands. This dataset was collected online in 2010 through an independent 
survey company as a part of a larger multi-wave panel study. All respondents 
completed all relevant questionnaire items, yielding no missing data. At least one 
person from every zip code region
1
 in the Netherlands was recruited. The mean age 
of the sample was 49 years (SD = 15.12) and 51% were men. Thirty-seven percent 
of the participants had completed primary school, 38% had completed high school 
and 25% had a college or university degree.  
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Annual gross household income showed a fairly normal distribution, with 
6% earning less than €11,000, 14% between €11,000 and €23,000, 25% between 
€23,000 and €34,000, 22% between €34,000 and €56,000, and 11% earned more 
than €56,000. Twenty-two percent of the respondents chose the option “I do not 
want to disclose this information”.  
Measures  
Objective Diversity.  
We assessed the percentage of non-Western minority members within a 
specific neighborhood (i.e., zip code) as an objective indicator of diversity within the 
year of data collection (see also Van Assche et al., 2014). We used the available data 
from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2010), indicating the number of 
individuals per zip code of non-Western origin
2
 and calculated the percentage as a 
function of the total number of registered inhabitants per zip code to get a measure 
of relative objective diversity (M = 11.01%, SD = 11.28, MIN = 0.00%, MAX = 
72.74%).  
Perceived Diversity. 
 We used two items to assess subjectively perceived diversity in one’s direct 
environment (see also Semyonov et al., 2004). These items read ‘How many people 
from immigrant origin live in your municipality/city?’ and ‘How many people from 
immigrant origin live in your street?’. Respondents answered using seven-point 
rating scales ranging from one (none) to seven (a lot). Both items were strongly 
positively related (r = .58, p < .001), yielding a scale with M = 3.44 (SD = 1.49).  
Right-wing Authoritarianism.  
The 12-item RWA3D-scale of Funke (2005) was administered on seven-
point Likert scales anchored by one (totally disagree) and seven (totally agree). A 
sample item is ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues 
children should learn’. Cronbach’s alpha was .70, with M = 3.93 (SD = 0.79).  
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Outgroup Threat.  
Outgroup threat was measured with three items (Stephan et al., 2002; see 
also Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011) tapping into perceived realistic threat posed by 
immigrants for the Dutch economy and the employment of native Dutch people. 
These items read ‘In our country, people from immigrant origin have more 
economic power than they deserve’, ‘People from immigrant origin make it harder 
for Dutch natives to find a good job’, and ‘The presence of people from immigrant 
origin in our country has a negative impact on the Dutch economy’. Respondents 
answered using seven-point Likert scales ranging from one (totally disagree) to 
seven (totally agree). Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .85, with M = 3.73 (SD = 
1.48).  
Intergroup Anxiety.  
We used a 4-item abridged version (Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011) of 
Stephan and Stephan’s (1985) 11-item intergroup anxiety scale (see also Turner, 
Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008; Turner, Dhont, Hewstone, Prestwich, & 
Vonofakou, 2014). Participants were asked to think about a situation where they 
would interact with people from immigrant origin. Next, they were asked to what 
extent they would feel ‘anxious’, ‘insecure’, ‘afraid’, and ‘scared’. Respondents 
answered using seven-point scales ranging from one (certainly not) to seven 
(certainly). Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .94, with M = 2.57 (SD = 1.44).  
Outgroup Mistrust.  
The measure for mistrust consisted of eight items (see also Dhont & Van 
Hiel, 2011). An example item reads ‘If there are people from immigrant origin 
around me, I usually do not trust them’. Respondents answered using seven-point 
Likert scales ranging from one (totally disagree) to seven (totally agree). 
Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .90, with M = 3.67 (SD = 1.12).  
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses  
Our data were theoretically nested (i.e., individuals were nested within zip 
codes), although 78% of the respondents in our sample had a unique zip code (N = 
661). Therefore, we first investigated whether multilevel analyses were warranted 
for all or some of our variables. We estimated empty (intercept-only) models, which 
provide insight into the variances in our outcomes at the individual and contextual 
levels. We also assessed the intraclass correlations (ICCs) to explore if there was 
substantial between-level variance in the scores of our outcome variables, which 
would warrant the use of multilevel modeling.  
Taking into account the higher-level structure for threat, anxiety, and 
mistrust did not significantly improve the goodness-of-fit statistics of each model 
(i.e., changes in -2 * log-likelihood were χ²(1) = 1.17, p = .28 for threat; χ²(1) = 0.00, 
p = .99 for anxiety; and χ²(1) = 1.48, p = .22 for mistrust). Additionally, all ICC’s 
were very small (ranging from .00 to .07). However, taking into account the higher-
level structure for perceived diversity (i.e., the mediator) significantly improved the 
goodness-of-fit (i.e., the change in -2 * log-likelihood was χ²(1) = 28.20, p < .001). 
Also the ICC of .41 indicated that there was substantial between-level variance in 
perceived diversity. Therefore, for specific analyses with perceived diversity as the 
outcome variable, we used multilevel analyses.
3
  
Next, the bivariate correlations among all study variables were calculated 
(see Table 1). Objective and subjective diversity were highly positively interrelated. 
Objective diversity was weakly negatively related to RWA but not to the outcome 
variables, while perceived diversity was positively related to all three outcome 
variables. Also, moderate to high positive correlations were found between 
authoritarianism and all outgroup outcomes. Finally, all outgroup outcomes were 
positively interrelated. 
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Table 1. Correlations among study variables 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.        Objective Diversity -      
2. Perceived Diversity .62*** -     
3. Right-Wing Authoritarianism -.08* .02 -    
4. Outgroup Threat -.04  .09*  .51***  -   
5. Intergroup Anxiety .02 .14*** .18*** .31*** -  
6. Outgroup Mistrust -.04 .08* .48*** .69*** .44*** - 
Note: *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 
Main Analyses  
Firstly, we conducted several hierarchical linear regression analyses to test 
the moderating role of authoritarianism in the relationships between each of the 
variables of interest: the predictor (objective diversity), the mediator (perceived 
diversity), and the outcomes (outgroup threat, anxiety, and mistrust). All predictors 
were centered before running the analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Table 2 
summarizes the results of these analyses. In line with our expectations, each of the 
three interaction effects were significant.  
Simple slope analyses revealed a) a stronger positive association between 
actual and perceived diversity among people high (β = .72, p < .001) vs. low (β = 
.55, p < .001) in authoritarianism
4
, b) positive associations between objective 
diversity and feelings of threat, anxiety, and mistrust among people high in 
authoritarianism (β = .09, p = .04; β = .12, p = .01; β = .09, p = .04; for threat 
anxiety, and mistrust, respectively) versus no significant associations among people 
low in authoritarianism (β = -.06, p = .15; β = -.04, p .40; β = -.06, p = .09; for threat 
anxiety, and mistrust, respectively), and c) positive associations between perceived 
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diversity and feelings of threat, anxiety, and mistrust among individuals high in 
authoritarianism (β = .13, p = .001; β = .22, p < .001; β = .13, p = .002; for threat 
anxiety, and mistrust, respectively) versus no significant associations among people 
low in authoritarianism (β = .01, p = .87; β = .04, p = .43; β = .01, p = .85; for threat 
anxiety, and mistrust, respectively).  
 
Table 2. Standardized estimates (βs) of hierarchical regression analyses on perceived 
diversity (multilevel), outgroup threat, intergroup anxiety, and outgroup mistrust 
 
 Perceived 
Diversity 
Outgroup 
Threat 
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
Outgroup 
Mistrust 
Objective Diversity (OD) .64***a .02 .04 .02 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) .07**a .51*** .18*** .48*** 
OD X RWA .09**a .08* .09* .08** 
R2 .43*** .27*** .04*** .24*** 
Perceived Diversity (PD)  .07* .13*** .07* 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)  .51*** .18*** .48*** 
PD X RWA  .06* .10** .06* 
R2  .27*** .06*** .24*** 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
a
 Standardized estimates for regression analyses on perceived diversity were 
calculated on the basis of multilevel unstandardized estimates. These were b = 8.40 (SE = 
0.36), p < .001 for objective diversity (OD), b = .13 (SE = 0.05), p = .009 for 
authoritarianism (RWA), and b = 1.44 (SE = 0.45), p = .002 for the OD x RWA interaction 
term. 
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Secondly, we tested whether perceived diversity accounts for the 
interactions between objective diversity and authoritarianism on outgroup negativity 
using the regression-based method of Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005; see Table 3). 
To test the hypothesized mediated moderation, three regression steps needed to be 
examined. Step 1 was already reported in Table 2 and included the predictor 
(objective diversity), the moderator (authoritarianism) and their interaction 
predicting each outcome. In Step 2, we added the mediator (perceived diversity) to 
the model, and in Step 3, the interaction between the mediator (perceived diversity) 
and the moderator (authoritarianism) was added. For all outcomes, the addition of 
perceived diversity in Step 2 significantly improved the model, while, at the same 
time, the interaction between objective diversity and authoritarianism remained 
significant.  
Interestingly, for all outcomes, adding the interaction between perceived 
diversity and authoritarianism in Step 3 did not produce additional explained 
variance, but the interaction between objective diversity and authoritarianism was no 
longer significant (see Table 3). Because a significant effect of the mediator on the 
outcome emerged, and the residual predictor X moderator interaction was reduced to 
non-significance, the requirements for mediated moderation were fulfilled. In sum, 
these analyses indicated that authoritarianism particularly acted as a moderator of 
the effects of objective diversity (the predictor) on both perceived diversity (the 
mediator) and the outcome variables, rather than moderating the effects of perceived 
diversity on only the outcome variables.  
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Therefore, to test the conditional indirect effects of objective diversity on the 
outcome variables via perceived diversity, we conducted bootstrap analyses (1000 
bootstrap samples) using Hayes’ Process macro (2013, default 1000 bootstrap 
samples) in which the association between the predictor (i.e., objective diversity) 
and the mediator (i.e., perceived diversity), as well as the associations between the 
predictor and the outcome variables (i.e. threat, anxiety, and mistrust) were 
moderated by authoritarianism (i.e., Model 8; Hayes, 2013; see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the tested mediated moderation model  
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Table 3. Standardized estimates (βs) of the hierarchical regression analyses on outgroup 
threat, intergroup anxiety, and outgroup mistrust  
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Outgroup Threat    
Objective Diversity (OD) .02 -.05 -.05 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) .51*** .50*** .50*** 
OD X RWA .08* .07* .05 
Perceived Diversity (PD)   .11** .11** 
PD X RWA   .04 
ΔR2 .27*** .01** .00 
Intergroup Anxiety    
Objective Diversity (OD) .04 -.07a -.08a 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) .18*** .17*** .17*** 
OD X RWA .09* .07* .02 
Perceived Diversity (PD)   .19*** .18*** 
PD X RWA   .08a 
ΔR2 .04*** .02*** .01a 
Outgroup Mistrust    
Objective Diversity (OD) .02 -.05 -.05 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) .48*** .47*** .47*** 
OD X RWA .08** .07* .06 
Perceived Diversity (PD)   .11** .11** 
PD X RWA   .02 
ΔR2 .24*** .01** .00 
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The model tests revealed that the indirect associations of objective diversity 
with increased outgroup threat, anxiety and mistrust through perceived diversity 
were stronger for those higher (vs. lower) in authoritarianism (see Figure 3 and 
Table 4). Moreover, in line with previous studies (e.g., Pettigrew et al., 2010), 
objective diversity was directly associated with lower levels of threat, anxiety, and 
mistrust, but this proved to be the case only for people relatively low in 
authoritarianism, not among those relatively high in authoritarianism. The total 
association of objective diversity with all three outcome variables was then positive, 
but only for high authoritarians. All direct, indirect, and total effects of objective 
diversity on each outcome are reported in Table 4.  
To check that our results were robust, we also conducted a number of 
alternative analyses, which yielded a similar pattern of results. These analyses either 
controlled for demographic variables and unemployment rates, used a 
fractionalization index (see Putnam, 2007) instead of the objective minority 
proportion as indicator of actual diversity, or tested the model for both items of 
perceived diversity separately as a form of robustness analysis.
5
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Table 4. Standardized estimates (βs) of the total, direct, and indirect effects of objective 
diversity on outgroup threat, intergroup anxiety, and outgroup mistrust at high and low levels 
of authoritarianism 
 
 Total Direct              Indirect 
 β β β b (Boot S.E.) [CI95] 
Outgroup Threat     
   High RWA (+ 1SD) .09* .01 .08** 1.02 (.38) [.25; 1.73] 
   Low RWA (- 1SD) -.06 -.12** .06** .78 (.29) [.17; 1.33] 
Intergroup Anxiety     
   High RWA (+ 1SD) .12* -.01 .13* 1.71 (.46) [.78; 2.62] 
   Low RWA (- 1SD) -.04 -.14** .10* 1.30 (.35) [.60; 1.97] 
Outgroup Mistrust     
   High RWA (+ 1SD) .09*   -.02 .07* .76 (.31) [.14; 1.35] 
   Low RWA (- 1SD) -.06a -.12** .06** .58 (.24) [.11; 1.04] 
Note. 
a
 p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure 3. Results of the models for process model 8 on outgroup threat (upper panel), 
intergroup anxiety (middle panel), and outgroup mistrust (lower panel) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Discussion 
Rising immigration and cultural diversity have been an increasingly 
prominent issue in political and societal debates in Western societies, and as such 
this topic represents a most relevant field of investigation for social and political 
psychologists. However, previously reported effects of cultural diversity on majority 
members’ intergroup attitudes seem to be rather inconsistent, suggesting that such 
effects may depend on both contextual and individual characteristics (see Kauff et 
al., 2013; Sibley et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2014). The present study takes this 
approach one step further by focusing on the role of context and individual 
differences in the genesis of subjective perception of diversity.  
Specifically, we investigated a) the role of authoritarianism in the 
relationship between the actual proportion of minorities in a given area and the 
perception of neighborhood diversity by the majority members living in this area, 
and b) how such differential relations between objective and perceived diversity 
may, in turn, result in a differential impact on experienced outgroup threat, anxiety, 
and mistrust for majority members high versus low in authoritarianism.  
The Relationship between Actual and Perceived Diversity  
The present study shows that individuals’ perception of ethnic diversity in 
their local environment depends upon the actual proportion of minorities living 
there, with the perceiver’s level of authoritarianism playing a moderating role. In 
particular, the association between the actual proportion of ethnic minorities in the 
neighborhood and the perception of this diversity was significantly stronger among 
individuals scoring high on authoritarianism than for those scoring low. This finding 
may be surprising to scholars who merely expect greater perception bias in high 
authoritarian individuals, but it is in line with our reasoning that such individuals are 
more likely to spot the presence of other ethnic and cultural groups because they are 
more vigilant of these specific groups.  
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However, a stronger link between actual and perceived diversity among high 
(vs. low) authoritarian individuals does not preclude the possibility that high 
authoritarian individuals overestimate diversity. Indeed, correlations and mean level 
differences are statistically independent. Hence, even though the estimates of high 
authoritarians are more sensitive to real contextual differences, their estimates may 
also be exaggerated. Previous research (Alba, Rumbaut, & Marotz, 2005; Sigelman 
& Niemi, 2001) has reported that majority members tend to have inflated 
estimations of the proportion of minorities in their community and it seems plausible 
that this tendency is stronger among individuals high (vs. low) in authoritarianism.  
Although we obtained a non-significant zero-order correlation between 
authoritarianism and perceived diversity, additional analyses indicated that this 
could be due to high authoritarians living in objectively less diverse areas than low 
authoritarians. Indeed, statistically controlling for this mean difference in living 
environment revealed that high authoritarians tended to have slightly (r = .09, p < 
.01) higher overall estimates of ethnic diversity. However, the present data do not 
allow us to determine whether these estimates represent an overestimation by high 
authoritarians, an underestimation by low authoritarians, or both. The use of 
percentage-wise estimates of minority proportions in follow-up studies could 
provide a more direct test of the ‘authoritarian overestimation’ hypothesis.  
The Role of Authoritarianism and its Possible Implications for Interventions  
Our results indicated that higher levels of authoritarianism have a dual effect 
that underlies the global (i.e., total) interaction effect between objective diversity and 
authoritarianism on outgroup negativity. In particular, authoritarianism boosted the 
indirect relationship between greater objective diversity and outgroup negativity 
through greater perceived diversity, while it simultaneously curbed the direct 
association of objective diversity with reduced threat, anxiety, and mistrust.  
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These findings thus distinguish two paths explaining why objective diversity 
is associated with more negativity towards minorities among individuals high in 
authoritarianism. This dissociation in two paths may have relevant practical 
implications for interventions. The indirect path of objective diversity to increased 
feelings of threat, anxiety and mistrust towards ethnic minorities through perceived 
diversity may offer few opportunities for intervention. Indeed, such interventions 
would need to involve masking or manipulating people’s perception of the presence 
of minorities, which not only seems impractical, but can also be considered 
unethical. Moreover, such strategies are likely to be ineffective and possibly even 
counterproductive if people find out that they have been misled.  
A more promising target for interventions would be to bolster the direct path 
between actual diversity and reduced negativity towards minorities. As we discussed 
above, diverse neighborhoods provide opportunities for positive contact with 
individuals from other social groups, and therefore also have the potential to 
decrease intergroup anxiety and threat, and to increase empathy and positive 
intergroup attitudes (see; Schmid et al., 2014; Stolle et al., 2008; Wagner et al., 
2003; 2006). Such positive interactions may account for the direct effect of objective 
diversity on reduced feelings of threat, anxiety and mistrust in our model among low 
authoritarian respondents.  
But why would actual diversity have these beneficial effects among low 
scoring authoritarians, but not among high scoring individuals? The answer to this 
question is rather straightforward: People who score high on authoritarianism are 
more likely to avoid intergroup contact (Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, & Stellmacher, 
2007; Pettigrew, 2008). In the present sample, we also found that people scoring 
high on authoritarianism generally live in neighborhoods with an objectively smaller 
minority presence (see also Pettigrew et al., 2007; Hodson, 2011).  
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High authoritarian individuals thus seem to have had less opportunity to 
experience intergroup contact, or they may even actively avoid environments where 
contact is more likely. Nevertheless, studies have indicated that if positive 
intergroup contact does occur, its beneficial effects on the reduction of prejudice and 
outgroup negativity are most pronounced among high authoritarians (e.g., Dhont & 
Van Hiel, 2009; 2011; Hodson, 2011). Interventions that seek to reduce outgroup 
negativity may thus most likely benefit from a focus on the promotion of intergroup 
contact among individuals high in authoritarianism, who otherwise seem to be less 
likely to interact with outgroup members.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
The present research provides an extended perspective on how 
characteristics of the individual may shape the relationship between ethnic diversity 
in one’s neighborhood and one’s reactions to ethnic minorities. However, although 
this study provides new insights into the mediating role of perceived diversity and 
the moderating role of authoritarianism, it also raises new questions. As such, the 
present study should be regarded as an initial step and will hopefully encourage 
future research to further develop this interesting theoretical framework of diversity, 
authoritarianism and intergroup relations using more specialized designs.  
Firstly, in the present study, we chose a broad approach with respondents 
covering the entire country, which resulted in the majority of respondents in our 
sample having a unique zip code. Yet, to tackle this limitation and further 
corroborate the authoritarianism-dependent relationship between objective diversity 
and perceived diversity (and the consequences thereof), there is a need for clearly 
nested data with more observations per contextual unit. As such, future studies could 
focus on a select number of high and low diversity neighborhoods and collect data 
from several respondents within each of these neighborhoods in order to test our 
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findings in a multilevel model that fully takes into account both individual-level and 
context-level variation.  
Secondly, the complex relation between authoritarianism and perceived 
threat deserves further discussion. High authoritarians are likely to perceive more 
threat in their environment, and the present results show this for the specific case of 
intergroup threat. An interesting possibility for future research, however, could be to 
disentangle the role of general threat sensitivity and that of the social-ideological 
dimension of authoritarianism as moderator variables in explaining outgroup 
negativity in the face of diversity.  
A final limitation is the cross-sectional nature of our data. The use of 
longitudinal data could allow scholars to address the issue of reverse causality 
between diversity perceptions and outgroup negativity. It is likely that individuals 
with higher outgroup negativity might overestimate ethnic diversity within their 
local environment. Furthermore, such longitudinal data could also test for ‘self-
selection bias’: Do authoritarians choose to live in less diverse neighborhoods, or do 
people living in diverse neighborhoods become less authoritarian over time (possibly 
as a consequence of more positive intergroup experiences)?  
Conclusion  
The present study demonstrated that people’s perception of diversity is not 
only a function of where they live, but also of their individual level of 
authoritarianism, which has implications for people’s feelings of threat, anxiety, and 
mistrust towards outgroups. This points to the importance of integrating the 
psychology of individual differences in sociological and social psychological 
theories of diversity. 
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Notes  
1 
A zip code region in the Netherlands is comprised of all zip codes that share the 
first two digits (for example: zip code region one consists of all zip codes 
between 1000 and 1099, zip code region two consists of all zip codes 
between 1100 and 1199, …, zip code region 90 consists of all zip codes 
between 9900 and 9999). A zip code region covers about 82 square 
kilometers.  
2 
Non-Western ethnic minorities are defined as immigrants whose ethnic background 
(or that of at least one parent) is in Africa, South America or Asia 
(excluding Indonesia or Japan). Most non-Western minorities are Turks 
(23.2%), Moroccans (21.1%) and Surinamese (20.7%; CBS, 2010). Note 
that in the Dutch context, the category ‘non-Western minorities’ is generally 
referred to as ‘ethnic minorities’ (Guiraudon, Phalet, & ter Wal 2005). For 
that reason, we use both terms interchangeably.
  
3 
According to Maas and Hox (2005) and Gelman and Hill (2007), multilevel 
analyses can legitimately be performed with a low number of respondents 
per contextual unit, providing that a) the model fit increases significantly 
when taking into account the nested structure in the data, and b) the ICC is 
sufficiently large. When considering perceived diversity as an outcome, 
these two conditions were met.  
4 
Standardized estimates for regression analyses on perceived diversity were 
calculated on the basis of multilevel unstandardized estimates. These were b 
= 9.54 (SE = 0.54) ), p < .001 for individuals high in authoritarianism, and b 
= 7.26 (SE = 0.47), p < .001 for those low in authoritarianism.  
5 
Given the largely analogous results, we do not report the full results of these 
additional analyses, but they are available upon request with the first author.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The diversity challenge for high and low 
authoritarians: Multilevel and longitudinal effects 
through intergroup contact and threat 
 
 
Abstract 
The current studies integrate different frameworks on the positive and negative 
consequences of ethnic diversity for intergroup relations. Using a nationally 
stratified sample of Dutch majority members (N = 680) from 50 cities in the 
Netherlands, Study 1 demonstrated that objective diversity was indirectly related to 
prejudice and to generalized, ingroup, and outgroup trust, through more positive and 
more negative contact. These indirect effects tended to be stronger for high versus 
low authoritarians. Furthermore, perceived diversity was indirectly related to less 
trust and greater prejudice, via more negative contact and threat. Again, these 
associations were more pronounced among high authoritarians. Study 2, using a 
representative sample of German majority members (N = 412) nested within 237 
districts, replicated the cross-sectional results regarding objective diversity and 
prejudice. Additionally, longitudinal analyses indicated that objective diversity 
predicted more positive and more negative contact two years later, though only 
among moderate and high authoritarians.  
 
This chapter is based on Van Assche, J., Asbrock, F., Dhont, K., & Roets, A. (in press). The 
diversity challenge for high and low authoritarians: Multilevel and longitudinal effects through 
intergroup contact and threat. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 
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Introduction 
 The rise in ethnic diversity in Western European societies repeatedly covers 
the news headlines and has attracted increased scholarly attention in social and 
political sciences (Hewstone, 2015). As a result, a growing body of research has 
investigated the effects of diversity on societal and intergroup outcomes such as 
social capital (e.g., Laurence, 2011; Letki, 2008), trust (e.g., Putnam, 2007; Schmid, 
Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014), and prejudice (e.g., 
Pettigrew, Wagner, & Christ, 2010; Quillian, 1995; Van Assche, Roets, Dhont, & 
Van Hiel, 2014, 2016). The vast majority of these studies have shown no overall 
effects of diversity, yet, this seems to be the result of various processes with opposite 
consequences competing with each other. In the current set of two studies, we aim to 
delineate these processes and their repercussions for several key aspects of 
intergroup relations (e.g., trust and prejudice), taking into account the mediating role 
of positive intergroup contact, negative intergroup contact, and threat, while also 
considering the moderating role of right-wing authoritarianism (see Figure 1). 
Contact and Threat as Mediators of Diversity Effects 
Two conflicting sets of theories have dominated research on ethnic diversity 
effects (see Hewstone, 2015; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014, for reviews). On the 
one hand, research inspired by the intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Brown 
& Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998) has proposed that the growing representation of 
varied ethnic groups in Western societies is associated with more contact between 
members of different ethnic groups, which in turn leads to more tolerance and 
positivity towards outgroups (e.g., Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 
2006; Wagner, Van Dick, Pettigrew, & Christ, 2003). In line with this perspective, 
some studies have shown that higher diversity was associated with more positive 
outgroup perceptions (Oliver & Wong, 2003), and less prejudice (Kunovich & 
Hodson, 2002).  
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the tested moderated mediation model 
 
 
 
On the other hand, intergroup conflict theories (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 
1958; Bobo, 1999), encompassing group threat theory (Quillian, 1995) and 
integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), claim that diversity is often 
perceived as threatening by members of the host society (e.g., Semyonov, Raijman, 
Yom-Tov, & Schmidt, 2004; Taylor, 1998). Consequently, diversity would lead to 
more prejudice and less trust towards ethnic outgroups (e.g., Scheepers, Gijsberts, & 
Coenders, 2002; Schneider, 2008). Based on a sample of over 30,000 people from 
41 American communities, Putnam even concluded that - other things being equal - 
more diversity was associated with less trust both between and within ethnic groups 
(Putnam, 2007). Extending this perspective, Koopmans and Veit (2014) found that 
experimental primes of ethnic diversity caused lower trust in one’s neighbors. 
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Putnam’s (2007) infamous ‘constrict claim’, stating that ethnic diversity has 
detrimental consequences for social cohesion and trust, has been the subject of a hot 
and unresolved debate among both policy makers and academics. Following 
Putnam’s claim, a number of studies in several countries tested the ‘hunkering 
down’ hypothesis. Do individuals “pull in like a turtle” (Putnam 2007, p. 149), 
withdraw from others and from social life at large in the face of diversity? In a 
comprehensive review of 90 post-Putnam studies, van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) 
concluded that, at best, evidence for Putnam’s constrict claim is mixed. Especially in 
European societies, the idea of univocal negative repercussions of diversity for trust 
and prejudice can be refuted (see Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers, 2009; 
Gijsberts, van der Meer, & Dagevos, 2012). In particular, it seems that the two major 
competing processes, positive intergroup contact and perceived outgroup threat, 
cancel each other out, yielding no main effects of diversity.  
Indeed, various scholars have tried to integrate both theoretical frameworks 
in one single design, and provided evidence for these opposite mechanisms (e.g., 
Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin, 2010; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen, & Scheepers, 2011; 
Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; Schlueter & Wagner, 2008; Schmid et al., 2014). For 
instance, Schmid and colleagues (2014) tested the diversity-trust association in the 
United Kingdom and demonstrated that diversity as such had no substantial overall 
effects on outgroup trust and outgroup attitudes, because the positive effect of higher 
positive intergroup contact and the negative effect of higher perceived threat 
counterbalanced each other. These opposing processes may thus explain why many 
studies reported non-significant overall effects of diversity on societal and 
intergroup outcomes (Hewstone, 2015; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). 
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Authoritarianism as Moderator of Diversity Effects  
Although diversity may instill opposite and “counterbalancing” processes 
related to contact and threat, its effects also seem to depend on the characteristics of 
the individual. Not everyone seems equally sensitive to diversity (Stolle, Soroka, & 
Johnston, 2008). Correspondingly, Wagner and colleagues (2006) suggested that 
whether contact or threat effects dominate, may depend on moderating factors. More 
specifically, the extent to which people hold right-wing social-ideological attitudes 
has been identified to play a critical role in whether ethnic diversity is perceived 
predominantly as a contact opportunity or as a threat, and in turn, is associated with 
either increased or decreased outgroup positivity (see Kauff, Asbrock, Thorner, & 
Wagner, 2013; Van Assche et al., 2016).  
The seminal work by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford 
(1950) on ‘The Authoritarian Personality’ offers an interesting outlook on how such 
individual differences have the potential to shape diversity effects. Contemporary 
accounts conceptualize authoritarianism as a social-ideological attitude most 
frequently operationalized in terms of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer 
1981). RWA is defined as the conglomerate of conventionalism (i.e., adherence to 
traditional norms and values), submission to authorities, and aggression towards 
norm violators (Altemeyer 1988). According to Duckitt (2001; see also Van Hiel, 
Cornelis, & Roets, 2007), people high in right-wing authoritarianism generally 
perceive the world as a dangerous place and are motivated to protect ingroup 
cohesion, order, and collective security. Therefore, right-wing authoritarians tend to 
perceive ethnic diversity more as a threat to traditional norms and values (see also 
Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011; De keersmaecker, Van Assche, & Roets, 2016; Kauff et 
al., 2013). 
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Van Assche and colleagues (2014, 2016) showed that authoritarianism 
shapes the associations between diversity and various intergroup outcomes. 
Specifically, diversity was found to be associated with less positive attitudes and 
more mistrust towards ethnic outgroups, yet only among high authoritarians. Among 
low authoritarians, diversity was related to more outgroup positivity. Analogous 
interaction patterns have been revealed for individual differences in left-right self-
placement (Karreth, Singh, & Stojek, 2015), dangerous worldviews (Sibley et al., 
2013) and conformity values (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013), three concepts 
closely related to RWA (Duckitt, 2001). In particular, individuals living in diverse 
environments who strongly endorse conservative ideologies, dangerous worldviews, 
or group conformity typically hold more negative attitudes towards minorities than 
their neighbors who do not hold these respective values.  
Van Assche and colleagues (2016) further revealed that diversity is 
associated with more outgroup threat, but again, only among high authoritarians. 
Similarly, Kauff and colleagues (2013) found that high (vs. low) authoritarians 
perceive a multicultural ideology as a threat to cultural traditions, which leads to an 
increase in prejudice. In sum, diversity is most likely to be perceived as a threat by 
authoritarians, and for them, diversity consequentially breeds more prejudice and 
less trust towards minorities. This moderating role of RWA in the relationship 
between diversity and threat is included as Path A in Figure 1. 
The role of authoritarianism in the association between diversity and 
intergroup contact is less straightforward. On the one hand, authoritarians usually 
tend to avoid contact with outgroup members (see Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; 2011; 
Pettigrew, 2008). However, recent research has shown that, in very diverse 
environments, people high in authoritarianism appear to show a steep increase in 
intergroup contact encounters (Brune, Asbrock, & Sibley, 2016). Indeed, although 
almost all individuals living in diverse areas tend to have increased intergroup 
DIVERSITY EFFECTS FOR HIGH AND LOW AUTHORITARIANS 
 
113 
contact (e.g. Schlueter & Wagner, 2008; see Hewstone, 2015), this effect, 
counterintuitively, was found to be most pronounced among authoritarians (Brune et 
al., 2016). This finding suggests that authoritarians in homogenous areas manage to 
avoid contact with other ethnic groups, but in diverse environments - where contact 
is inevitable - they may have no choice but to give up their general avoidance 
tendencies, and engage more with outgroup members. Furthermore, in diverse 
neighborhoods, where intergroup contact is the norm, authoritarians as such comply 
with the norm (Brune et al., 2016). Yet, this increased engagement may include both 
positive and negative contact experiences.  
Indeed, while previous studies almost exclusively focused on increased 
opportunities for positive contact, diversity likely increases both positive and 
negative intergroup encounters (Koopmans & Veit, 2014). In this regard, Laurence, 
Schmid, and Hewstone (2017) recently found that diversity increased both positive 
and negative contact, with the former improving and the latter harming intergroup 
relations. It is therefore essential to simultaneously include positive and negative 
intergroup contact when testing diversity effects for high and low authoritarians. In 
sum, we propose that diversity is associated with more (positive and negative) 
intergroup contact, and these associations are especially pronounced for those high 
in authoritarianism. This hypothesis is represented by Paths B and C in Figure 1. 
Authoritarianism as Moderator of Contact and Threat Effects  
Where positive contact reduces prejudice, threat (and negative contact) 
induces it. On the one hand, a bulk of evidence has accumulated for the positive 
effects of positive contact on many different outcomes (Hewstone & Swart, 2011; 
Hewstone et al., 2014; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, & 
Christ, 2011). On the other hand, the negative effects of threat on trust and tolerance 
are also indisputable (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000).  
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However, also contact and threat effects on intergroup outcomes have been 
shown to depend on individual differences in authoritarianism (paths D, E and F in 
Figure 1). For example, once authoritarians experience positive intergroup contact, 
they often benefit from it the most (Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012; Dhont 
& Van Hiel, 2009, 2011; Hodson, 2011; see Figure 1, path D). Moreover, negative 
contact experiences may also have the greatest impact among authoritarians (Dhont 
& Van Hiel, 2009; see Figure 1, path E). Hence, high authoritarians are most likely 
to engage in intergroup contact in diverse environments, compared to homogeneous 
environments, and these encounters have the potential to influence their prejudice 
and trust levels to a greater extent. In the same vein, authoritarians tend to be most 
prone to societal threat (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stellmacher & Petzel, 
2005), yielding stronger positive associations of threat with prejudice and negative 
outgroup emotions (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009) among those high versus low in 
authoritarianism. In other words, threatening conditions or perceptions - particularly 
resonant in diverse environments - potentially have the greatest impact among those 
holding strong authoritarian attitudes (Stenner, 2005; see Figure 1, path F).  
The Present Studies 
The current contribution aims to fill the gap in fundamental research on 
diversity effects by integrating previous mediation and moderation approaches into a 
unifying multilevel moderated mediation design (see Figure 1, for a schematic 
representation of our model). Firstly, we want to investigate how diversity affects 
trust and prejudice simultaneously via positive intergroup contact, negative 
intergroup contact, and outgroup threat, and how these processes may 
counterbalance each other. Secondly, we want to examine for whom diversity is 
most strongly associated with these mediating processes, and furthermore, for whom 
these mediators have the strongest repercussions on relevant intergroup outcomes. In 
Study 1, we focused on five outcomes (i.e., generalized trust, ingroup trust, outgroup 
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trust, subtle prejudice, and blatant prejudice), using a unique, nested adult sample 
from the 50 largest cities in the Netherlands. Study 2 dug deeper into racial prejudice 
in a representative German sample, using a rare, yet important longitudinal design.  
Important in the study of diversity effects, is the distinction between 
objective diversity and perceptions of diversity, as they might have differential 
effects (Hewstone, 2015; Koopmans & Schaeffer, 2015). In line with this, 
Semyonov and colleagues (2004) found that not the actual relative size of the 
outgroup population, but rather the perception of its size (i.e., the estimated 
percentage) was associated with greater perceived threat and exclusionary outgroup 
attitudes. Moreover, objective and perceived diversity may in fact also work 
differently through the various processes (Pettigrew et al., 2010). Hence, a thorough 
test of diversity effects should acknowledge this distinction and therefore, in our 
studies, we look at objective diversity as well as the perception of diversity.  
Our first set of hypotheses states that objective diversity yields no overall 
effects on intergroup outcomes, but it may have detrimental total effects for high 
authoritarians on the one hand, and beneficial effects for low authoritarians on the 
other hand. Moreover, we hypothesize that these differences are explained by the 
indirect associations of diversity with trust and prejudice via positive contact, 
negative contact, and threat, which should be different (and stronger) among high 
(vs. low) authoritarians.  
Our second set of research questions focuses on perceptions of diversity, 
which potentially yield more detrimental total effects in terms of lower trust and 
higher prejudice, compared to objective diversity. Again, we assume that the indirect 
associations via positive contact, negative contact, and threat are significant, and 
most pronounced among high authoritarians. Finally, we also examine how contact 
and threat further relate to intergroup outcomes, once more hypothesizing that 
especially the associations would be especially large for high authoritarians.  
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants  
We used a nationally stratified sample of citizens (N = 680) without 
migration background from the 50 largest cities in the Netherlands (mean number of 
observations per city M = 13.80). This dataset was collected online in 2015 through 
an independent ISO 26362-certified survey company. The mean age of the sample 
was 51 years (SD = 16.69) and 52% were men. Thirty-four percent of the 
participants had completed primary school, 40% had completed high school and 
27% had a college or university degree. Income distributions are provided in 
Appendix A. 
Measures 
Objective Diversity.  
We assessed the percentage of non-Western minority members within a 
specific city as an objective indicator of diversity within the year of data collection 
(see also Van Assche et al., 2016). We used the available data from the Dutch 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2015), indicating the number of individuals per 
city of non-Western origin, and we calculated the percentage as a function of the 
total number of registered inhabitants to get a measure of relative objective diversity 
(M = 16.76%, SD = 9.15, MIN = 4.11%, MAX = 37.34%).  
Estimations of Diversity.  
To measure perceptions of diversity, participants had to specify their 
estimated percentage of non-Western immigrants living in their city, with M = 
28.31% (SD = 17.85, MIN = 0.00%, MAX = 95.00%). 
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Right-wing Authoritarianism.  
A 6-item RWA-scale (based on Altemeyer, 1981; see Onraet, Dhont, & Van 
Hiel, 2014) was administered on seven-point scales anchored by one (totally 
disagree) and seven (totally agree). A sample item is ‘Obedience and respect for 
authority are the most important virtues children should learn’, α = .67, M = 4.47 
(SD = 1.53). 
Intergroup Contact.  
We assessed intergroup contact by asking respondents the frequency of both 
positive and negative interactions with people of immigrant origin (e.g., Dhont & 
Van Hiel, 2009), using seven-point scales ranging from one (never) to seven (very 
frequently). The items are ‘How often did you have positive interactions with people 
of immigrant origin?’ (M = 4.29, SD = 1.53) and ‘How often did you have negative 
interactions with people of immigrant origin?’ (M = 2.98, SD = 1.53).  
Outgroup Threat.  
Outgroup threat was measured with four items (based on Stephan et al., 
2002; see also Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011). An example item reads ‘People of 
immigrant origin threaten the way of life of people of Dutch origin’. Respondents 
answered using seven-point scales ranging from one (totally disagree) to seven 
(totally agree), α = .87, M = 4.03 (SD = 1.44). 
Trust.  
We tapped into general, ingroup, and outgroup trust. General trust was 
measured by three items from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2014). An example 
item reads ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’. Respondents answered using 
seven-point scales ranging from one (‘You can’t be too careful’) to seven (‘Most 
people can be trusted’), yielding a reliable scale with α = .84; M = 4.19 (SD = 1.15).  
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For ingroup trust, respondents answered to one item (‘When you specifically 
think of people of Dutch origin, do you think most of them are to be trusted or not to 
be trusted?’; M = 4.52, SD = 1.07), anchored by 1 (‘Most people cannot be trusted’) 
and 7 (‘Most people can be trusted’). Outgroup trust was also measured with one 
item (‘When you specifically think of people of immigrant origin, do you think most 
of them are to be trusted or not to be trusted? ’; M = 4.02, SD = 1.23), using the 
same anchors.  
Racial Prejudice.  
An 8-item subtle racism and a 4-item blatant racism scale were administered 
(based on Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; see Onraet & Van Hiel, 2013). Sample items 
are ‘I feel sympathy for people of immigrant origin’ (reverse coded) for subtle 
racism and ‘All things taken together, the White race is superior over other races’ for 
blatant racism. Respondents answered using seven-point scales ranging from one 
(totally disagree) to seven (totally agree). Cronbach’s alphas were .82, with M = 
4.18 (SD = 0.92), and .88, with M = 2.30 (SD = 1.39), for subtle and blatant racism, 
respectively. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
We first investigated whether multilevel analyses were warranted because 
our data were nested (i.e., individuals were located within cities). We estimated 
empty (intercept-only) models which provide insight in the variances in our 
mediators and outcomes at the individual and contextual level. We also assessed the 
intraclass correlations (ICCs) which confirmed there was substantial between-level 
variance, warranting the use of multilevel modeling (see Appendix B).
1
 The 
correlations among all variables are presented in Appendix C.  
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Main Analyses  
Multilevel path analyses with maximum likelihood estimation were 
conducted using the MPlus package (version 7.1; Muthén & Muthén, 2012). 
Standard errors were computed using bootstrapping (N = 50,000 bootstrap samples). 
All independent variables were centered around the overall average of the sample to 
control for their compositional effects at the contextual level (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). We modelled a random coefficient model where the intercept and the slope 
coefficients vary across cities (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Pituch & Stapleton, 
2012). Specifically, we tested the hypothesized model with one context-level 
predictor (i.e., either objective diversity or estimations of diversity at the city level), 
three individual-level mediators (i.e., positive intergroup contact, negative 
intergroup contact, and outgroup threat), and five individual-level outcomes (i.e., 
generalized trust, ingroup trust, outgroup trust, subtle prejudice, and blatant 
prejudice).  
Furthermore, RWA was included as an individual-level moderator variable 
and we allowed each path of the mediation model to be moderated by RWA. For all 
paths, we estimated the effects for low ( < 1 SD below the mean), medium (mean 
level), and high ( > 1 SD above the mean) authoritarians, as such examining the 
conditional effects of the predictor and mediators at various levels of RWA (see 
Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004, p. 87-88; for similar procedures in 
multilevel regression models). Tables 1a and 1b display the standardized coefficients 
of the model considering objective diversity, and tables 2a and 2b portray the 
standardized coefficients for the model considering perceived diversity.
2
  
As expected, the results showed that higher objective diversity was related 
to more positive and more negative contact, but only among individuals with 
moderate or high levels of authoritarianism (see Table 1a).  
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Positive contact was further associated with more trust and less prejudice, 
and a reversed pattern of results was revealed for negative contact. Most 
importantly, the results indicated that there were no significant total effects of 
objective diversity on any of the five outcomes (see Table 1b). Nonetheless, there 
were significant indirect effects via positive and negative contact, but only among 
those with average and high levels of authoritarianism.  
In sum, overall, objective diversity did not affect intergroup relations, as it 
was associated with both more positive and more negative intergroup contact, and 
hence the “positive” and the “negative” process cancelled each other out. Finally, 
these indirect effects were more pronounced among high authoritarians, and less 
outspoken or even absent among low authoritarians. Surprisingly, outgroup threat 
did not mediate objective diversity effects.  
Secondly, the results concerning perceived diversity showed a somewhat 
different pattern. Higher estimates of diversity were related to more negative 
intergroup contact and higher threat perceptions, and these two “negative” processes 
were further associated with less trust and more prejudice (see Table 2a). Most 
importantly, the results indicated that there were significant negative total effects of 
estimations of diversity on trust, and significant positive total effects on prejudice, 
but only among moderate and high authoritarians (see Table 2b).  
Furthermore, there were significant indirect effects via negative contact and 
threat, but not via positive contact. The conclusion here is that, overall, unlike the 
results with objective diversity, higher individual estimates of diversity seem to 
drive down trust and increase prejudice, as these estimates were associated with both 
more negative contact and more threat, two “negative” processes that add up to less 
tolerance. Finally, similar to the objective diversity results, these relations were 
generally more outspoken among high authoritarians whereas they were smaller and 
even non-significant among low authoritarians.  
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Table 1a. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the structural model in Study 1 
considering objective diversity’s effects on the mediators, and the mediators’ effects on 
intergroup outcomes at different levels of authoritarianism 
 
Paths  
 
 
IV 
 
MEDIATOR  
 
 OUTCOME 
 
For 
RWA  
For Low 
RWA 
For Medium 
RWA 
For High 
RWA 
 
Objective 
Diversity 
L: 0.091a 
Positive Contact 
0.101a 0.145*** 0.189*** Generalized Trust 
M: 0.124** 0.128* 0.135*** 0.143*** Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.157**  0.138** 0.191*** 0.245*** Outgroup Trust 
   -0.211*** -0.189*** -0.167*** Subtle Prejudice 
   -0.236*** -0.255*** -0.273*** Blatant Prejudice 
Objective 
Diversity 
L: 0.081 
Negative Contact 
-0.282*** -0.251*** -0.220*** Generalized Trust 
M: 0.135*** -0.273*** -0.150*** -0.027 Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.189***  -0.284*** -0.248*** -0.212*** Outgroup Trust 
   0.197*** 0.226*** 0.254*** Subtle Prejudice 
   0.019 0.098** 0.176*** Blatant Prejudice 
Objective 
Diversity 
L: -0.045 Threat -0.145** -0.111* -0.078 Generalized Trust 
M: 0.005  -0.155* -0.035 0.086 Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.055  -0.261*** -0.246*** -0.230*** Outgroup Trust 
   0.530*** 0.537*** 0.544*** Subtle Prejudice 
   0.489*** 0.494*** 0.499*** Blatant Prejudice 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table 1b. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the structural model in Study 1 
considering objective diversity’s conditional total, direct, and indirect effects on intergroup 
outcomes 
 
Paths  
 
  
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total 
Effect 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
via Positive 
Contact 
Indirect 
Effect 
via Negative 
Contact 
Indirect 
Effect 
via 
Threat 
Objective  
Diversity 
Generalized  
Trust  
Low 0.010 0.014 0.006 -0.022 0.008 
Medium -0.016 -0.007 0.017** -0.034*** -0.001 
  High -0.041 -0.028 0.034** -0.044*** -0.003 
Objective  
Diversity 
Ingroup  
Trust  
Low 0.040 0.024 0.003 -0.019 0.007 
Medium 0.010 -0.004 0.015* -0.020** 0.000 
  High -0.020 -0.032 0.033* -0.013** -0.005 
Objective  
Diversity 
Outgroup  
Trust  
Low 0.008 0.007 0.010* -0.023 0.013 
Medium -0.004 0.000 0.023** -0.034*** -0.001 
  High -0.019 -0.007 0.041** -0.041*** -0.012 
Objective  
Diversity 
Subtle  
Prejudice  
Low -0.046 -0.022 -0.020** 0.016 -0.023 
Medium 0.018 0.005 -0.024** 0.030*** 0.003 
  High 0.081a 0.031 -0.026** 0.047*** 0.030 
Objective  
Diversity 
Blatant  
Prejudice  
Low -0.010 0.032 -0.022** 0.000 -0.024 
Medium 0.017 0.030 -0.032** 0.013* 0.003 
  High 0.043 0.028 -0.044** 0.036** 0.025 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table 2a. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the structural model in Study 1 
considering estimations of diversity’s effects on the mediators, and the mediators’ effects on 
intergroup outcomes at different levels of authoritarianism 
 
Paths       
IV 
 
MEDIATOR  
 
 OUTCOME 
 
For 
RWA 
 
For Low 
RWA 
For Medium 
RWA 
For High 
RWA 
 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
L: 0.017 Positive 
Contact 
0.112* 0.149*** 0.185*** Generalized Trust 
M: -0.004 0.141** 0.140** 0.139** Ingroup Trust 
 H: -0.024  0.145** 0.196*** 0.246*** Outgroup Trust 
   -0.204*** -0.182*** -0.160*** Subtle Prejudice 
   -0.235*** -0.254*** -0.272*** Blatant Prejudice 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
L: 0.231*** 
Negative 
Contact 
-0.262*** -0.231*** -0.199*** Generalized Trust 
M: 0.257*** -0.255*** -0.127*** 0.000 Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.283***  -0.280*** -0.240*** -0.200*** Outgroup Trust 
   0.211*** 0.241*** 0.272*** Subtle Prejudice 
   0.013 0.098** 0.182*** Blatant Prejudice 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
L: 0.190*** Threat -0.126* -0.090a -0.054 Generalized Trust 
M: 0.192***  -0.139** -0.015 0.109a Ingroup Trust 
 H: 0.194***  -0.251*** -0.232*** -0.212*** Outgroup Trust 
   0.537*** 0.545*** 0.553*** Subtle Prejudice 
   0.479*** 0.486*** 0.494*** Blatant Prejudice 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table 2b. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the structural model in Study 1 
considering estimations of diversity’s conditional total, direct, and indirect effects on 
intergroup outcomes 
 
Paths  
 
  
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Positive  
Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via 
Negative 
Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Threat 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Generalized 
Trust 
Low -0.160** -0.069 0.001 -0.060** -0.030* 
Medium -0.183*** -0.103** -0.001 -0.018* -0.018* 
  High -0.206*** -0.137** -0.005 -0.006* -0.006 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Ingroup 
Trust 
Low -0.144** -0.066 0.001 -0.051** -0.028* 
Medium -0.140** -0.104** 0.000 -0.034** -0.003 
  High -0.136** -0.141** -0.005 -0.012 0.021a 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Outgroup 
Trust 
Low -0.210*** -0.095a 0.002 -0.063** -0.051*** 
Medium -0.174*** -0.065a -0.001 -0.063** -0.045*** 
  High -0.159** -0.034 -0.006 -0.061** -0.039** 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Subtle 
Prejudice 
Low 0.088 -0.055 -0.004 0.047** 0.102*** 
Medium 0.103** -0.063** 0.001 0.061** 0.104*** 
  High 0.118** -0.071** 0.004 0.077*** 0.107*** 
Estimations 
of Diversity 
Blatant 
Prejudice 
Low 0.125a 0.029 -0.004 0.000 0.101*** 
Medium 0.149** 0.028 0.001 0.025** 0.094*** 
  High 0.174** 0.026 0.007 0.056*** 0.088*** 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Brief Discussion 
In conclusion, in Study 1, our hypotheses were confirmed with regards to 
the lack of total effects of objective diversity versus the negative total effects for 
estimations of diversity. Secondly, with regards to the processes explaining the total 
effects, we found mediation effects via positive and negative contact when 
considering objective diversity effects versus mediation effects via negative contact 
and threat when considering estimations of diversity. Thirdly, across both models, 
our results confirm that it is crucial to take into account individual differences in 
authoritarianism, as the relations are especially pronounced among individuals with 
average or high levels of RWA. 
Finally, our findings revealed largely similar repercussions of diversity for 
three pertinent trust outcomes as well as for two forms of racial prejudice. Indeed, 
generalized trust, commonly regarded as part of the “social glue” that holds 
communities together (Schmid et al., 2014), trust in ethnic outgroups, and subtle and 
blatant prejudicial attitudes towards these outgroups are to largely the same extent 
affected by diversity, through the same mechanisms, and with consistently stronger 
effects among high authoritarians. Yet, ingroup trust was slightly differentially 
affected for high versus low authoritarians. Specifically, as authoritarians are 
prominently concerned about ingroup protection (Duckitt, 2001), negative 
intergroup contact and threat experiences accompanying diversity did not 
necessarily lower their trust in the own ethnic group. 
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Study 2 
Study 2 extended Study 1 in two significant ways. Firstly, Study 2 was 
conducted in Germany, another Western European country with a fair share of 
immigrants and foreigners. Secondly, we examined the longitudinal effects of 
diversity, which has rarely been done in previous research. Study 2 involved 
secondary analyses of existing data with less variables compared to Study 1. Yet, the 
data set included a sufficient number of critical variables to test our hypotheses. 
More specifically, Study 2 tested the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of 
objective and perceived diversity on racial prejudice, through positive and negative 
contact (but not threat) for high and low authoritarians.  
Method 
Participants 
We analyzed a representative sample of German majority members (N = 412 
individuals nested within 237 districts
3
, mean number of observations per district M 
= 1.74) from the 2008 (T1) and 2010 (T2) waves of the Group-Focused Enmity 
project (Heitmeyer, 2002). There were no missing data among respondents who 
completed the questionnaire at both time points. The mean age of the sample at T1 
was 51 years (SD = 14.55) and 45% were men. Thirty-three percent of the 
participants had completed primary school, 21% had completed lower high school, 
29% upper high school, and 17% had a college or university degree. Income 
distributions, family status and religious affiliation are provided in Appendix A. 
Measures 
Objective Diversity.  
We assessed the share of foreigners in each district as an objective indicator 
of diversity within the year of data collection (MT1 = 7.62%, SDT1 = 5.60, MINT1 = 
0.70%, MAX T1 = 23.50%; and MT2 = 7.55%, SDT2 = 5.57, MINT2 = 0.70%, MAX T2 = 
23.40%).  
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Perceived Diversity.  
To assess perceptions of diversity, respondents had to evaluate ‘How many 
foreigners live in your neighborhood?’ using four-point rating scales ranging from 
one (absolutely none) to four (a great number; MT1 = 2.10, MT2 = 0.89; MT2 = 2.04, 
SDT2 = 0.82). 
Right-wing Authoritarianism.  
A 4-item RWA-scale based on Altemeyer (1981) and Lederer (1982) was 
administered on four-point scales anchored by one (I do not agree at all) and four (I 
totally agree). A sample item is ‘Crime should be punished more harshly’. 
Cronbach’s alpha was .76 at T1 and .78 at T2, with MT1 = 2.70 (SDT1 = 0.69) and 
MT2 = 2.73 (SDT2 = 0.71). 
Intergroup Contact.  
We assessed the frequency of both positive and negative contact experiences 
with ethnic minorities (in this study referred to as ‘foreigners’), using four-point 
scales ranging from one (never) to four (frequently). The positive contact items were 
‘How often did a foreigner help you?’ and ‘How often did you have an interesting 
conversation with a foreigner?’. Both items were strongly positively related (rT1 = 
.49, p < .001; rT2 = .50, p < .001), MT1 = 2.54 (SDT1 = 0.83) and MT2 = 2.50 (SDT2 = 
0.82). The item for negative contact reads ‘How often were you harassed by a 
foreigner?’ (MT1 = 1.42, SDT1 = 0.67; and MT2 = 1.45, SDT2 = 0.68).  
Racial Prejudice.  
A 4-item racial prejudice scale was administered (based on Wasmer, Koch, 
Harkness, & Gabler, 1996). A sample item reads ‘There are too many foreigners 
living in Germany’. Respondents answered using four-point scales ranging from one 
(I do not agree at all) to seven (I totally agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .80 at T1 and 
.81 at T2, with MT1 = 2.20 (SDT1 = 0.68) and MT2 = 2.21 (SDT2 = 0.67). 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
As in Study 1, we investigated whether multilevel analyses were warranted 
because our data were nested (i.e., individuals were located within districts). We 
estimated empty (intercept-only) models which provided insight in the individual- 
and context-level variances in our mediators and outcomes. We also calculated the 
ICCs which confirmed there was substantial between-level variance, warranting the 
use of multilevel modeling (see Appendix B). Correlations among all study variables 
can be found in Appendix C.  
Main Analyses 
A multilevel random coefficient model was tested, in which the intercept and 
the slope coefficients varied across districts (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Pituch 
& Stapleton, 2012). Specifically, we investigated a model with one predictor (i.e., 
either objective district-level or perceived individual-level diversity), two individual-
level mediators (i.e., positive and negative intergroup contact), and one individual-
level outcome (i.e., racial prejudice). In order to compute the slopes for low and high 
authoritarians, we allowed each path to be moderated by individual-level RWA (cf., 
Raudenbush et al., 2004). Tables 3a and 3b report all standardized coefficients of the 
cross-sectional and longitudinal models considering objective diversity. Tables 4a 
and 4b portray all standardized coefficients of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
model considering perceived diversity.  
Cross-sectional Results.  
Firstly, higher objective diversity was related to more positive and more 
negative intergroup contact, especially among individuals with moderate or high 
levels of authoritarianism (see Table 3a). Positive contact was further associated 
with less prejudice, and a reversed pattern of results was revealed for negative 
contact, but only among moderate and high authoritarians.  
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Importantly, the results further indicated that there were no significant total 
effects of objective diversity on prejudice (see Table 3b).  
Nonetheless, there were significant indirect effects via positive and negative 
contact, which were especially pronounced among those with average and high 
levels of authoritarianism. In line with the results of Study 1, objective diversity did 
not show an overall significant effect on prejudice because it was associated with 
both more positive and more negative intergroup contact, which, in turn had 
opposite effects on prejudice. These indirect effects were less outspoken or even 
absent among low authoritarians.  
Secondly, the cross-sectional results concerning perceived diversity showed 
an analogous pattern. Higher perceived diversity was related to more positive and 
more negative intergroup contact, especially among individuals with moderate or 
high levels of authoritarianism (see Table 4a). Positive contact was further 
associated with less prejudice, and a reversed pattern of results was revealed for 
negative contact, but only among moderate and high authoritarians.  
Most importantly, the results indicated that there were no total effects of 
perceived diversity on prejudice, except for a negative total effect for low 
authoritarians at T2 (see Table 4b). Furthermore, perceived diversity simultaneously 
showed a prejudice-reducing indirect effect via more positive contact experiences 
(which was significant for everyone) and a prejudice-enhancing indirect effect via 
more negative contact experiences (which was only significant among moderate and 
high authoritarians).  
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Longitudinal Results.  
The cross-sectional analyses at T1 and T2 provided evidence for the 
hypothesized diversity-prejudice relation via positive and negative contact, which 
were especially outspoken among those high in RWA. Yet, to provide more clear 
indication of the direction of the associations, longitudinal analyses were conducted, 
following the procedure suggested by Cole and Maxwell (2003). In particular, we 
tested a model in which the centered T1 scores of diversity and RWA, as well as 
their interaction term predicted the T2 scores of positive and negative contact, 
controlling for T1 scores of positive and negative contact.  
By including the T1 contact scores, we controlled for the stability effect of 
contact over time (i.e., including the autoregressive paths; β = .60, p < .001 and β = 
.53, p < .001 for positive and negative contact, respectively). Furthermore, the 
centered T1 scores of contact and RWA, as well as their interaction terms were 
included as predictors of the T2 scores of prejudice, controlling for T1 scores of 
diversity and prejudice (with the autoregressive path β = .71, p < .001).  
The bottom lines of Tables 3 and 4 display the standardized coefficients of 
the model considering objective and perceived diversity, respectively. As expected, 
higher levels of objective diversity predicted more positive and more negative 
intergroup contact over time. Importantly, this was only the case among those with 
medium and high levels of RWA, in line with our hypotheses (see Table 3a). The 
paths from perceived diversity showed no such pattern (see Tables 4a). Finally, all 
longitudinal total and indirect effects of diversity on prejudice did not reach 
significance (see Tables 3b and 4b for the models considering objective and 
perceived diversity, respectively).  
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Table 3a. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
structural models in Study 2 considering objective diversity’s effects on the mediators, and 
the mediators’ effects on prejudice at different levels of authoritarianism 
 
Paths   
 
IV 
 MEDIATOR 
   OUTCOME 
 
For 
RWA 
 
For Low 
RWA 
For Medium 
RWA 
For High 
RWA 
 
Cross-sectional       
Objective 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.210*** 
Positive Contact 
T1 
    
M: 0.229*** -0.261*** -0.274*** -0.286*** Prejudice T1 
H: 0.248***     
Objective 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.198** 
Negative Contact 
T1 
    
M: 0.239*** 0.074 0.097* 0.121* Prejudice T1 
H: 0.279***     
Objective 
Diversity  
T2 
L: 0.206*** 
Positive Contact 
T2 
    
M: 0.221*** -0.263*** -0.230*** -0.198*** Prejudice T2 
H: 0.237***     
Objective 
Diversity  
T2 
L: 0.117a 
Negative Contact 
T2 
    
M: 0.205*** 0.094 0.135*** 0.175*** Prejudice T2 
H: 0.293***     
Longitudinal       
Objective 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.063 
Positive Contact 
T2/T1 
    
M: 0.083* -0.053 -0.033 -0.012 Prejudice T2 
H: 0.103*     
Objective 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.057 
Negative Contact 
T2/T1 
    
M: 0.089* 0.027 0.013 -0.001 Prejudice T2 
H: 0.121*     
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table 3b. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
structural models in Study 2 considering objective diversity’s conditional total, direct, and 
indirect effects on prejudice 
 
Paths  
 
 
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Positive Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Negative Contact 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Prejudice T1 
Low 0.062 0.101a -0.053** 0.013 
Medium  0.025 0.065 -0.064*** 0.023* 
  High -0.011 0.029 -0.074*** 0.036* 
Objective  
Diversity T2 
Prejudice T2 
Low 0.010 0.058 -0.054*** 0.011* 
Medium  0.023 0.042 -0.051*** 0.028** 
  High 0.036 0.026 -0.047* 0.052** 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Prejudice T2 
Low -0.010 -0.009 -0.003 0.002 
Medium  0.019 0.020 -0.002 0.002 
  High 0.048 0.049 -0.001 0.000 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table 4a. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
structural models in Study 2 considering perceived diversity’s effects on the mediators, and 
the mediators’ effects on prejudice at different levels of authoritarianism 
 
Paths  
 
 
IV 
 MEDIATOR 
   OUTCOME 
 
For 
RWA 
 
For Low 
RWA 
For Medium 
RWA 
For High 
RWA 
 
Cross-sectional       
Perceived 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.354*** 
Positive Contact 
T1 
    
M: 0.298*** -0.275*** -0.284*** -0.292*** Prejudice T1 
H: 0.243***     
Perceived 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.196** 
Negative Contact 
T1 
    
M: 0.223*** 0.075 0.095* 0.115* Prejudice T1 
H: 0.251***     
Perceived 
Diversity  
T2 
L: 0.247*** 
Positive Contact 
T2 
    
M: 0.236*** -0.253*** -0.221*** -0.188*** Prejudice T2 
H: 0.226***     
Perceived 
Diversity  
T2 
L: 0.097 
Negative Contact 
T2 
    
M: 0.144** 0.098a 0.143*** 0.188*** Prejudice T2 
H: 0.191**     
Longitudinal       
Perceived 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.027 
Positive Contact 
T2/T1 
    
M: 0.030 -0.048 -0.028 -0.007 Prejudice T2 
H: 0.033     
Perceived 
Diversity  
T1 
L: 0.090 
Negative Contact 
T2/T1 
    
M: 0.047 0.032 0.017 0.003 Prejudice T2 
H: 0.004     
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table 4b. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
structural models in Study 2 considering perceived diversity’s conditional total, direct, and 
indirect effects on prejudice 
Paths  
 
 
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Positive Contact 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Negative Contact 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Prejudice T1 
Low -0.033 0.035 -0.087*** 0.016 
Medium  0.019 0.077a -0.082*** 0.021* 
  High 0.071 0.118* -0.074*** 0.028* 
Perceived 
Diversity T2 
Prejudice T2 
Low -0.155** -0.115a -0.051** 0.011 
Medium  -0.042 -0.013 -0.051** 0.020* 
  High 0.071 0.090a -0.051** 0.031* 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Prejudice T2 
Low -0.060 -0.062 -0.001 0.003 
Medium  -0.012 -0.012 -0.001 0.001 
  High 0.036 0.037 0.000 0.000 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
 
 
Brief Discussion 
In Study 2, we were able to replicate the cross-sectional results considering 
objective diversity and prejudice. Indeed, the opposing processes of positive and 
negative intergroup contact largely drive the null effects of objective diversity. 
Moreover, higher objective diversity longitudinally predicted more positive and 
more negative intergroup contact, especially among those with average and high 
levels of authoritarianism. Finally, the cross-sectional results for perceived diversity 
were similar to the objective diversity results, though they were not in line with the 
results considering estimations of diversity in Study 1. It seems that, compared to 
higher estimates of diversity, higher perceived diversity did not show the same 
negative relations with intergroup attitudes, which suggests an intriguing difference 
between both ‘types of measurement’ of diversity perceptions. 
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General Discussion 
The present series of studies investigated the associations of ethnic diversity 
with several aspects of intergroup relations, taking into account important mediators 
(i.e., positive and negative contact and threat) as well as a critical moderator (i.e., 
authoritarianism) of these associations. The results of the multilevel models in Study 
1 and Study 2 indicated that the non-significant overall associations of objective 
diversity with generalized, ingroup, and outgroup trust, as well as with subtle and 
blatant prejudice, were the result of mediating processes through positive and 
negative intergroup contact, working in opposite directions, while intergroup threat 
played no meaningful role.  
Moreover, a closer inspection of the slopes of the indirect effects for 
individuals high versus low in authoritarianism specified that especially among 
moderately and highly authoritarians, higher proportions of ethnic outgroups related 
to both more positive and more negative intergroup contact. The longitudinal results 
in Study 2 showed that, also over time, moderate and high authoritarians engage in 
more (positive as well as negative) contact when diversity levels are higher in their 
local environment.  
Secondly, the results concerning perceptions of diversity yielded an 
interesting insight into the dynamics of diversity ‘in the eye of the beholder’. In 
Study 1, higher estimates of minority proportions (measured via percentage-guesses) 
were related to lower levels of trust and higher levels of prejudice via more negative 
intergroup contact and more outgroup threat, but not via positive intergroup contact. 
Again, these indirect associations were especially present among high authoritarians. 
Remarkably, in Study 2, higher perceived ethnic diversity (asking for respondents’ 
general impressions of diversity on scales ranging from “no diversity” to “a great 
degree of diversity”) showed no associations with prejudice. In fact, overall, higher 
perceived diversity was unrelated to prejudice.  
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Moreover, analogous to the results regarding objective diversity, the non-
significant total associations of perceived diversity with prejudice were mediated by 
both positive and negative intergroup contact. Once more, the slopes for these 
indirect effects tended to be more pronounced among moderate and high 
authoritarians. Longitudinally, however, higher perceptions of diversity were not 
related to higher levels of contact or prejudice over time. In the following, we 
discuss each of these core findings. 
The Repercussions of Ethnic Diversity for Intergroup Relations 
Objective versus Subjective Diversity.  
First and foremost, the results indicate that objective, estimated, and 
perceived indicators of diversity demonstrate differential relationships when it 
comes to intergroup relations. Indeed, whereas higher levels of objective diversity 
and higher perceptions of diversity did not show an overall relationship with 
intergroup attitudes because they simultaneously related to a constructive and a 
harmful process (i.e., both positive and negative intergroup contact), higher 
estimates of diversity were related to more negative intergroup attitudes because 
they related to two harmful processes (i.e., negative intergroup contact and 
perceptions of outgroup threat) at once. In corroboration with previous research, we 
found that the indirect effects of objective diversity via contact appeared to be 
stronger than via threat (e.g., Savelkoul et al., 2011; Schmid et al., 2014). Yet, in line 
with Laurence and colleagues (2017), we argue that it is warranted to look beyond 
just positive contact, as objective diversity offers opportunities for both positive and 
negative contact with ethnic and cultural outgroups.  
Furthermore, we found that higher estimates of diversity sparked feelings of 
threat, corroborating previous research (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2004). We argue that 
estimates of diversity, compared to general evaluations, are far more likely to be 
misjudged, overemphasized, and driven by previous personal attitudes.  
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Indeed, almost all majority members tend to overestimate the actual relative 
size of the minority population (see Hooghe & De Vroome, 2015). It seems 
reasonable that such exaggerated estimates of minority proportions do not form a 
basis for (self-reported) positive experiences with ethnic outgroups. Conversely, our 
findings showed that higher actual minority proportions do stimulate individuals to 
engage in (positive as well as negative) intergroup contact, and as such offer a more 
complete portrait of the opportunities within diverse settings. 
 The Role of Individual Differences in Authoritarianism.  
Our results also highlight the importance of taking individual differences 
into account when testing diversity effects. Our multilevel interaction approach of 
simultaneously including psychological and socio-structural variables in the 
prediction of social phenomena speaks directly to Pettigrew’s (1991, 2008) general 
calls for an integrative ‘contextual social psychology’. Furthermore, by considering 
the interplay between diversity and authoritarianism in various psychological 
processes, our research neatly builds upon the growing scholarly interest in applying 
this person X context interplay to the field of intergroup relations (Hodson & Dhont, 
2015). Indeed, the question of whether and how diversity affects the social cohesion 
of communities has become an increasingly prominent and contested topic of debate 
(see Putnam, 2007) and individual differences in authoritarianism might serve as a 
key variable here.  
Whereas previous research has accumulated evidence for the moderating 
role of authoritarianism in the relations between a) diversity and contact (e.g., Brune 
et al., 2016), b) diversity and threat (e.g., Van Assche et al., 2016), and c) diversity 
and intergroup attitudes (e.g., Kauff et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2014, 2016), the 
question remained how authoritarianism shaped the total, direct and indirect effects 
of diversity via the three main mediating processes. 
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As such, the results of this study extends previous research on diversity, 
intergroup contact and threat (e.g. Hewstone, 2015; Putnam, 2007; Schmid et al., 
2014) by demonstrating that diversity effects are especially pronounced among 
moderate and high authoritarians, and sometimes even non-significant among low 
authoritarians. These findings seem to indicate that in diverse areas, where contact is 
highly likely and presumably more normative, authoritarians do not necessarily 
avoid the outgroup (as is their ‘natural’ inclination). On the contrary, in an 
environment with many ethnic outgroups, authoritarians might perceive contact with 
such groups as inevitable and even normative (see also Brune et al., 2016). 
Remarkably, we replicated the findings of Brune and colleagues (2016) using a 
different diversity indicator (i.e., the proportion of immigrants in Study 1 and 
foreigners in Study 2 versus the proportion of Asians in the Brune et al. study) and a 
different contact indicator (i.e., frequency of positive and frequency of negative 
contact experiences versus an intergroup friendship scale in the Brune et al. study).  
This is noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, authoritarians likely feel more 
threatened by the presence of immigrants and foreigners as opposed to Asians (who 
are usually perceived as more competent; see Asbrock, 2010; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, 
& Xu, 2002). Still, we found that, even over time, authoritarians engage in contact 
with these outgroups. Secondly, where Brune and colleagues show that diversity 
relates to intergroup friendship as an affective high-quality form of contact, we 
corroborate and extend these results by showing that diversity relates to less close 
forms of positive contact (i.e., mere quantity of positive experiences) and even 
negative contact experiences.  
Intriguingly, while our findings indicate that individuals high in 
authoritarianism are most prominently impacted by diversity, they also suggest that 
individuals low in authoritarianism are little affected by diversity in terms of contact, 
threat, and intergroup attitudes. Future studies could specifically focus on low 
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authoritarians by investigating why they are less sensitive to diverse environments 
compared to high authoritarians (see Van Assche et al., 2016). A tentative 
hypothesis could be that low authoritarians also have more intergroup contact and 
immigrant friends outside their local area, and thus depend less on the diversity in 
their direct physical environment for intergroup contact.  
Finally, it is valuable to include several intergroup outcomes when 
examining diversity effects. In our aim to test Putnam’s pessimistic hunkering down 
hypothesis, we took into account five aspects of intergroup attitudes. With regards to 
the consequences of objective and perceived diversity, we found no evidence for any 
detrimental effects across our outcomes. With regards to the correlates of 
estimations of diversity, however, our results suggest that this aspect of diversity is 
indeed connected to greater prejudice and lower trust, in people in general, in ethnic 
outgroups, and even in one’s own ethnic group. Whereas the impact of diversity 
tends to generalize across various intergroup facets, the conclusions for threat and 
contact effects are slightly divergent for outgroup attitudes (i.e., outgroup trust, 
subtle and blatant prejudice) compared to ingroup attitudes (i.e., ingroup trust) and 
more general attitudes (i.e., generalized trust). Positive contact experiences did 
ameliorate all these attitudes (with their largest benefits among high authoritarians; 
see also Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009). Negative contact and threat, on the other hand, 
decreased outgroup trust and increased prejudice for high and low authoritarians 
alike (with the exception that negative contact did not affect low authoritarians’ 
blatant prejudice), but only in low authoritarians did these negative processes also 
decrease ingroup and generalized trust. Indeed, high authoritarians’ perceived 
outgroup threat was even related to more ingroup trust, suggesting that they apply 
some sort of defense mechanism which protects against decreased ingroup trust in 
the face of negative intergroup experiences (cf. Kessler & Cohrs, 2008). Future 
research could dig deeper into this mechanism and test our speculative hypothesis. 
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Strengths, Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The present study included slightly different measures and different levels of 
analysis across two studies, which precludes direct comparisons but offers insights 
in the robustness of our findings. Moreover, by including an objective as well as and 
two subjective measures of diversity, we went beyond most previous diversity 
research. This differentiation is important because the similarity in findings for 
objective and perceived measures indicates that the results found with the perceived 
measure are robust and could not merely be attributed to biased or extreme 
responding. The deviating findings found for estimations of diversity, on the other 
hand, might point to potentially biased responding, something which future research 
may want to investigate in greater detail.  
A second merit bears upon the inclusion of both small-to-medium (i.e., city) 
and medium-to-large (i.e., district) levels of analysis to measure the specific ethnic 
environment of the respondents. In Study 1, we even specifically collected nested 
data with at least 5 observations per contextual unit. The specific choice for a 
relatively broad contextual unit of analysis may however also constitute a drawback, 
as previous studies suggested that ethnic diversity mainly affects trust in the micro-
context, whereas these effects vanish in larger contextual units (Dinesen & 
Sønderskov, 2015; Koster, 2013). Indeed, diversity in the local neighborhood makes 
a stronger impression on individuals (Schaeffer, 2014), being the most direct 
geographical environment in which people spend most of their social time (Tolsma, 
van der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009). Yet, the present study, using two medium levels 
of analysis, showed no main effects of objective as well as perceived diversity, as 
such substantiating previous studies using smaller contextual units-of-analysis (e.g., 
Gijsberts et al., 2012; Schmid et al., 2014) as well as replicating studies that also 
used relatively large levels of analysis (e.g., the country-level study of Hjerm, 2007; 
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the region-level study of Evans and Need, 2002, and the municipality-level study of 
Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). 
Thirdly, by applying longitudinal analyses, we gained greater insight into 
how diversity impacts intergroup contact and prejudice in the longer run. Our results 
indicated that, over a period of two years, higher minority proportions heighten 
positive and negative intergroup contact experiences, but they did not relate to 
prejudice levels over time. There may be various reasons for this lack of longitudinal 
effect on prejudice. Firstly, actual minority proportions did not change that much in 
the two-year period we considered. In fact, the levels dropped on average 0.07%, 
ranging from a small decrease of 1.20% in some districts to a small increase of 
0.30% in others. Secondly, we believe that while contact experiences can easily vary 
both in quantity and quality, prejudiced attitudes may be less subjected to 
momentary circumstances but rather relatively stable across a few months or years, 
leaving not much room for diversity to exert a significant impact (cf., the correlation 
between prejudice at T1 and T2 was .78; see Appendix C, see also Dhont, Van Hiel, 
De Bolle, & Roets, 2012). Future studies may examine the change in the ethnic 
composition and its potential long-term effects on prejudice over a longer period of 
time with special attention to periods with large and sudden upsurges in immigration 
of foreign-born people (cf., the recent increase of refugees).  
Finally, future research may want to use more elaborate (multi-item) 
measures, which are more reliable and may yield larger effect sizes, especially with 
regards to intergroup contact effects (see Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017). Although 
the use of short scales (and particularly the lack of a threat measure in Study 2) is a 
limitation of the current contribution, we believe this research sets an example in 
two other ways. Firstly, in terms of model building, we included many critical 
variables into one coherent and comprehensive model, hence avoiding ‘the Single 
Factor Fallacy’ (i.e., the missing of key variables which might distort results and 
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conclusions; Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017). Secondly, in terms of methodology, we 
acknowledged the complex nature of the effects and processes instigated by 
diversity through applying mediation–moderation multilevel analyses and 
longitudinal research. 
Conclusion 
Our results add a crucial piece of the puzzle that goes beyond previous 
research unraveling the complex and multifaceted diversity effects. By providing 
new insights into the mediating role of contact and threat and the moderating role of 
authoritarianism in the associations of diversity with various facets of intergroup 
relations, this research will hopefully encourage future research to further develop 
the interesting theoretical framework of ethnic diversity, right-wing ideologies and 
intergroup processes and attitudes. 
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Notes 
 1 
As the variances at the contextual level in the mediators and outcomes were rather 
small (all ICCs < 0.05 in Study 1 and < 0.14 in Study 2), we also ran 
individual-level path models in SPSS, using Hayes’ (2013) Process macro 
Model 59 (N = 50.000 bootstrap samples). These analyses yielded virtually 
identical results and are available upon request with the first author. 
2 
Alternative models considering the indirect effects of prejudice in the associations 
of diversity with intergroup contact and threat only provided limited 
evidence for prejudice as a mediator. Additionally, a test of a model 
investigating the conditional effects of objective diversity on subjective 
diversity revealed that, in both studies, the strong and positive associations 
between objective and subjective diversity were especially pronounced 
among medium and high authoritarians (even over time). As such, we 
replicated previous findings by Van Assche and colleagues (2016) in a 
longitudinal sample and in another country. The results of these analyses can 
be found in Appendix D. 
3 Germany is divided into 440 districts (“Kreise”), which are subdivisions of a 
government district ("Regierungsbezirk"), which itself is the subdivision of 
a federal state (“Land or Bundesland”). Sizes of districts vary between 
approximately 35,000 and 3,400,000 inhabitants. 
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Appendix A. Additional Sample Information 
Income Distributions per Sample. 
In Study 1, annual gross household income showed a fairly normal 
distribution, with 9% earning less than €12,500, 13% between €12,500 and €26,000, 
25% between €26,000 and €39,000, 22% between €39,000 and €65,000, and 9% 
earned more than €56,000. Twenty-two percent of the respondents chose the option 
“I do not want to disclose this information”.  
In Study 2, monthly net household income was fairly normally distributed, 
with 1% earning less than €500, 6% between €500 and €1000, 12% between €1000 
and €1500, 20% between €1500 and €2000, 12% between €2000 and €2500, 14% 
between €2500 and €3000, 9% between €3000 and €3500, 6% between €3500 and 
€4000, 7% between €4000 and €4500, 3% between €4500 and €5000, and 5% 
earned more than €5000. Five percent of the respondents chose not to divulge this 
information. Sixty percent of the sample was married, 19% was single, 12% was 
divorced, and 9% was widowed. Finally, 36% was evangelist, 36% did not have any 
religious denomination, 26% was catholic, 1% was Muslim, and 1% categorized 
themselves as belonging to an ‘other religion’. 
 
Appendix B. Changes in Model Fit and Intraclass Correlations per Outcome 
 
S1 
Positive  
Contact 
Negative 
Contact 
Threat Generalized 
Trust 
Ingroup 
Trust 
Outgroup 
Trust 
Subtle 
Prejudice 
Blatant 
Prejudice 
Δχ²(1) 0.43 8.07** 8.94** 0.00 0.02 0.00 4.71* 0.89 
ICC 0.77 4.78 3.89
 
0.00 0.21 0.00 3.02 1.50 
 
S2 
Positive  
Contact 
T1 
Negative 
Contact 
T1 
Prejudice 
T1 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Negative 
Contact 
T2 
Prejudice 
T2 
  
Δχ²(1) 2.93
a 
0.11 0.24 5.07* 0.42 0.64   
ICC 10.61 1.27 2.77 13.91 2.55 4.13   
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Appendix C. Correlations among Study Variables (Table A and Table B) 
 
Table A. Correlations among study variables in Study 1 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Objective 
Diversity 
-          
2. Estimations  
of Diversity 
.41*** -         
3. RWA -.05 .13*** -        
4. Positive 
Contact 
.13*** -.03 -.21*** -       
5. Negative 
Contact 
.13*** .27*** .14*** -.10** -      
6. Outgroup 
Threat 
-.02 .25*** .45*** -.39*** .40*** -     
7. General  
Trust 
-.01 -.20*** -.12** .22*** -.31*** -.27*** -    
8. Ingroup  
Trust 
.01 -.15*** -.06 .17*** -.15*** -.14*** .78*** -   
9. Outgroup 
Trust 
.01 -.19*** -.21*** .33*** -.36*** -.43*** .72*** .66*** -  
10. Subtle 
Prejudice 
.00 .16*** .44*** -.44*** .48*** .76*** -.34*** -.15*** -.49*** - 
11. Blatant 
Prejudice 
.00 .18*** .27*** -.45*** .34*** .63*** -.24*** -.16*** -.38*** .60*** 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table B. Correlations among study variables in Study 2 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Objective  
Diversity T1 
-           
2. Perceived  
Diversity T1 
.43
***
 -          
3. RWA T1 -.25*** .09a -         
4. Positive  
Contact T1 
.29
***
 .32
***
  -.31
***
 -        
5. Negative  
Contact T1 
.22
***
 .23
***
 -.01 .12
*
 -       
6. Subtle  
Prejudice T1 
-.11
*
 -.03 .60
***
 -.40
***
 .07 -      
7. Objective  
Diversity T2 
1.00
***
 .43
***
 -.25
***
 .29
***
 .22
***
 -.11
*
 -     
8. Perceived  
Diversity T2 
.39
***
 .75
***
 -.12
*
 .31
***
 .18
***
 -.06 .39
***
 -    
9. RWA T2 -.24*** -.06 .82*** -.29*** .03 .53*** -.24*** -.09a -   
10. Positive  
Contact T2 
.29
***
 .24
***
 -.35
***
 .66
***
 .09
a 
-.42
***
 .29
***
 .26
***
 -.33
***
 -  
11. Negative  
Contact T2 
.20
***
 .16
***
 -.03 .11
*
 .55
***
 .11
**
 .20
***
 .15
***
 -.07 .08
a 
 
12. Subtle  
Prejudice T2 
-.11
*
 -.05 .54
***
 -.34
***
 .07 .78
***
 -.11* -.07 .55
***
 -.37
***
 .09
a 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Appendix D. Alternative Path Models (Table C, Table D, Table E, Table F, and 
Table G) 
 
Table C. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the structural model in Study 1 considering 
objective diversity’s conditional total, direct, and indirect effects on intergroup 
contact and threat 
 
Paths  
 
    
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Generalized  
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via 
Ingroup 
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via 
Outgroup 
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via 
Subtle 
Prejudice 
Indirect  
Effect  
via 
Blatant 
Prejudice 
Objective  
Diversity 
Positive  
Contact 
Low 0.091a 0.072 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.012 0.003 
Medium  0.124** 0.131*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 
  High 0.157** 0.189*** 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.012 
Objective  
Diversity 
Negative  
Contact 
Low 0.081 0.089* -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.014 0.000 
Medium  0.135*** 0.115*** 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 
  High 0.189*** 0.142*** 0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.037 0.004 
Objective  
Diversity 
Threat 
Low -0.045 -0.013 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.021 -0.004 
Medium  0.005 -0.009 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.005 
  High 0.055 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.044 0.008 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table D. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the structural model in Study 1 considering 
estimations of diversity’s conditional total, direct, and indirect effects on intergroup 
contact and threat 
 
Paths  
 
    
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Generalized  
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via 
Ingroup 
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via 
Outgroup 
Trust 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Subtle 
Prejudice 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Blatant 
Prejudice 
Estimations 
of 
Diversity 
Positive  
Contact 
Low 0.017 0.103* -0.003 0.010 -0.027 -0.023 -0.036 
Medium  -0.004 0.085
*
 0.001 -0.002
 
-0.022 -0.022 -0.043 
  High -0.024 0.067 0.034 -0.044 -0.003 -0.020 -0.051 
Estimations of 
Diversity 
Negative  
Contact 
Low 0.231
***
 0.171
***
 0.021 -0.006 0.031 0.028 0.000 
Medium  0.257
***
 0.179
***
 0.029
**
 -0.016
* 
0.018 0.040
***
 0.006 
  High 0.283
***
 0.186
***
 0.038** -0.025
**
 0.007 0.054
***
 0.013 
Estimations of 
Diversity 
Threat 
Low 0.190
***
 0.094
**
 -0.004 -0.005 0.028
*
 0.041 0.043
***
 
Medium  0.192
***
 0.096
**
 -0.003 -0.007
 
0.016
*
 0.052
***
 0.039
***
 
  High 0.194
***
 0.099
**
 -0.002 -0.008 0.007 0.064
***
 0.032
**
 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table E. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
structural models considering objective diversity’s conditional total, direct, and 
indirect effects on intergroup contact and threat 
 
Paths  
 
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Prejudice 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Positive  
Contact T1 
Low 0.210*** 0.221*** -0.025 
Medium  0.229*** 0.243*** -0.009 
  High 0.248*** 0.265*** 0.004 
Objective  
Diversity T2 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Low 0.206*** 0.198** -0.004 
Medium  0.221*** 0.224*** -0.007 
  High 0.237*** 0.250*** -0.008 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Low 0.063 0.061 0.001 
Medium  0.083* 0.086* -0.003 
  High 0.103* 0.109* -0.006 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Negative  
Contact T1 
Low 0.198** 0.188** 0.007 
Medium  0.239*** 0.234*** 0.003 
  High 0.279*** 0.280*** -0.001 
Objective  
Diversity T2 
Negative  
Contact T2 
Low 0.117a 0.115a 0.002 
Medium  0.205*** 0.203*** 0.004 
  High 0.293*** 0.291*** 0.007 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Negative  
Contact T2 
Low 0.057 0.058 -0.001 
Medium  0.089* 0.087a 0.002 
  High 0.121* 0.115* 0.006 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table F. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
structural models considering perceived diversity’s conditional total, direct, and 
indirect effects on intergroup contact and threat 
 
Paths  
 
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Direct  
Effect 
Indirect  
Effect  
via Prejudice 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Positive  
Contact T1 
Low 0.354*** 0.332*** 0.012 
Medium  0.298*** 0.300*** -0.007 
  High 0.243*** 0.267*** -0.024 
Perceived 
Diversity T2 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Low 0.247*** 0.189** 0.052* 
Medium  0.236*** 0.215*** 0.012 
  High 0.226*** 0.241*** -0.015 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Positive  
Contact T2 
Low 0.027 0.019 0.008 
Medium  0.030 0.028 0.002 
  High 0.033 0.038 -0.005 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Negative  
Contact T1 
Low 0.196** 0.206** -0.004 
Medium  0.223*** 0.225*** 0.002 
  High 0.251*** 0.244*** 0.007 
Perceived 
Diversity T2 
Negative  
Contact T2 
Low 0.097 0.129a -0.031a 
Medium  0.144** 0.154** -0.008 
  High 0.191** 0.180** 0.013 
Perceived 
Diversity T1 
Negative  
Contact T2 
Low 0.090 0.096a -0.007 
Medium  0.047 0.048 -0.001 
  High 0.004 0.000 0.004 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Table G. Path analysis: standardized estimates of the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
structural models considering objective diversity’s conditional effects on 
estimations of diversity and perceived diversity  
 
Paths    
From To 
For  
RWA 
Total  
Effect 
Objective  
Diversity 
Estimations of 
Diversity 
Low 0.381*** 
Medium  0.423*** 
  High 0.464*** 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Perceived  
Diversity T1 
Low 0.366*** 
Medium  0.444*** 
  High 0.522*** 
Objective  
Diversity T2 
Perceived  
Diversity T2 
Low 0.245*** 
Medium  0.400*** 
  High 0.556*** 
Objective  
Diversity T1 
Perceived  
Diversity T2 
Low 0.005 
Medium  0.079* 
  High 0.153** 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Chapter 6 
 
Positive neighborhood norms buffer ethnic 
diversity effects on neighborhood dissatisfaction, 
perceived neighborhood disadvantage, and 
moving intentions 
 
 
Abstract 
Positive neighborhood norms, such as strong local networks, are critical to people’s 
satisfaction with, perceived disadvantage of, and intentions to stay in their 
neighborhood. At the same time, local ethnic diversity is said to be detrimental for 
these community outcomes. Integrating both frameworks, we tested whether the 
negative consequences of diversity occur even when perceived social norms are 
positive. Study 1 (N = 1,760 German adults) showed that perceptions of positive 
neighborhood norms buffered against the effects of perceived diversity on moving 
intentions via neighborhood satisfaction and perceived neighborhood disadvantage. 
Study 2 (N = 993 Dutch adults) replicated and extended this moderated mediation 
model using other characteristics of diversity (i.e., objective and estimated minority 
proportions). Multilevel analyses again revealed consistent buffering effects of 
positive neighborhood norms. Our findings are discussed in light of the ongoing 
public and political debate concerning diversity and social and communal life. 
 
 
This chapter is based on Van Assche, J., Asbrock, F., Roets, A., & Kauff, M. (in press). Positive 
neighborhood norms buffer ethnic diversity effects on neighborhood dissatisfaction, perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage, and moving intentions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 
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Introduction 
Renowned political scientist Robert Putnam (1993) advanced a 
‘communitarian’ understanding of social capital, emphasizing that positive 
neighborhood norms (e.g., strong local networks, mutual trust, and joint activities) 
greatly improve social life in a local area. At the same time, he argued that living in 
an ethnically diverse environment is detrimental for social cohesion (Putnam, 2007). 
The latter claim, also known as the ‘constrict’ hypothesis, has been the subject of a 
hot and unresolved debate among policy makers as well as academics.  
Putnam’s former claim, however, has received far less attention in social 
psychological and political sciences, and, to our knowledge, research integrating 
both frameworks is currently lacking. The aim of the current manuscript is to 
investigate how ethnic diversity might affect neighborhood satisfaction, perceptions 
of neighborhood disadvantage, and moving intentions, while simultaneously taking 
into account the possible buffering role of positive neighborhood norms.  
Positive Neighborhood Norms and Neighborhood Life  
Positive neighborhood norms and beliefs, including friendships, reciprocity, 
helping behaviors, neighborhood involvement, and a sense of community, constitute 
some of the key dimensions of local neighborhood life (Portes, 1998). In a 
neighborhood setting, norms are unwritten social rules for interactions with other 
residents and one’s behavior in public spaces. These shared norms are not always 
positive. In some cases, they may deliberately exclude outsiders and impose general 
negativity on group members (Portes, 1998). In the same vein, perceptions of 
negative neighborhood norms coincide with perceptions of lower neighborhood 
quality and perceptions of greater neighborhood disadvantage and deterioration. This 
has been called the ‘dark side of social capital’ (Portes & Landolt, 1996).  
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However, the perception of positive norms in terms of a mutual dependency 
where residents live peacefully alongside each other, maintain common beliefs and 
trust, and cooperate successfully in case of shared interest, is an important basis of 
neighborhood satisfaction (e.g., Kleinhans, 2009). Moreover, positive local norms 
and strong social bonds are also important determinants of residents’ intentions to 
stay in their neighborhood rather than move away (Connerly, 1986; Speare, 1974). 
Prior research further proposed that residents’ neighborhood satisfaction can be 
considered a critical predictor of their mobility intentions (e.g., Lu, 1998; Morris, 
Crull, & Winter, 1976). Indeed, when people feel satisfied with their neighborhood, 
they feel closely attached to their local area, and this strong identification with the 
neighborhood as a focal social category reduces their intentions to move away 
(Giuliani, 2003; see also Tajfel, 1982).  
Ethnic Diversity and Neighborhood Life  
A second body of literature which advanced our understanding of 
neighborhood satisfaction, perceptions of neighborhood disadvantage, and 
residential mobility, is based on contextual ‘neighborhood effects’ studies. 
Originating from Schelling's theoretical work (1969), various researchers have 
proposed that the specific composition of a neighborhood, and more particularly, the 
occurrence of high concentrations of ethnic minorities, can exert a detrimental effect 
on residents’ decisions to stay. Indeed, empirical studies have shown that individuals 
have a stronger wish to leave their neighborhood when they are different from their 
neighbors (e.g., Clark, 1991). In line with these results, studies also demonstrated 
that higher proportions of ethnic minorities in a neighborhood relate to a higher 
probability that residents wanted to leave their neighborhood (e.g., Feijten & Van 
Ham, 2009; Van Ham & Feijten, 2008). Literature on the ‘White flight hypothesis’ 
(Crowder, 2000) corroborates this evidence by linking the likelihood of Whites 
leaving their neighborhood to an increased share of minorities.  
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For a better understanding of the processes underlying the effect of diversity 
on moving intentions, it is important to investigate how diversity affects the 
predictors of moving intentions. Indeed, despite the bulk of research linking higher 
diversity to higher moving intentions, little attention has been paid to the potential 
association of diversity with neighborhood satisfaction and perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage (for a notable exception, see Laurence & Bentley, 2015). In particular, 
previous research primarily focused on the consequences of diversity for intergroup 
relations and attitudes. On the one hand, higher diversity has been shown to relate to 
more contact experiences with ethnic minorities (e.g., Wagner, Van Dick, Pettigrew, 
& Christ, 2003; Brune, Asbrock, & Sibley, 2016). On the other hand, higher 
diversity has also been associated with more prejudice (e.g., Cernat, 2010; Quillian, 
1995), more feelings of outgroup threat (Semyonov, Raijman, Tov, & Schmidt, 
2004; Taylor, 1998), and lower levels of trust (both between and within ethnic 
groups; Putnam, 2007).  
Moreover, Putnam (2007) claimed that, in the face of diversity, individuals 
“pull in like a turtle” (p. 149) and withdraw from others and from social life at large. 
In line with this constrict claim, we assume that higher diversity would also relate to 
lower levels of neighborhood satisfaction and greater perception of disadvantage in 
that neighborhood. Some studies already focused on the perception of personal 
threat in one’s neighborhood as a result of diversity (Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 
2001; Van Assche, Roets, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014, 2016). For example, Van 
Assche and colleagues (2014) showed that higher perceptions of diversity as well as 
higher actual levels of diversity, were related to higher perceptions of neighborhood 
threat in terms of street crime, vandalism, poverty, community demise and 
degradation, drug abuse, and unemployment.  
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In line with these findings, Swaroop and Krysan (2001) and Hipp (2009) 
already reported that those perceiving more ethnic heterogeneity tend to perceive 
more social and physical disorder and more crime in their neighborhood, and they 
are less satisfied. These studies indicate that diversity has the potential to evoke 
lower neighborhood satisfaction and greater perceptions of neighborhood 
disadvantage. Such perceptions of a deteriorating neighborhood potentially increase 
the odds that someone wants move away (see Kearns & Parkes, 2010).  
Joint Effects of Diversity and Norms  
Ethnic diversity might thus instill greater moving intentions via lower 
neighborhood satisfaction and higher perceived neighborhood disadvantage, but the 
strength of such effects might also depend on the norms within the local 
environment. The seminal work of Uslaner (2011, 2012) suggests that segregation, 
rather than diversity, is the real culprit in worsened intergroup relations. Indeed, the 
various ethnic groups in diverse neighborhoods often have very little interpersonal 
interaction, and it is exactly this segregation in everyday life that inhibits the 
formation of close personal ties and positive local norms (see Hewstone, 2015).  
On the other hand, diverse neighborhoods with positive social interaction 
norms might offer an optimal context to foster integration and to buffer against the 
potential detrimental effects of diversity on neighborhood life (Aberson, 2010). 
Indeed, Schmid, Al Ramiah, and Hewstone (2014) already showed that the harmful 
effects of diversity disappear when local intergroup contact experiences are taken 
into account.  
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Furthermore, studies have shown that merely having friends who have 
positive intergroup contact experiences can be beneficial to intergroup relations and 
attitudes (i.e., the extended contact hypothesis; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & 
Ropp, 1997). The effectiveness of such indirect experiences is especially 
encouraging for it signals that mere knowledge that others have positive relations 
with minorities, can help transform attitudes. Positive social norms in a 
neighborhood communicate these relationship standards at a broader level and thus 
could sort similar effects at a more general scale.  
We therefore assert that perceptions of positive versus negative 
neighborhood norms could play a crucial role in how ethnic diversity is related to 
neighborhood satisfaction, to perceived neighborhood disadvantage, and in turn, to 
moving intentions. In particular, we hypothesize that especially for residents 
perceiving negative norms in their neighborhood, ethnic diversity predicts reduced 
neighborhood satisfaction, increased perception of neighborhood disadvantage, and 
heightened moving intentions. Conversely however, for those perceiving positive 
norms in their local environment, diversity should not have such detrimental 
repercussions.  
To study these effects of neighborhood norms, we believe that it is 
warranted to carefully consider the concept of neighborhood norms (see Alaimo, 
Reischl, & Allen, 2010), by looking into both general relational norms (pertaining to 
the general relations between residents) and intergroup relational norms (pertaining 
to the specific relations between immigrants and natives).
1
  
The Present Studies  
The current manuscript aims to fill the gap in fundamental research on 
several aspects of neighborhood life, i.e., neighborhood satisfaction, perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage, and moving intentions.  
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Putting together various perspectives in the literature, we propose a unifying 
moderated mediation framework in order to advance a more complete understanding 
of residents’ moving intentions (see Figure 1). In particular, across two studies, we 
examine the buffering effects of positive neighborhood norms in the relationships of 
diversity with neighborhood satisfaction, and with perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage. Furthermore, we expect that higher neighborhood satisfaction further 
relates to lower moving intentions and that higher perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage further relates to greater moving intentions. 
In sum, we hypothesize that for those who perceive the neighborhood norms 
to be positive, diversity will not be detrimental for neighborhood satisfaction, and 
will not elevate perceptions of disadvantage. Consequentially, diversity will not 
heighten moving intentions when neighborhood norms are positive.  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of the associations between diversity, neighborhood norms and 
moving intentions via neighborhood satisfaction and perceived neighborhood disadvantage 
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To investigate each of these issues, we identify a number of considerations 
that deserve greater attention. First, Koopmans and Schaeffer (2015) indicated that it 
is important to take into account objective diversity as well as subjective diversity. 
For objective diversity, straightforward measures of minority proportions can be 
used (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2004). To assess subjective diversity, some previous 
studies have used a Likert scale (e.g., Van Assche et al., 2014), where other studies 
asked respondents to estimate minority proportions (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2004). 
However, Hooghe and De Vroome (2015) showed that individuals are quite 
inaccurate in estimating the actual proportion of minorities in the area they live in, 
and they recommend including both Likert scales and (potentially biased or 
exaggerated) estimations when investigating the perception of ethnic diversity. 
Accordingly, after we tap into only one aspect of diversity (i.e., perceived diversity) 
in Study 1, we consider no less than three aspects of diversity (i.e., perceived, 
estimated, and objective diversity) in Study 2, as a robustness check for our findings 
regarding the tested model.  
Secondly, when examining the effects of specific variables on moving 
intentions, it is crucial to also control for a wide variety of individual and contextual 
characteristics that already have been demonstrated to significantly affect mobility 
decisions (Crowder, 2000). Therefore, the present study took into account twelve 
background and control characteristics.
2
 In particular, in all analyses across both 
studies, we included age and gender, as older individuals tend to show lower moving 
intentions (Long, 1988), and women tend to move more often than men 
(McLanahan, 1983). We further controlled for participants’ education level, as this 
relates positively to moving intentions by expanding awareness of alternative 
residential options (Long, 1973; South & Deane, 1993).  
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Greater family income may increase mobility by making a wider range of 
alternative housing options available and by improving the ability to move in case of 
dissatisfaction with current residential conditions (Landale & Guest, 1985; Newman 
& Duncan, 1979). Furthermore, marital status was taken into account, as married 
persons tend to move less frequently than the unmarried (South & Deane, 1993), and 
number of persons in the household was also controlled for, as the presence of more 
children tends to impede moving intentions by increasing ties to the local 
community and reliance on its resources and institutions (Rossi, 1955).  
Moreover, we controlled for home ownership and time lived in the house. 
Indeed, compared to renters, homeowners tend to be more tied to the community 
because of their substantial financial investments in their current dwelling and their 
greater cost and inconvenience of moving (Bach & Smith, 1977; Landale & Guest, 
1985; Rossi, 1955; Speare, 1974). The same reasoning applies to the number of 
years people have been living in their house, which constitutes our eighth 
background variable.  
In Study 2, we also considered satisfaction with the residence (i.e., the house 
itself) and external pressure to live in one’s current house as additional individual-
level control variables. Finally, in Study 2, we also were able to obtain and include 
objective neighborhood-level markers of security and crime as context-level control 
variables. 
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
We analyzed a representative sample of German ethnic majority members 
(N = 1,760) from the 2007 wave of the Group-Focused Enmity project (Heitmeyer, 
2002), specifically tapping into perceptions of neighborhood norms. The mean age 
of the sample was 47 years (SD = 16.02) and 44% were men. Twenty-eight percent 
of the participants had completed primary school, 20% had completed lower high 
school, 33% upper high school, and 18% had a college or university degree.  
Income distributions are provided in Appendix A (OSF: 
https://osf.io/pe2fg). The average number of persons per household was 2.46 (SD = 
1.32), and 54% of the respondents was owner of their house (vs. 46% tenant or 
subtenant). Finally, 8% of the sample had been living in their house since birth, 61% 
since 5 years or more, 18% between 2 and 5 years, 10% between 6 months and 2 
years, and 3% had only been living in their house for six months or less.  
Measures  
Perceived Diversity.  
To assess perceived diversity, respondents had to indicate ‘How many 
foreigners are there in your neighborhood?’ using a four-point rating scale ranging 
from one (very few) to four (a lot; M = 1.87, SD = 0.80).  
Positive Perceived Neighborhood Norms.  
To assess respondents’ perceptions of the norms within their neighborhood, 
they were asked to evaluate two statements using four-point Likert scales anchored 
by one (not at all true) and four (totally true). These items were ‘People like to help 
each other in my neighborhood’ and ‘People know each other well in my 
neighborhood’. The items were strongly positively correlated (r = .54, p < .001), 
yielding a scale with M = 3.17 (SD = 0.72).  
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Neighborhood Satisfaction.  
Neighborhood satisfaction was measured with two items, reading ‘I feel 
connected with my neighborhood’ and ‘I feel at home in my neighborhood’. 
Respondents answered those items on a scale anchored by one (not at all true) and 
four (totally true). Both items were strongly positively correlated (r = .51, p < .001), 
yielding a scale with M = 3.45 (SD = 0.62).  
Perceived Neighborhood Disadvantage.  
Six indicators of perceived disadvantage in one’s neighborhood were 
administered as follows: ‘Below, a number of societal problems are listed. Please 
indicate for each of the problems to what extent they occur in the neighborhood 
where you live: Garbage and bulky waste strewn on birch pavements and green 
areas; Drunk people; Drug addicts and drug dealers; Destroyed telephone boxes, 
letterboxes, dustbins, bus stops, and benches; Sprayed, smeared walls; People who 
threaten, rip off or beat up others’. Respondents answered all items on four-point 
Likert scales ranging from one (not a problem at all) to four (a big problem). An 
exploratory factor analysis with the principal-axis extraction method on these six 
indicators of perceived neighborhood disadvantage showed that, based on the 
eigenvalues and scree plot, all items loaded on a single factor. Cronbach’s alpha was 
.93, with M = 2.00 (SD = 0.99).  
Moving Intentions.  
Two items tapped into moving intentions: ‘I would prefer to live in another 
part of town’, and ‘I would rather live in another town. Respondents answered using 
four-point Likert scales ranging from one (not at all true) to four (totally true). The 
items showed a moderate positive relationship (r = .25, p < .001). Yet, as testing 
them individually yielded identical effects, the items were collapsed into a single 
measure (with M = 1.56, SD = 0.71) for all analyses. 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses  
The correlations among all study variables are presented in Table 1. Strong 
positive associations were found between perceived norms and neighborhood 
satisfaction, and strong negative relations were found between these two variables 
and moving intentions. An opposite pattern was revealed for perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage, which was negatively associated with perceived norms 
and neighborhood satisfaction, and positively related to moving intentions.  
Most importantly, however, were the negative associations of perceived 
diversity with perceived norms and neighborhood satisfaction, and the positive 
relations of perceived diversity with neighborhood disadvantage and moving 
intentions. Overall, as opposed to those perceiving low diversity, individuals who 
perceive their neighborhood to be highly diverse tend to perceive less positive norms 
and more disadvantage in their neighborhood, tend to be less satisfied with their 
neighborhood, and to show higher intentions to move.  
 
Table 1. Correlations among study variables in Study 1 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1.         Perceived diversity -    
2. Perceived norms -.28*** -   
3. Neighborhood satisfaction -.16*** .34*** -  
4. Neighborhood disadvantage .15*** -.08***  -.08*** - 
5. Moving intentions .20*** -.23*** -.51*** .08*** 
Note: *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Second, because respondents were nested within Kreis-districts, we 
investigated whether it was warranted to control for this nested structure using 
multilevel analyses. We estimated empty (intercept-only) models which provide 
insight in the variances in our mediators and outcome at the individual and 
contextual level. We also assessed the intraclass correlations (ICCs) to explore if 
there was substantial between-level variance, justifying the use of multilevel 
modeling. Taking into account the higher-level structure did not significantly 
improve the goodness-of-fit statistics for neighborhood satisfaction (i.e., change in -
2 * log-likelihood χ²(1) = 0.27, p = .60; ICC = .00) and moving intentions (χ²(1) = 
0.09, p = .77; ICC = .00). However, taking into account the higher-level structure 
significantly improved the goodness-of-fit for disadvantage (i.e., χ²(1) = 9.50, p = 
.002; ICC = .02). Therefore, for specific analyses with perceived disadvantage as 
outcome, we applied multilevel analyses that controlled for the fact that perceptions 
of disadvantage are more alike within than between districts. 
Main Analyses  
First, we investigated whether positive perceptions of neighborhood norms 
moderated the association of diversity with neighborhood satisfaction, neighborhood 
disadvantage, and moving intentions. We conducted three regression analyses, 
testing the effects of diversity with norms as moderator, controlling for a number of 
relevant background variables (i.e., age, gender, education, household income, 
marital status, number of persons in the household, whether or not one owned the 
house, and the time lived in the house). These three interaction terms were further 
examined by means of simple slope analyses, testing the significance of the 
regression slopes at two levels of the moderator, that is, at low (i.e., < 1 SD below 
the mean) and high (i.e., > 1 SD above the mean) levels of perceived neighborhood 
norms.  
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All predictors were centered before running the analyses (Aiken & West, 
1991). Table 2 summarizes the results of these analyses. In line with our 
expectations, all interaction effects were significant. Simple slope analyses showed 
that higher perceptions of neighborhood ethnic diversity were only associated with 
less neighborhood satisfaction and more perceived neighborhood disadvantage 
among people perceiving less positive norms in their neighborhood, and not among 
those perceiving positive norms in their neighborhood.  
Notably, although perceived diversity was still significantly positively 
related to higher moving intentions when perceived norms were positive, the slope 
was considerable weaker, indicating that the buffering effect of positive 
neighborhood norms also played a role with regards to moving intentions.  
 
Table 2. Standardized and unstandardized estimates (CI95 in Brackets) of regression analyses 
in Study 1 examining the role of perceived norms in neighborhood satisfaction, perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage, and moving intentions (controlling for background 
characteristics) 
 
 Neighborhood  
Satisfaction 
Neighborhood  
Disadvantage 
Moving  
Intentions 
 β b  
[CI95] 
β b  
[CI95] 
β b  
[CI95] 
Perceived  
Diversity (PD) 
-0.05* -0.04  
[-0.08; -0.01] 
0.10*** 0.12  
[0.06; 0.19] 
0.13*** 0.12  
[0.07; 0.16] 
Perceived  
Norms (PN) 
0.27*** 0.23  
[0.19; 0.27] 
-0.02 -0.03  
[-0.10; 0.04] 
-0.15*** -0.15 
[-0.20; -0.10] 
PD X PN 0.05* 0.04  
[0.01; 0.09] 
-0.08*** -0.12  
[-0.19; -0.04] 
-0.06** -0.06 
[-0.11; -0.01] 
 PD effect for low PN -0.09*** -0.07  
[-0.12; -0.03] 
0.17*** 0.21  
[0.13; 0.28] 
0.18*** 0.16 
[0.11; 0.21] 
PD effect for high PN -0.01 -0.01  
[-0.06; 0.04] 
0.03 0.04  
[-0.05; 0.13] 
0.08* 0.07 
[0.01; 0.13] 
Note: *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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To test the conditional indirect effects of diversity on moving intentions via 
neighborhood satisfaction and disadvantage, we conducted bootstrap analyses (N = 
50,000 bootstrap samples) using Hayes’ Process macro (2013) in which the 
associations between the predictor (i.e., perceived diversity) and the mediators (i.e., 
neighborhood satisfaction and perceived disadvantage) were moderated by perceived 
neighborhood norms (Model 7; Hayes, 2013; see Figure 2). Again, we controlled for 
all relevant background characteristics.  
 
Figure 2. Standardized results of the model in Study 1 testing the association of perceived 
diversity with moving intentions via neighborhood satisfaction and perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage, at high and low levels of perceived positive neighborhood norms (controlling 
for background characteristics) 
 
 
Note: *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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The model tests revealed that the indirect associations of higher diversity 
with higher moving intentions through lower neighborhood satisfaction were only 
significant for those perceiving less positive norms in their neighborhood (b = 0.04; 
boot S.E. = 0.02; β = 0.04; p < .001), but not for those perceiving positive norms in 
their neighborhood (b = 0.01; boot S.E. = 0.02; β = 0.01; p = .69). The indirect 
associations of higher diversity with higher moving intentions through higher 
neighborhood disadvantage were not significant for people both low (b = 0.00; boot 
S.E. = 0.00; β = 0.00; p = .25) and high in perceived norms (b = 0.00; boot S.E. = 
0.00; β = 0.00; p = .48). Finally, neighborhood satisfaction, but not perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage, further related to less moving intentions.  
Hence, when taken together, only neighborhood satisfaction turned out to 
have unique effects on moving intentions. In line with this finding, the indirect effect 
via satisfaction was significantly stronger than the indirect effect via perceived 
disadvantage (bsatisfaction- disadvantage = 0.05; boot S.E. = 0.01; CI95 = [0.02; 
0.07]). 
Study 2 
Study 1 showed that positive norms affect the effects of diversity 
perceptions, indicating that diversity perceptions increase moving intentions mostly 
for those who do not perceive positive norms in their neighborhood. These results as 
such specify how important positive norms are for the residents of a neighborhood, 
and especially when that neighborhood is diverse in ethnic composition. Study 2 
aimed to further delineate this buffering role of positive neighborhood norms in the 
associations of diversity with neighborhood satisfaction, perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage, and moving intentions.  
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Study 2 moved beyond Study 1 in three important ways. First, Study 2 was 
conducted in the Netherlands, another Western European country with a fair share of 
immigrants and foreigners. Secondly, in Study 2, we tapped into the effects of 
various aspects/measurements of diversity (i.e., perceived, estimated, and objective 
diversity). Third, while Study 1 tapped into perceptions of general norms in one’s 
neighborhood, Study 2 tapped specifically into perceptions of intergroup norms. In 
sum, this study investigated the combined effects of various aspects of neighborhood 
diversity and norms on moving intentions via neighborhood satisfaction and 
disadvantage.  
Method 
Participants  
We used a nationally stratified sample of Dutch majority members (N = 993) 
nested within neighborhoods (N = 688; mean number of observations per 
neighborhood M = 1.44). This dataset was collected online in 2015 through an 
independent ISO 26362-certified survey company. The mean age of the sample was 
50 years (SD = 16.70) and 52% were men. Thirty-three percent of the participants 
had completed primary school, 39% had completed high school and 28% had a 
college or university degree. Fifty-four percent of the sample was doing paid work 
(see Appendix A for income distributions).  
On average, participants had been living in their neighborhood for 18 years 
(SD = 14.24). Sixty percent of the respondents was owner of their house, and 60% 
had children. Specifically, 40% of the sample was living in partnership without 
children, 28% was living in partnership without children, 18% was living alone, 7% 
was living with their parent(s) or caretaker(s), 4% was living without partner with 
children, and 3% was cohousing with non-relatives.  
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Measures  
Diversity.  
Perceived Diversity. We used two items to assess subjectively perceived 
diversity in one’s neighborhood (see also Van Assche et al., 2014). These items read 
‘How many people of origin live in your neighborhood?’ and ‘There is a high 
chance of meeting people of immigrant origin in my neighborhood’. Respondents 
answered using seven-point rating scales ranging from one (none / totally disagree, 
respectively) to seven (a lot / totally agree, respectively). Both items were strongly 
positively related (r = .71, p < .001), yielding a scale with M = 3.82 (SD = 1.70).  
Estimated Diversity. Another way to tap into perceptions of diversity is to 
assess estimates of local minority proportions (see also Semyonov et al., 2004). To 
measure estimated diversity, participants specified their estimated percentage of 
non-Western immigrants living in their neighborhood, with M = 19.00% (SD = 
19.14, MIN = 0.00%, MAX = 90.00%).  
Objective Diversity. To assess the actual diversity in respondents’ 
neighborhood, we calculated the percentage of non-Western minority members 
within their specific neighborhood within the year of data-collection (see also Van 
Assche et al., 2016). We used the available data from the Dutch Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS, 2015).  
To get a measure of objective diversity, we calculated the number of 
individuals per neighborhood of non-Western origin as a percentage of the total 
number of registered inhabitants (M = 12.69%, SD = 12.11, MIN = 0.00%, MAX = 
76.30%).  
Positive Perceived Neighborhood Norms.  
To specifically assess respondents’ perceptions of the intergroup norms 
within their neighborhood, they were asked to evaluate two statements using seven-
point Likert scales anchored by one (totally disagree) and seven (totally agree).  
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These items are ‘In the neighborhood where I live, there is an atmosphere in 
which immigrants and natives have the will to move forward together’ and ‘In the 
neighborhood where I live, many people like to have contact with people of another 
ethnic group’. These items were strongly positively correlated (r = .70, p < .001), 
yielding a scale with M = 3.96 (SD = 1.15). 
Neighborhood Satisfaction.  
Neighborhood satisfaction was measured with two items, reading ‘I am 
satisfied with my neighborhood’ and ‘I like to live in my neighborhood’. 
Respondents answered those items on a scale anchored by one (totally disagree) and 
seven (totally agree). Both items were strongly positively correlated (r = .87, p < 
.001), yielding a scale with M = 5.69 (SD = 1.39).  
Perceived Neighborhood Disadvantage.  
We administered three indicators of perceived disadvantage in one’s 
neighborhood, presented as follows: ‘How problematic are the following things in 
your neighborhood? Poor condition of the streets and houses; Crime; 
Unemployment’. Respondents answered seven-point Likert scales ranging from one 
(totally not problematic) to seven (totally problematic). Cronbach’s alpha was .82, 
with M = 2.82 (SD = 1.30).  
Moving Intentions.  
Finally, we administered moving intentions by three items using seven-point 
Likert scales anchored by one (totally disagree) and seven (totally agree). An 
example item reads ‘I think about moving to another neighborhood in my town or 
city in the near future’. All items were collapsed into a scale (α = .69; M = 2.23; SD 
= 1.41).  
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Control Variables.  
In addition to the background characteristics that relate to moving intentions 
administered in Study 1, we also assessed residence satisfaction and external 
pressure to live in one’s current house as additional control variables. First, 
participants had to indicate on a scale ranging from one (totally disagree) to seven 
(totally agree) to what extend they agreed with the following question: ‘I am 
satisfied with my residence (i.e., the house or apartment itself, not the location or 
neighborhood)’, with M = 5.73 (SD = 1.64). Next, respondents had to indicate on a 
scale anchored by one (totally voluntarily) and seven (totally out of necessity) to 
what extend they chose their current residence voluntarily (e.g., the house and/or 
neighborhood are ideal) or out of necessity (e.g., cheap rent or sale price), with M = 
2.20 (SD = 1.84).  
Finally, we also considered two objective neighborhood-level control 
variables that might affect neighborhood satisfaction and particularly perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage and moving intentions. We retrieved the objective 
indicators of neighborhood livability from the data provided by the Dutch Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, i.e., ‘Leefbaarometer’ [Livability barometer] (Leidelmeijer, 
Marlet, Van Iersel, Van Woerkens, & Van der Reijden, 2008). This website 
(www.leefbaarometer.nl) provides biennial data for 49 indicators on six dimensions 
that reflect quality of life. We used the data from 2015 for the dimension ‘security’, 
representing an objective indication of the safety in Dutch neighborhoods.  
The various indicators of the security-dimension are ruination, disruption of 
public policy, violent felonies, car thefts and nuisance. Every zip-code is graded 
with a number between -50 and 50, with zero being the national average. The mean 
of this scale was- 2.74 (SD = 26.69).  
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Additionally, we were able to retrieve objective number of crimes from the 
Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2015) and calculated the relative crime rate 
as a function of the number of inhabitants for every zip-code as a second indicator of 
objective deprivation (M = 0.03%, SD = 0.03).  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses  
First, the correlations among all study variables were calculated (see Table 
3). As in Study 1, we found moderately positive associations between perceived 
norms and neighborhood satisfaction, and strong negative relations were found 
between these variables and moving intentions. Again, an opposite pattern was 
revealed for perceived neighborhood disadvantage. We replicated the negative 
associations of perceived diversity with norms and neighborhood satisfaction, and 
the positive relations of perceived diversity with neighborhood disadvantage and 
moving intentions found in Study 1.  
 
Table 3. Correlations among study bariables in Study 2 
 
Measure  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.         Perceived diversity -      
2. Estimated diversity .69*** -     
3. Objective diversity .53*** .60*** -    
4. Perceived norms -.07* -.08* .01 -   
5. Neighborhood satisfaction -.32*** -.38*** -.22*** .13*** -  
6. Neighborhood disadvantage .49*** .51***  .36*** -.16*** -.43*** - 
7. Moving intentions .19*** .23*** .10** -.07* -.51*** .29*** 
Note: *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
Chapter 6 
 
 
182 
Similar patterns were revealed for estimated and objective diversity, two 
operationalizations of diversity strongly positively related to perceived diversity. 
Overall, compared to low neighborhood diversity, higher diversity was associated 
with less positive norm perceptions, more disadvantage perceptions, less 
neighborhood satisfaction, and higher intentions to move.  
Second, we again investigated whether multilevel analyses were warranted. 
Taking into account the higher-level structure for neighborhood satisfaction did not 
significantly improve the goodness-of-fit statistics (i.e., change in -2 * log-likelihood 
χ²(1) = 3.24, p = .07; ICC = .08). However, taking into account the higher-level 
structure significantly improved the goodness-of-fit for disadvantage (i.e., χ²(1) = 
12.73, p < .001) and moving intentions (χ²(1) = 5.58, p = .02). In the same vein, the 
ICCs of .19 and .10 indicated that there was substantial between-level variance in 
perceptions of neighborhood disadvantage and moving intentions, respectively. 
Therefore, for specific analyses with perceived disadvantage and moving intentions 
as individual-level outcome variables, we applied multilevel analyses.
3
  
Main Analyses  
First, we investigated whether positive perceptions of neighborhood norms 
moderated the association of diversity with neighborhood satisfaction, perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage, and moving intentions. We conducted nine regression 
analyses, testing the effects of the three diversity facets, with positive perceptions of 
neighborhood norms as moderator, controlling for relevant background variables 
(i.e., age, gender, education, household income, marital status, number of persons in 
the household, whether or not one owned the house, the time lived in the house, 
residence satisfaction, external pressure to live in one’s current house, and objective 
neighborhood-level markers of security and crime). These nine interaction terms 
were further examined by means of simple slope analyses. All predictors were 
centered before running the analyses (Aiken & West, 1991).  
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Table 4 summarizes the results of these analyses. All interaction effects were 
significant, except for the interactions between estimated diversity and norms, and 
between objective diversity and norms, on moving intentions. Nonetheless, a closer 
look at the simple slopes revealed a very straightforward and consistent story: higher 
perceptions, higher estimates, and higher actual levels of neighborhood ethnic 
diversity were especially associated with lower neighborhood satisfaction, higher 
perceived neighborhood disadvantage, and higher moving intentions among people 
perceiving less positive norms in their neighborhood, as opposed to those perceiving 
positive norms in their neighborhood. Notably, when perceived norms were positive, 
perceived diversity was even not significantly related to neighborhood satisfaction, 
and objective diversity was not related to neighborhood satisfaction and moving 
intentions.
4
  
Second, to test the conditional indirect effects of diversity on moving 
intentions via neighborhood satisfaction and disadvantage, we applied a similar 
strategy as in Study 1 by conducting bootstrap analyses (N = 50,000 bootstrap 
samples) in which the associations between the predictor (i.e., perceived, estimated, 
or objective diversity) and the mediators (i.e., neighborhood satisfaction and 
disadvantage) were moderated by perceived norms (see Figure 3; see Figure A in 
Appendix B for the similar results with personal intergroup norms). Again, we 
controlled for all relevant control variables.  
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Table 4. Standardized and unstandardized estimates (CI95 in brackets) of regression analyses 
in Study 2 examining the role of perceived norms in neighborhood satisfaction, perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage, and moving intentions (controlling for individual- and context-
level background characteristics) 
 
 Neighborhood  
Satisfaction 
Neighborhood  
Disadvantage 
Moving  
Intentions 
 β b  
[CI95] 
β b  
[CI95] 
β b  
[CI95] 
Perceived  
Diversity (PD) 
-0.18*** -0.15  
[-0.20; -0.11] 
0.37*** 0.28  
[0.24; 0.33] 
0.13*** 0.11  
[0.06; 0.17] 
Perceived  
Norms (PN) 
0.15*** 0.18  
[0.12; 0.23] 
-0.12*** -0.14  
[-0.20; -0.08] 
-0.07* -0.08  
[-0.14; -0.01] 
PD X PN 0.14*** 0.09  
[0.06; 0.12] 
-0.10*** -0.06  
[-0.09; -0.03] 
-0.06* -0.04  
[-0.07; 0.01] 
PD effect for low PN -0.32*** -0.26  
[-0.32; -0.21] 
0.46*** 0.35  
[0.30; 0.41] 
0.19*** 0.16  
[0.09; 0.22] 
PD effect for high PN -0.06 -0.05  
[-0.10; 0.01] 
0.27*** 0.21  
[0.15; 0.27] 
0.08* 0.07  
[0.00; 0.14] 
Estimated  
Diversity (ED) 
-0.23*** -1.66  
[-2.07; -1.26] 
0.39*** 2.64  
[2.22; 3.06] 
0.15*** 1.11  
[0.62; 1.60] 
Perceived  
Norms (PN) 
0.15*** 0.18  
[0.13; 0.24] 
-0.12*** -0.14  
[-0.20; -0.08] 
-0.06* -0.07  
[-0.14; 0.-01] 
ED X PN 0.13*** 0.75  
[0.45; 1.04] 
-0.09*** -0.50  
[-0.80; -0.20] 
-0.04 -0.27  
[-0.62; 0.07] 
ED effect for low PN -0.35*** -2.52  
[-3.03; -2.02] 
0.47*** 3.22  
[2.70; 3.74] 
0.19*** 1.42  
[0.82; 2.02] 
 ED effect for high PN -0.11** -0.81  
[-1.36; -0.26] 
0.30*** 2.07  
[1.50; 2.63] 
0.11* 0.80  
[0.14; 1.46] 
Objective  
Diversity (OD) 
-0.13*** -1.50  
[-2.25; -0.74] 
0.23*** 2.47 
[1.66; 3.29] 
0.05 0.58  
[-0.32; 1.47] 
Perceived  
Norms (PN) 
0.17*** 0.21  
[0.15; 0.27] 
-0.15*** -0.17  
[-0.24; -0.11] 
-0.07** -0.09  
[-0.16; -0.02] 
OD X PN 0.15*** 1.55  
[1.05; 2.04] 
-0.08** -0.73  
[-1.27; -0.20] 
-0.05 -0.47  
[-1.05; 0.12] 
OD effect for low PN -0.29*** -3.28  
[-4.26; -2.30] 
0.31*** 3.32  
[2.26; 4.38] 
0.10a 1.11  
[-0.05; 2.27] 
OD effect for high PN 0.03 0.29  
[-0.63; 1.20] 
0.15*** 1.63  
[0.65; 2.61] 
0.00 0.04  
[-1.04; 1.12] 
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The model tests revealed that the indirect associations of higher diversity 
with higher moving intentions through lower neighborhood satisfaction were more 
pronounced among those perceiving less positive norms in their neighborhood (b = 
0.10; boot S.E. = 0.02; β = 0.12; p < .001 for perceived diversity; b = 0.97; boot S.E. 
= 0.16; β = 0.13; p < .001 for estimated diversity; and b = 1.28; boot S.E. = 0.29; β = 
0.11; p < .001 for objective diversity), compared to those perceiving strong positive 
norms (b = 0.02; boot S.E. = 0.01; β = 0.02; p = .02 for perceived diversity; b = 0.31; 
boot S.E. = 0.12; β = 0.04; p < .001 for estimated diversity; and b = -0.11; boot S.E. 
= 0.21; β = -0.01; p = .81 for objective diversity; see Figure 3a, 3b, and 3c, 
respectively).  
The indirect associations of higher diversity with higher moving intentions 
through higher perceived neighborhood disadvantage also tended to be stronger 
among people low (b = 0.03; boot S.E. = 0.02; β = 0.04; p = .01 for perceived 
diversity; b = 0.33; boot S.E. = 0.14; β = 0.04; p = .009 for estimated diversity; and b 
= 0.37; boot S.E. = 0.15; β = 0.03; p = .002 for objective diversity) versus high in 
perceived positive norms (b = 0.02; boot S.E. = 0.01; β = 0.02; p = .01 for perceived 
diversity; b = 0.21. boot S.E. = 0.09; β = 0.03; p = .01 for estimated diversity; and b 
= 0.18; boot S.E. = 0.10; β = 0.02; p = .005 for objective diversity; see Figure 3a, 3b, 
and 3c, respectively).  
Finally, as expected, neighborhood satisfaction further related to less 
moving intentions, and perceived neighborhood disadvantage further related to more 
moving intentions (albeit to a lesser extent). In line with these findings, the indirect 
effect via satisfaction was significantly stronger than the indirect effect via 
disadvantage (bsatisfaction- disadvantage = 0.04; boot S.E. = 0.02; CI95 = [0.00; 
0.08] for perceived diversity; bsatisfaction- disadvantage = 0.44; boot S.E. = 0.20; 
CI95 = [0.05; 0.84] for estimated diversity), but not for objective diversity 
(bsatisfaction- disadvantage = 0.31; boot S.E. = 0.23; CI95 = [-0.11; 0.79]). 
Chapter 6 
 
 
186 
Figure 3. Standardized results of the model in Study 2 testing the associations of perceived 
diversity (upper panel), estimated diversity (middle panel), and objective diversity (lower 
panel) with moving intentions via neighborhood satisfaction and perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage, at high and low levels of perceived positive neighborhood norms (controlling 
for individual- and context-level characteristics) 
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In sum, the basic buffering pattern we found in Study 1 was replicated in 
Study 2 using another operationalization of norms (i.e., perceptions of specific 
intergroup norms) and using various diversity indices (i.e., perceived, estimated, and 
objective diversity). This is strong support for the claim that neighborhood norms 
are essential and both the perception of and the belief in a positive atmosphere in the 
neighborhood decreases negative effects of diversity. 
General Discussion 
Positive norms are commonly regarded as part of the “social glue” that holds 
communities together, with a range of positive outcomes for local neighborhood life 
(Putnam, 1993). Meanwhile, ethnically diverse neighborhoods impose a challenge to 
social cohesion and local neighborhood life (Putnam, 2007). The present set of 
studies shed new light on these frameworks by investigating the additive and 
interactive roles of norms and diversity, establishing consistent buffering effects of 
positive neighborhood norms on the relationship between neighborhood diversity 
and higher moving intentions via (lower) neighborhood satisfaction and to a lesser 
extent via (higher) perceived neighborhood disadvantage.  
In particular, a closer inspection of the slopes for individuals low versus 
high in positive norms specified that various facets of diversity are detrimental for 
individuals’ satisfaction with their neighborhood life, but especially or even 
exclusively among individuals who perceive less positive norms in their local area. 
Thus, positive neighborhood norms maintain social cohesion in a neighborhood, 
even under a potential threat like high diversity.  
Moving Out of the Hood: A Complex Story  
What makes people leave or stay in a neighborhood? Our findings 
consistently show that norms seem to play an essential role in various aspects of 
social life in a neighborhood. Indeed, individuals’ intentions to move greatly depend 
on their levels of satisfaction with their neighborhood, which in turn depend on how 
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diverse one’s neighborhood is and if one perceives positive norms such as strong 
local networks and neighborhood involvement. As such, we integrated the literature 
on positive neighborhood norms as the ‘bright side of social capital’ (cf. Portes & 
Landolt, 1996) and the literature on ethnic diversity as the ‘enemy of local social 
life’ (see Clark, 1991; Putnam, 2007). In accordance with Van Ham and Feijten 
(2008) as well as Feijten and Van Ham (2009), our results show that diversity across 
the board is associated with higher moving intentions.  
However, the story is not that simple and forthright, as a complex interplay 
between diversity and norms seems to determine one’s moving intentions through 
one’s satisfaction with the neighborhood, and to a lesser extent through one’s 
perceptions of disadvantage and deterioration within the local community. More 
specifically, positive norms buffer against negative diversity effects, and diversity is 
not harmful to neighborhood attitudes when norms are positive. Moreover, this 
buffering effect was found consistently a) across two large samples from two 
different countries (i.e. Germany and the Netherlands), b) across various facets of 
diversity (cf. Koopmans & Schaeffer, 2015), namely for perceived, estimated, and 
objective diversity, and c) across various facets of social norms (cf. Alaimo et al., 
2010), namely for perceptions of general local norms and perceptions of local 
intergroup norms.  
In sum, higher perceptions, higher estimates, and higher actual levels of 
neighborhood ethnic diversity appear to instigate perceptions of neighborhood 
disadvantage and especially neighborhood dissatisfaction in individuals who do not 
perceive positive local norms, but not in individuals who do consider the norms in 
the neighborhood to be positive. As such, dependent on their perceptions of the local 
neighborhood, some individuals wish to move away in the face of diversity while 
others do not.  
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Promoting Positive Hood Norms: A Challenging Story  
An effective way to encourage positive general norms is by creating shared 
neighborhood goals and a mutual dependency where residents have the opportunity 
to get to know one another, cooperate successfully and in general learn to get along 
well. Such small and non-intrusive, organized events have been shown to effectively 
boost residents’ local bonds and satisfaction with their neighborhood (e.g., 
Kleinhans, 2009). An effective way to endorse positive intergroup norms is by 
stimulating intergroup contact between local immigrants and ‘natives’.  
Multi-ethnic contexts effectively provide opportunities for contact between 
ethnic groups (see Frølund Thomsen, 2012; Huijts, Kraaykamp, & Scheepers, 2014; 
Schlueter & Wagner, 2008; Stein, Post, & Rinden, 2000). Moreover, intergroup 
contact has been shown to effectively improve various forms of intergroup attitudes 
and trust (Hewstone & Swart, 2011; Hewstone et al., 2014; Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006; Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, & Christ, 2011), and hence to countervail negative 
effects of diversity on trust (Schmid et al., 2014). Contact between members of 
different ethnic groups should thus be central to policy makers aiming to manage the 
local intergroup atmosphere, as such tackling inhabitants’ potential intentions to 
move to another place.  
Furthermore, our interaction approach of simultaneously taking into account 
psychological and socio-structural variables in the prediction of social phenomena 
speaks directly to Pettigrew’s (1991, 2008) calls for an integrative ‘contextual social 
psychology’. By considering the interplay between norms and diversity in various 
processes related to local neighborhood life, our research extends previous diversity 
studies that applied a similar framework to the field of intergroup relations. Indeed, 
following Putnam’s ‘hunkering down’ article (2007), research has accumulated 
evidence for conditional diversity effects on social cohesion of communities (e.g., 
Brune et al., 2016; Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner, & Wagner, 2013; Van Assche et al., 
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2014, 2016). Our findings extend this interaction perspective by demonstrating 
conditional diversity effects on neighborhood satisfaction, perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage, and moving intentions, even when controlling for other relevant 
influences.  
Merits, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research  
The first asset of the present set of studies pertains to the inclusion of 
multiple well justified control variables (cf. Bernerth & Aguinis, 2016), such as 
marital status and neighborhood-level crime rates. We also included multiple 
outcomes, such as neighborhood satisfaction, perceived neighborhood disadvantage, 
and actual intentions to move away, which were not included in previous diversity 
studies. A second merit lies in the inclusion of several aspects of both diversity and 
norms. First, the similarity in findings for perceived and objective measures of 
diversity indicates that effects found with the subjective measures are robust and 
could not merely be attributed to biased or extreme responding. Second, we were 
able to replicate the buffering effect of positive norms across various samples and 
various measures, as such attesting to its robustness and offering strong evidence for 
policy makers aiming implement specific interventions. Indeed, local neighborhood 
workers and volunteers need not be pessimistic: diversity is not destructive for social 
life per se, since its potentially harmful effects on neighborhood satisfaction and 
perceived disadvantage can effectively be countered by promoting positive 
neighborhood norms.  
The present research provides an extended perspective on how social norms 
may shape the relationship of ethnic diversity in one’s neighborhood with one’s 
feelings of satisfaction and disadvantage in that neighborhood, and one’s intentions 
to move. To understand the diversity - neighborhood attitudes associations, it is vital 
to look at interactions, as diversity can have divergent effects dependent on 
individual moderators such as perceived neighborhood norms. Although this study 
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provides new insights into the additive and interactive effects of norms and diversity 
in shaping individuals’ moving intentions via satisfaction and perceived 
disadvantage, it also raises new questions.  
First, due to the cross-sectional nature of our datasets, we cannot draw firm 
conclusions with regards to causality of any effects. For instance, longitudinal 
designs looking at neighborhood attitudes over time could test whether changes in 
local diversity relate to changes in resident’s satisfaction over time, or whether 
satisfied residents proactively choose homogenous neighborhoods to live in. Ideally, 
further (field-)experimental work could additionally study consequences of 
experimental variations in perceptions of neighborhood diversity (Enos, 2014).  
Second, in the present study, we either ran a secondary analysis of an 
already existing dataset (Study 1), or we chose a broad approach with respondents 
covering the entire country (Study 2), which resulted in samples where the majority 
of respondents had a unique neighborhood zip-code. Yet, to further corroborate the 
norm-dependent relationship between diversity and neighborhood attitudes (and the 
behavioral consequences thereof), future studies could collect clearly nested data 
with more observations per contextual unit. Such studies could purposefully select 
broader units of analysis (e.g., cities or districts) in order to examine if diversity and 
norms play a similar role at a larger contextual level.  
Nonetheless, previous studies indicated that diversity in the local 
neighborhood makes a stronger impression on individuals (Schaeffer, 2014), as the 
neighborhood is the direct geographical environment in which people spend most of 
their social time (Tolsma van der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009). As such, the current 
manuscript analyzed the joint effects of norms and diversity at the lowest (and 
potentially most relevant) level of analysis. Yet, future studies incorporating various 
contextual levels are needed to substantiate our findings in broader environments 
(cf., Van Assche, Roets, De keersmaecker, & Van Hiel, 2016).  
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As self-report methods tapping into perceptions of local norms have certain 
limitations, future studies could also help our understanding of local neighborhood 
life by using additional methodological techniques, such as social network analyses 
(see Wölfer & Hewstone, 2017). Such dynamic analyses could generate alternative, 
network-based “norm parameters” that account for the full complexity of underlying 
(direct and indirect) ties between residents in a local neighborhood (Wölfer et al., 
2017).  
Finally, our results add a crucial piece of the puzzle that goes beyond 
previous research unraveling the complex and multifaceted diversity effects. By 
including relevant control variables, and simultaneously studying the moderating 
role of norms and the mediating role of satisfaction and perceived disadvantage in 
the effects of diversity on moving intentions, this study avoided ‘the Single Factor 
Fallacy’ (Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017). Instead of ignoring critical influences, we 
included a wide variety of critical predictive and control variables into one coherent 
and comprehensive model.  
Additionally, we applied mediation–moderation and multilevel analysis as 
suggested by Pettigrew and Hewstone (2017). Nonetheless, these authors also 
pointed out that multiple item measures are more reliable and yield larger effect 
sizes. Building on secondary data, we were unable to do so for all variables. Also, 
we did not consider closely related constructs (e.g. trust, cohesion, intergroup 
contact, or intergroup action tendencies) that are relevant in this line of research, as 
outcomes or mediators predicting moving intentions. Hence, this research should be 
regarded as an initial step and will hopefully encourage future research to further 
develop this interesting theoretical framework.  
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Conclusion  
The current set of two studies carefully delineated a model showing the 
complex interplay between neighborhood norms and ethnic diversity in 
neighborhood satisfaction, perceived neighborhood disadvantage, and moving 
intentions, concluding that positive norms can buffer against negative diversity 
effects. 
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Notes 
 1 
Within the category of intergroup norms, we further distinguished between 
perceived norms (reflecting views on how intergroup relations in one’s 
neighborhood are) and personal norms (reflecting views on the value of 
diversity). Indeed, while diversity effects might depend upon people’s 
perceptions of general and intergroup norms in their neighborhood, they 
might similarly depend upon people’s personal beliefs about diversity, 
multiculturalism, and intergroup relations at large. In a series of additional 
analyses (see Appendix B), we considered personal intergroup norms (i.e., 
diversity beliefs) as a moderator, as such aiming to replicate the buffering 
effects of intergroup norm perceptions for general intergroup beliefs. 
2 
Analyses that do not include the control variables yielded virtually identical results 
and are available upon request with the first author. 
3 
According to Maas and Hox (2005), multilevel analyses can legitimately be 
performed with a low number of respondents per contextual unit, providing 
that (a) model fits increase significantly when taking into account the nested 
structure in the data, and (b) intraclass correlations (ICCs) are sufficiently 
large. When considering perceived neighborhood disadvantage (in both 
studies) and moving intentions (in Study 2) as outcomes, these two 
conditions were met. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POSITIVE NORMS BUFFER NEGATIVE DIVERSITY EFFECTS 
 
195 
4
 Through a similar procedure, we ran nine regression analyses with positive 
personal intergroup norms as moderator. As portrayed in Table B in 
Appendix B, all interaction effects were significant, and the simple slopes 
analyses again indicated that higher diversity (in all its forms) was most 
strongly associated with lower neighborhood satisfaction, greater perceived 
neighborhood disadvantage, and greater moving intentions among people 
holding less positive intergroup norms, as opposed to those holding strong 
positive intergroup norms that value diversity and multiculturalism in a 
neighborhood. Hence, the buffering effect of norms not only applied to 
perceptions of one’s specific neighborhood, but also to one’s personal norms 
regarding the value of intergroup relations in general. 
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Supplementary Materials 
Appendix A. Additional Sample Information 
 Income Distributions per Sample. 
 In Study 1, monthly net household income was fairly normally distributed, 
with 3% earning less than €500, 10% between €500 and €1,000, 15% between 
€1,000 and €1,500, 18% between €1,500 and €2,000, 16% between €2,000 and 
€2,500, 10% between €2500 and €3,000, 8% between €3000 and €3,500, 5% 
between €3,500 and €4,000, 4% between €4,000 and €4500, 2% between €4,500 and 
€5000, and 4% earned more than €5,000. Four percent of the respondents chose not 
to divulge this information, and one percent did not know their income level. Sixty-
eight percent of the sample was living in partnership and/or married, 31% was 
single, and 1% chose not to disclose this information.  
Finally, annual gross household income in Study 2 showed a fairly normal 
distribution, with 7% earning less than €12,500, 13% between €12,500 and €26,000, 
25% between €26,000 and €39,000, 21% between €39,000 and €65,000, and 10% 
earned more than €56,000. Twenty-four percent of the respondents chose the option 
“I do not know / I do not want to disclose this information”. 
Appendix B: Additional Analyses for Personal Intergroup Norms (Study 2)  
Apart from perceptions of neighborhood intergroup norms, we also tapped 
into personal intergroup norms (see Christ et al., 2014). On a Likert scale ranging 
from one (totally disagree) to seven (totally agree), respondents had to indicate to 
what extent they agreed with three statements (e.g., ‘It is important for a 
neighborhood to have people of various ethnic backgrounds’). Cronbach’s alpha of 
this scale was .86, with M = 4.10 (SD = 1.35). As such, two items tapped into 
perceptions of positive neighborhood norms and three items tapped into personal 
intergroup norms (i.e., diversity beliefs).  
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A principal component analysis with direct oblimin rotation including these 
five items yielded two components, with perceived and personal norms items having 
primary loadings on a different component (see Table A). 
 
Table A. Pattern matrix among norm items in Study 2 
 
Item 
Factor 1: 
Perceived positive 
intergroup norms 
Factor 2: 
Positive personal 
intergroup norms 
In the neighborhood where I live, many people like to 
have contact with people of another ethnic group 
.95 -.04 
In the neighborhood where I live, there is an atmosphere 
in which immigrants and natives have the will to move 
forward together 
.88 .06 
It is important for a neighborhood to have people of 
various ethnic backgrounds 
-.07 .94 
People of immigrant origin provide an enrichment of the 
cultural life in a neighborhood 
.01 .88 
Bringing together different ethnic groups in a 
neighborhood is no problem for the social order 
.10 .81 
Note: Secondary factor loadings in italics 
 
Furthermore, personal intergroup norms were strongly positively related to 
perceived neighborhood norms (r = .64, p < .001), and personal norms were also 
positively related to neighborhood satisfaction (r = .21, p < .001), and negatively to 
perceived neighborhood disadvantage (r = -.19, p < .001) and moving intentions (r = 
-.11, p < .001). Interestingly, personal intergroup norms were unrelated to all facets 
of diversity. Table B and Figure A summarize the results of all analyses examining 
the buffering role of personal norms in diversity effects. 
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Table B. Standardized and unstandardized estimates (standard errors in brackets) of 
regression analyses in Study 2 examining the role of personal norms in neighborhood 
satisfaction, perceived neighborhood disadvantage, and moving intentions (controlling for 
background characteristics) 
 
 Neighborhood 
Satisfaction 
Neighborhood 
Disadvantage 
Moving  
Intentions 
 β b  
(S.E.) 
β b  
(S.E.) 
β b  
(S.E.) 
Perceived Diversity (PD) -0.23*** -0.19 
(0.02) 
0.45*** 0.34 
(0.02) 
0.14*** 0.12  
(0.02) 
Personal Norms (PN) 0.12*** 0.12 
(0.03) 
-0.14*** -0.14 
(0.03) 
-0.07* -0.07 
(0.03) 
PD X PN 0.14*** 0.08 
(0.01) 
-0.06* -0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.06* -0.03 
(0.02) 
     PD effect for low PN -0.36*** -0.29 
(0.03) 
0.50*** 0.38 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 0.16  
(0.03) 
     PD effect for high PN -0.11** -0.09 
(0.03) 
0.40*** 0.30 
(0.03) 
0.09* 0.07  
(0.03) 
Estimated Diversity (ED) -0.26*** -1.90 
(0.19) 
0.46*** 3.16 
(0.20) 
0.15*** 1.07 
(0.22) 
Personal Norms (PN) 0.12*** 0.13 
(0.03) 
-0.12*** -0.13 
(0.03) 
-0.07* -0.07 
(0.03) 
ED X PN 0.13*** 0.69 
(0.13) 
-0.06* -0.29 
(0.13) 
-0.07* -0.35 
(0.15) 
     ED effect for low PN -0.39*** -2.83 
(0.25) 
0.52*** 3.55 
(0.26) 
0.21*** 1.53  
(0.29) 
     ED effect for high PN -0.13*** -0.98 
(0.26) 
0.41*** 2.76 
(0.27) 
0.08* 0.60  
(0.31) 
Objective Diversity (OD) -0.18*** -2.05 
(0.30) 
0.33*** 3.58 
(0.32) 
0.07* 0.79 
(0.34) 
Personal Norms (PN) 0.14*** 0.14 
(0.03) 
-0.15*** -0.15 
(0.03) 
-0.08** -0.08 
(0.03) 
OD X PN 0.13*** 1.06 
(0.20) 
-0.08** -0.62 
(0.22) 
-0.07* -0.56 
(0.24) 
     OD effect for low PN -0.30*** -3.47 
(0.43) 
0.41*** 4.42 
(0.46) 
0.12** 1.54 
(0.50) 
     OD effect for high PN -0.05 -0.63 
(0.37) 
0.26*** 2.74 
(0.40) 
0.00 0.04  
(0.43) 
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Figure A. Standardized results of the model in Study 2 testing the associations of perceived 
diversity (upper panel), estimated diversity (middle panel), and objective diversity (lower 
panel) with moving intentions via neighborhood satisfaction and perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage, at high and low levels of personal positive neighborhood norms (controlling 
for individual- and context-level characteristics) 
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Finally, the conditional indirect effects found with perceived intergroup 
norms were replicated for personal intergroup norms. Indeed, the indirect 
associations of higher diversity with higher moving intentions through lower 
neighborhood satisfaction were more pronounced among those holding less positive 
intergroup norms (b = 0.11; boot S.E. = 0.02; β = 0.13; p < .001 for perceived 
diversity; b = 1.07; boot S.E. = 0.17; β = 0.14; p < .001 for estimated diversity; and b 
= 1.32; boot S.E. = 0.29; β = 0.11; p < .001 for objective diversity), as opposed to 
those holding strong positive intergroup norms (b = 0.03; boot S.E. = 0.01; β = 0.04; 
p = .002 for perceived diversity; b = 0.37; boot S.E. = 0.12; β = 0.05; p < .001 for 
estimated diversity; and b = 0.24; boot S.E. = 0.17; β = 0.02; p = .10 for objective 
diversity; see Figure 3a, 3b, and 3c, respectively).  
The indirect associations of higher diversity with higher moving intentions 
through higher perceived neighborhood disadvantage also tended to be stronger 
among people low (b = 0.03; boot S.E. = 0.02; β = 0.04; p = .01 for perceived 
diversity; b = 0.33; boot S.E. = 0.16; β = 0.05; p = .009 for estimated diversity; and b 
= 0.48; boot S.E. = 0.20; β = 0.04; p = .002 for objective diversity) versus high in 
personal norms (b = 0.03; boot S.E. = 0.01; β = 0.03; p = .01 for perceived diversity; 
b = 0.26; boot S.E. = 0.13; β = 0.04; p = .01 for estimated diversity; and b = 0.30; 
boot S.E. = 0.13; β = 0.03; p = .003 for objective diversity; see Figure A). 
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Chapter 7  
 
The mobilizing effect of right-wing ideological 
climates: Cross-level interaction effects on 
different types of outgroup attitudes 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The present research investigated a multilevel person-context interactionist 
framework for the relationship between right-wing ideologies and prejudice across 
two large, representative samples (Study 1: European Social Survey: N = 56,752; 
Study 2: World Values Survey: N = 74,042). Across three different 
operationalizations of right-wing ideology, two contextual levels (regional and 
national) of right-wing climate, and three types of outgroup attitudes (i.e., age-, 
ethnicity-, and gender-based), the analyses consistently revealed cross-level 
interactions, showing a strong association between right-wing attitudes and negative 
outgroup attitudes at the individual level in contexts with a low right-wing climate, 
whereas this relationship is weaker and often even absent in contexts with a high 
right-wing climate. These cross-level interactions remained significant after 
controlling for statistical artefacts (i.e., restriction of range and outliers). The authors 
propose norm setting as the mobilizing mechanism through which a right-wing 
climate develops and curbs the influence of individual right-wing social-ideological 
attitudes on outgroup attitudes. 
 
This chapter is based on Van Assche, J., Roets, A., De keersmaecker, J., & Van Hiel, A. (2017). 
The mobilizing effect of right-wing ideological climates: Cross-level interaction effects on 
different types of outgroup attitudes. Political Psychology, 38(5), 757-776. 
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Introduction 
Research on negative outgroup attitudes and its determinants has been on the 
forefront of scientific research in social psychology since the 1950s (e.g., Allport, 
1954). Several personality traits and social-ideological attitudes have been proposed 
as important bases of how people think and feel about outgroups, such as 
authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), tough-
mindedness (Eysenck, 1954), power distance (Hofstede, 1980), and conservation 
(Schwartz et al., 2001) (for an overview, see Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).  
Contemporary psychological research has proposed two broad social-
ideological attitudes that influence outgroup attitudes in different ways (Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2010). These dimensions of generalized social beliefs about the ideal 
arrangement of society (habitually referred to as “ideologies”) are often labeled 
social conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism or social-cultural right-wing 
attitudes on the one hand, and economic conservatism, social dominance orientation 
or economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes on the other hand (Duckitt, 2001; 
Middendorp, 1978).  
In the social-cultural domain, right-wing ideology reflects adherence to 
traditional rules, submission to authorities imposing discipline, and aversion to 
deviance (Altemeyer, 1981). These social-cultural right-wing attitudes have been 
proposed to stem from motivational goals related to collective security, social order, 
social cohesion and conformity (Duckitt, 2001). In the economic-hierarchical 
domain, right-wing ideology entails the preference for intergroup dominance, social 
hierarchy and societal inequality (Middendorp, 1978; see also Onraet, Van Hiel & 
Cornelis, 2013; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which is based on 
motivational concerns related to control over economic resources, superiority and 
power (Duckitt, 2001). 
MOBILIZING EFFECTS OF RIGHT-WING CLIMATES 
 
211 
Much research relates both social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-
wing attitudes to various types of negative outgroup attitudes and prejudice, 
including racism (e.g. Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005), sexism (e.g., Roets, Van Hiel, 
& Dhont, 2012), and homophobia (e.g., Poteat & Spanierman, 2010). Moreover, 
individuals holding right-wing attitudes, especially at the economic-hierarchical 
level, show greater anti-elderly sentiment (Aosved, Long, & Voller, 2009; North & 
Fiske, 2013), suggesting that they see older people as weak and inferior.  
The relationship between the social-cultural dimension of right-wing 
attitudes and ageism is less straightforward, with the few available studies revealing 
small positive (e.g., North & Fiske, 2013) or negative associations (Lambert & 
Chasteen, 1997). In this regard, one may suspect that simultaneous views of the 
elderly as respected and relatively conventional on the one hand, but also as 
disadvantaged and resource-draining on the other hand, elicit ambiguous reactions in 
people holding social-cultural right-wing attitudes.  
In sum, the positive relationship between right-wing attitudes and outgroup 
prejudice is well-documented for a variety of different outgroups (with the socio-
cultural aspect playing a somewhat ambiguous role for older-age outgroups). 
Moreover, these relationships were found with longitudinal designs (Asbrock, 
Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010) and across different countries (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010).  
The Multilevel Character of Ideologies  
Although social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes are 
conceptualized as individual differences, these constructs are embedded within a 
much broader context of intergroup relations (Pratto et al., 1994). Indeed, an 
important feature of ideologies is that they are socially shared. Individuals are 
embedded in societal contexts, and ideological climates can provide social groups, 
organizations, and even whole societies with a set of unifying, collectively shared 
norms and values, which guide how individuals within these contexts think about, 
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understand, and evaluate other social groups (Cohrs, 2012). This “higher-level” 
character of ideology offers the opportunity to explore the role of ideological 
climates in shaping intergroup attitudes. Stangor and Jost (1997) have asserted that, 
in the intergroup relations literature, higher-level processes are far too often 
approached only theoretically, and little empirical research has been conducted to 
explore their normative influence in social phenomena. It is therefore unclear to 
what extent higher-order contextual variables like ideological climate have an 
impact beyond the values and beliefs individuals personally endorse on target 
variables like outgroup attitudes.  
Some studies have made use of the presence of radical right-wing parties as 
an indicator of a conservative climate within a geo-political area, showing that 
across European countries, the presence of such parties is related to negative 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration over and above the variance 
explained by individuals’ own political orientation (Semyonov, Raijman, & 
Gorodeisky, 2006). Additionally, two studies conducted in Switzerland revealed that 
individuals’ opposition to anti-racism laws (Sarrasin et al., 2012) and individuals’ 
attitudes towards Muslim women wearing a veil (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013) 
were predicted by the conservative climate of their municipality (indexed by the 
results on an earlier referendum), in addition to individual-level conservative values.  
However, the presence of particular political parties or referendum results 
can only serve as a proxy for right-wing ideological climates within a region, and 
they also do not capture the distinction between the social-cultural and economic-
hierarchical dimensions as studied in the literature about right-wing attitudes at the 
individual level. Fischer (2009) therefore suggested a bottom-up approach to 
ideological climate by using aggregated individual-level measures of values and 
beliefs to reflect popular views within a context.  
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The combined effects of the individual and contextual levels have been 
investigated in several studies studying peer groups. For example, Poteat, Espelage, 
and Green (2007) found that a hierarchy-enhancing social climate within a peer 
group of friends was related to more negative attitudes among students towards 
homosexuals. Furthermore, Poteat and Spanierman (2010) reported that aggregated 
right-wing beliefs of peer groups predicted individuals’ racist and homophobic 
attitudes beyond their personal ideological views.  
The theoretical rationale here is that such peer group environments are social 
contexts in which group norms are developed and enforced through socialization 
processes that encourage the acceptance of and support for traditional rules, social 
order and social inequality (Poteat et al., 2007; 2010). Kiesner, Maass, Cadinu and 
Vallese (2003) further suggested that the salience of such contextual norms leads to 
the internalization of these norms and the ideological justification for their 
expressions. In the same vein, theorizing on psychological geography holds that 
social norms have top-down effects on personality and ideology by shaping life 
experiences and opportunities (Rentfrow, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). The basic idea 
here is that the traditions and daily practices common to an area affect social norms, 
which in turn affect people’s attitudes and behaviors.  
This psychosocial environment could, in turn, reinforce the regional social 
norms and influence the ways in which people in that region think, feel, and behave, 
even if those tendencies are contrary to their natural dispositions (Rentfrow et al., 
2008; see also Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In sum, individuals may use their own 
ideological beliefs as well as those of their fellow citizens to justify their outgroup 
attitudes. Yet, at the societal level, no published studies to date have investigated 
such aggregated ideology scores as a measure of right-wing climate in order to 
investigate its incremental power in the prediction of prejudice.  
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To a Person X Context Interaction Approach  
Based on the findings we discussed above, there seems to be substantial 
evidence that right-wing ideological attitudes and right-wing social climates both 
uniquely contribute to individual differences in prejudice. However, for a more 
complete understanding of outgroup attitudes, the study of the cross-level 
interaction between individual and society seems vital, and aligns well with the 
recurrent calls in the field for a more “integrated” (Doise, 1986) or “contextual” 
(Pettigrew, 1991) social psychology.  
A most interesting perspective on how such interactions may take form is 
provided by the interactionism framework (Blumer, 1969), which proposes that 
strong normative influences may weaken and even “take over” the influence of 
personal characteristics on an individual’s attitudes and behavior. Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004) argued that situational triggers may either galvanize 
those already concerned about a particular problem, or may mobilize citizens to 
become worried about a political problem, whether or not they were already 
predisposed to be concerned.  
From a “galvanizing” perspective, in low right-wing climates, almost all 
individuals (also those with high levels of right-wing attitudes) might be elicited to 
show less negative outgroup attitudes (because of liberal norm setting), whereas in 
high right-wing climates, only people high in right-wing attitudes would be 
prejudiced. An experimental study provided some preliminary support for the 
galvanizing perspective, showing that especially those with authoritarian 
predispositions tended to be activated by contextual cues of social threat (Stenner, 
2005). Also, a cross-country study indicated that the effect size of authoritarianism 
on prejudice was higher in countries where inhabitants were more likely to believe 
that immigrants increase crime rates (i.e., an indicator of a conservative regional 
norm; Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010).  
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A “mobilizing” perspective holds that in low right-wing climates, only 
people high in right-wing attitudes would be prejudiced, whereas in high right-wing 
climates, almost all individuals (also those with low levels of right-wing attitudes) 
might be elicited to show more negative outgroup attitudes (because of conservative 
norm setting). Consistent with this hypothesis, Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, 
and Thompson (2009) demonstrated in a series of experimental studies that threats to 
the system led liberal individuals to converge to attitudes very similar to those of 
conservatives. Likewise, national-level exclusionary policies increased opposition 
against immigration, especially among individuals with egalitarian values (Schwartz, 
2007).  
Nonetheless, to our knowledge, no studies have explicitly operationalized 
right-wing climates as aggregated individual-level ideologies and examined the 
cross-level interaction between right-wing attitudes and climates. Furthermore, 
whereas some small-scale studies investigated race-based outgroups, no studies have 
yet been conducted for age-based and gender-based outgroups.  
The Present Study  
This study is the first to thoroughly examine whether right-wing ideological 
climates galvanize individuals high in right-wing attitudes towards more prejudice, 
or mobilize individuals low in right-wing attitudes towards more prejudice. To 
ensure the robustness of the results obtained with this multilevel interactionist 
approach, we investigated the moderating influence of ideological climate in 
samples at the regional (Study 1) as well as the national (Study 2) level. Moreover, 
we tested the model for various forms of outgroup attitudes (i.e., anti-elderly, anti-
young and anti-immigrant attitudes in Study 1; and anti-elderly, anti-immigrant and 
anti-women attitudes in Study 2) to investigate the generalizability of the obtained 
relationships as well as to identify possible target-specific effects at the individual 
and group level. 
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Study 1 
Method 
Data 
 Study 1 analyzed data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey 
(ESS, 2008, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The European Social Survey is 
an academically driven cross-national survey explicitly developed and vetted to 
maximize cross-cultural invariance (Davidov et al., 2015). Data were collected by 
face-to-face interviews and are representative for each country. Round 4 data were 
collected between September and December 2008 (ESS, 2008) among 56,752 
individuals living in 29 European countries (see Online Appendix A). Within each 
country, NUTS (“Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques”, or 
“Classification of Territorial Units for Statistics”) can be distinguished. These units 
delineate within-country regions according to socioeconomic, cultural and historical 
characteristics, as determined by Eurostat (2003).  
 For example, within Sweden, three NUTS-1 regions are distinguished (East 
Sweden, South Sweden, and North Sweden). Each of these regions in turn include 
two or three smaller NUTS-2 regions, such as Stockholm and East Middle Sweden 
within East Sweden, Småland and the islands, South Sweden, and West Sweden 
within South Sweden, and North Middle Sweden, Middle Norrland, and Upper 
Norrland within North Sweden. NUTS-regions were used as higher-level units for 
this study (see below). ESS classified most respondents at the NUTS-2 level, with 
the exception of respondents in Belgium, France, Germany, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom, who were grouped according to the larger-scale NUTS-1 level. The 
overall sample hence identified 218 NUTS regions with a mean number of 
participants per region of 260).
1
  
 For the analyses on ageism, we assigned all respondents younger than 50 
years to form the ‘young’ group (Syoung, N = 30,729), and investigated their attitudes 
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towards older people (i.e., over 70 years). Participants over 50 years formed the 
‘old’ group (Sold, N = 24,841) and data were analyzed with respect to their attitudes 
towards young people (i.e., under 30 years). Because the age of 50 is the midpoint 
between the target groups in the age-related questionnaire items (see below), we 
selected this cut-off point to delineate the young and the old group and investigate 
the effects on ageism.  
 Importantly, analyses using different cut-off points (i.e., under 40 (N = 
21,087) or under 30 (N = 11,649) for Syoung, versus over 60 (N = 15,342) or over 70 
(N = 7343) for Sold) yielded similar results. Given that the straightforward split of the 
total sample at age 50 makes use of the maximal amount of data, these results are 
reported. To test our multilevel framework for negative attitudes towards ethnic 
outgroups, we omitted all respondents who had no national citizenship, who had a 
place of birth outside the country of data collection, or who classified themselves as 
belonging to a minority ethnic group in their country, resulting in a ‘non-immigrant’ 
sample (Snon-immigrant) with N = 51,816.  
Measures  
 Background Characteristics.  
 Means and distributions of age, gender, income and education for each 
sample are provided in Appendix B.
2
  
 Individual-level Measures.  
 The ESS survey assesses a wide variety of items but usually does not 
include full-length scales. Therefore, building on previous studies (e.g., Abrams, 
Russel, Vauclair, & Swift, 2011; Onraet et al., 2013), we selected relevant items and 
compiled the best possible measures for our constructs of interest. Because in some 
cases rating scales differed across items, Principal Component Analyses3 (PCA) 
were conducted to compute a single component for every construct, with a mean and 
standard deviation of 0 and 1, respectively.  
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 For all scales, PCA corroborated the one-dimensional nature of the 
construct. Explained variance and factor loading range for each measure in each 
sample are displayed in Appendix C.  
 Social-cultural Attitudes. The five items previously used by Kauff, Asbrock, 
Thörner, and Wagner (2013) were used to operationalize the construct of social-
cultural attitudes. These items were “Schools must teach children to obey authority”, 
“People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are 
these days”, “If a man is suspected of planning a terrorist attack in [country], the 
police should have the power to keep him in prison until they are satisfied he was 
not involved”, “How much like you is this person? It is important to her or him that 
the government ensures her or his safety against all threats. She or he wants the state 
to be strong so it can defend its citizens,” and “How much like you is this person? 
She or he believes that people should do what they’re told. She or He thinks people 
should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching”. Respondents 
answered the first three items on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Totally 
agree”) to 5 (“Totally disagree”) and the last two items on a six-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (“Very much like me”) to 6 (“Not like me at all”).  
 Economic-hierarchical Attitudes. For economic-hierarchical attitudes, we 
combined the two items previously used by Onraet et al. (2013): “The government 
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”, and “For a society to 
be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small”. Respondents 
answered on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Totally agree”) to 5 (“Totally 
disagree”), with higher values indicating preference for economic and societal 
inequality.  
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 Left-right Political Orientation. To include an additional political rather than 
social-ideological indicator of individual right-wing attitudes, we used the following 
item: “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”.  
 Negative Attitudes towards Other Age Groups. Negative attitudes towards 
other age groups were measured with three items asking participants to describe how 
they feel with respect to other age groups (Abrams et al., 2011). The items were 
“Please tell me how important it is for you to be unprejudiced against people of 
other age groups”, “Please tell me how important it is for you to be seen as being 
unprejudiced against people of other age groups”, and “Overall, how negative or 
positive do you feel towards people of [age group]?”. In the ‘young’ sample, the 
target age group refers to people over 70, whereas in the ‘old’ sample, the target 
group concerns people in their 20s. Respondents answered on a ten-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all important/Extremely negative”) to 10 (“Extremely 
important/Extremely positive”). All items were reverse coded.  
 Negative Attitudes towards Immigration. Six items measured attitudes 
towards immigration (Sides & Citrin, 2007). The first three items read: “To what 
extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group 
as most [country]’s people to come and live here?”, “To what extent do you think 
[country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most 
[country] people?”, and “To what extent do you think [country] should allow people 
from the poorer countries outside Europe?” Respondents answered on the following 
four-point Likert scale: 1 (“Allow many to come and live here”), 2 (“Allow some”), 
3 (“Allow a few”), and 4 (“Allow none”).  
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 The last three items tapped into appraisals of the value of immigration: 
“Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people 
come to live here from other countries?”, “Would you say that [country]’s cultural 
life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other 
countries?”, and “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people 
coming to live here from other countries?”). Answers were given on a ten-point 
Likert scale with 1 corresponding to full agreement with the first (i.e., negative) 
opinion and 10 to full agreement with the second (i.e., positive) opinion. These three 
items were reverse coded.  
 Climate Measures.  
 Social-cultural Climate. Regional indicators of the social-cultural climate 
within a NUTS-region were obtained by calculating the mean of individual factor 
scores on social-cultural attitudes of all respondents within a specific region.  
 Economic-hierarchical Climate. To measure the economic-hierarchical 
climate within a NUTS-region, we averaged individual factor scores on economic-
hierarchical attitudes of all respondents within a region.  
 Left-right Political Climate. The item on left-right political orientation was 
also averaged at the NUTS-level so that higher scores refer to a context where the 
overall political stance tends to be more right-wing.  
Data Analytic Procedure  
 We used multilevel modeling (MLM) because respondents (individual level) 
were nested within regions (social context level). All analyses were performed using 
SPSS Software (version 22.0; IBM Corp, 2013). For each analysis, we used the 
following procedure: first, we estimated empty (intercept-only) models which 
provide insight in the variances at the individual and contextual level. We assessed 
the intraclass correlations (ICC) for all indicators to ensure that there was substantial 
between-level variance, justifying the use of MLM.  
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 All ICCs were medium to large (0.09 for anti-elderly, 0.08 for anti-young, 
and 0.16 for anti-immigrant attitudes, respectively). During the next phases, all 
predictors were added to the model (in blocks). At the individual level, we tested the 
associations of right-wing ideology with negative outgroup attitudes. Next, at the 
context level, we tested the effect of the right-wing climate. Specifically, we 
included the relationship between the mean level of right-wing attitudes within the 
regions and the prejudice indicators at the individual level, while controlling for 
individual differences in right-wing attitudes. Finally, we analyzed the slope 
variance, testing whether the relationship between right-wing attitudes and negative 
outgroup attitudes was significantly different across regions, and whether our 
indicators of right-wing climate explain (part of) the variance in the slopes.  
 All independent variables were grand-mean centered around the overall 
average of the specific sample to control for their compositional effects at the 
contextual level (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We used full-information maximum-
likelihood estimates with robust standard errors. For none of our variables, the 
proportion of missing values was higher than 0.6%. We modelled a random 
coefficient model where the intercept and the slope coefficients vary across regions 
(see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
 Specifically, we investigated three combinations relevant for the multilevel 
interactionist hypothesis. Our first combination (the ‘Social-cultural Model’) 
explored the interaction between social-cultural attitudes and a social-cultural right-
wing climate on various prejudice outcomes. The second combination (the 
‘Economic-hierarchical Model’) examined the interaction between economic-
hierarchical attitudes and an economic-hierarchical right-wing climate in the 
prediction of negative outgroup attitudes. The third combination (the ‘Left-right 
Model’) investigated the interaction between political left-right orientation and 
general left-right political climate on our outcomes. 
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Results 
Main Analyses 
 In each subsample, we ran a multilevel hierarchical linear regression 
analysis to test whether the relationship between right-wing attitudes and negative 
outgroup attitudes was moderated by right-wing climate. For all analyses, the step-
by-step addition of predictors improved the goodness-of-fit statistics of each 
multilevel model significantly (see Appendix D). Importantly, there was significant 
variance in the slopes for all models (i.e., Wald Z-scores for slope variance were 
significant; see Appendix E). Correlations among all study variables can be found in 
Appendix F. Final model results are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Unstandardized estimates (standard errors in brackets) of multilevel regression 
analyses on outgroup attitudes in Study 1 (European Social Survey data) 
 
 Syoung Sold Snon-immigrant 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Social-cultural Model    
Social-cultural attitudes (SCA) 0.13*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.20*** (0.01) 
Social-cultural climate (SCC) 0.28*** (0.06) 0.24*** (0.05) 0.09 (0.06) 
SCA X SCC -0.16*** (0.03) -0.21*** (0.03) -0.19*** (0.03) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 3.81% / 7.95% 6.02% / 10.61% 9.67% / 3.91% 
Total Explained Varianceb 4.17% 6.40% 6.18% 
Explained Slope Variance 22.17% 20.26% 29.14% 
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Economic-hierarchal Model 
Economic-hierarchical attitudes (EHA) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 
Economic-hierarchical climate (EHC) 0.26*** (0.06) 0.14* (0.06) 0.36*** (0.06) 
EHA X EHC -0.15*** (0.03) -0.11*** (0.03) -0.07** (0.02) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 2.33% / 6.34% 1.13% / 6.79% 1.16% / 19.33% 
Total Explained Varianceb 2.69% 1.60% 4.03% 
Explained Slope Variance 17.41% 15.04% 6.80% 
Left-right Model    
Right-wing orientation (RWO) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 
Right-wing climate (RWC) 0.07 (0.04) 0.08 (0.06) 0.15 (0.11) 
RWO X RWC -0.16*** (0.04) -0.10** (0.04) -0.16*** (0.05) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 0.98% / 1.39% 0.66% / 2.82% 3.29% / 1.29% 
Total Explained Varianceb 1.02% 0.84% 2.97% 
Explained Slope Variance 22.84% 5.33% 6.65% 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
b
: Total explained variance = explained variance level 1* (1-ICC) + explained 
variance level 2*ICC. 
The outcomes are negative attitudes towards older people in the ‘young’ sample 
(left), towards younger people in the ‘old’ sample (middle), and towards 
immigration in the ‘non-immigrant’ sample (right). 
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Social-cultural Model.  
 The first model explored the cross-level interactions between social-cultural 
attitudes and social-cultural right-wing climate. At the individual level, right-wing 
attitudes were significantly and positively related to all prejudice outcomes. At the 
social context level, right-wing climate was positively related to both age-related 
outgroup attitude measures (but not significantly to anti-immigrant attitudes), 
indicating that individual negative anti-elderly and anti-young attitudes tended to be 
higher in regions with a right-wing climate. Most importantly, significant interaction 
effects between individual attitudes and regional climate emerged (see Table 1, and 
Figure 1, Panel A-C for cross-level interactions on negative attitudes towards the 
elderly, towards the young, and towards immigration, respectively).  
 Multilevel simple slope analyses (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) showed that 
the relationships between right-wing attitudes and prejudiced attitudes were overall 
rather weak and sometimes non-significant in regions with a high (i.e., 1SD above 
the mean) right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.07, p < .001; bSold = 0.03, p = .16; bSnon-
immigrant = 0.13, p < .001), whereas the slope lines in regions with a low (i.e., 1SD 
below the mean) right-wing climate showed a substantial incline (bSyoung = 0.19, p < 
.001; bSold = 0.19, p < .001; bSnon-immigrant = 0.27, p < .001). 
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Figure 1. Cross-level interactions between social-cultural right-wing attitudes and social-
cultural right-wing climates on negative attitudes towards the elderly (Panel A, upper panel), 
towards the young (Panel B, middle panel), and towards immigrants (Panel C, lower panel) 
in Study 1. 
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Economic-hierarchical Model.  
 The second model considered the other dimension of right-wing ideology by 
investigating cross-level interactions between economic-hierarchical attitudes and an 
economic-hierarchical right-wing climate. At the individual level, significant and 
positive within-level effects of right-wing attitudes on all prejudice outcomes were 
found. At the social context level, significant and positive between-level effects 
emerged, indicating that negative outgroup attitudes tended to be higher in regions 
with a high right-wing climate.  Furthermore, significant cross-level interaction 
effects were obtained (see Table 1, and Figure 2, Panel A-C for cross-level 
interactions on negative attitudes towards the elderly, towards the young, and 
towards immigrants, respectively).  
 Simple slope analyses indicated that the relationships between economic-
hierarchical right-wing attitudes were quite weak in regions with a high right-wing 
climate (bSyoung = 0.03, p = .001; bSold = 0.03, p = .04; bSnon-immigrant = 0.02, p = .06), 
while the slope lines showed a substantial incline in regions with a low right-wing 
climate (bSyoung = 0.13, p < .001; bSold = 0.10, p < .001; bSnon-immigrant = 0.06, p < 
.001).  
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Figure 2. Cross-level interactions between economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes and 
economic-hierarchical right-wing climates on negative attitudes towards the elderly (Panel A, 
upper panel), towards the young (Panel B, middle panel), and towards immigrants (Panel C, 
lower panel) in Study 1. 
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Left-right Model.  
 This model used political orientation as an indicator of right-wing attitudes 
and right-wing climate. At the individual level, right-wing political orientation was 
only significantly and positively related to negative attitudes towards immigrants 
and immigration. At the social context level, right-wing political climate was 
positively related to negative outgroup attitudes, but none of these effects were 
significant. Significant cross-level interaction effects were obtained (see Table 1, 
and Figure 3, Panel A-C for cross-level interactions on negative attitudes towards 
the elderly, towards the young, and towards immigrants, respectively).  
 Multilevel simple slope analyses revealed that the relationships between 
right-wing orientation and negative outgroup attitudes were weak in regions with a 
high right-wing climate (bSyoung = -0.02, p = .06; bSold = -0.01, p = .64; bSnon-immigrant = 
0.07, p < .001), where (except in the ‘old’ sample) the slope lines generally showed 
a moderate incline in regions with a low right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.05, p < .001; 
bSold = 0.02, p = .31; bSnon-immigrant = 0.14, p < .001). 
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Figure 3. Cross-level interactions between right-wing political orientation and right-wing 
political climate on negative attitudes towards the elderly (Panel A, upper panel), towards the 
young (Panel B, middle panel), and towards immigrants (Panel C, lower panel) in Study 1. 
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Additional Analyses  
 The significant cross-level interactions we obtained could be due to the 
possibly smaller variance in right-wing ideological attitudes in high right-wing 
regions as opposed to low right-wing climate regions. We tested this restriction-of-
range hypothesis in every sample by 1) exploring the correlation between the mean-
level and the standard deviation of ideological attitudes of our 218 NUTS-regions, 
and 2) entering the standard deviation (SD) of the particular attitude in the first step 
of our multilevel regression analyses.  
 Correlations between climate and mean SD ranged from r = -0.14 (p < .01) 
to r = 0.13 (p < .01), indicating that there is no overall restriction of variance in 
right-wing ideology in regions with a high right-wing climate. Moreover, the 
inclusion of SDs of ideology into our analyses did not alter the findings, and did not 
explain negative outgroup attitudes above the other predictors. Additional inclusion 
of cross-level interactions between individual ideology and contextual SD in 
ideological climate also did not alter the findings.  
 Finally, we also tested for outlier effects. One outlier below 3SD for social-
cultural right-wing climate was detected in all subsamples (i.e., Bremen, Germany). 
In the ‘young’ and ‘old’ sample, one outlier above 3SD for right-wing political 
climate emerged (i.e., Jerusalem, Israel in Syoung, and Podkarpackie, Poland in Sold). 
The final model results remained, however, unaltered when excluding these NUTS-
regions from either the sample-specific analysis or from all our analyses (i.e., across 
samples). Results from all additional analyses are available upon request with the 
first author. 
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Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend the results of Study 1 by investigating 
1) an additional form of prejudice (i.e., sexist attitudes of men towards women) and 
2) a broader contextual level (i.e., nations across the world instead of regions across 
Europe).  
Method 
Data  
This study used data from the sixth round of the World Values Survey 
(WVS, 2012, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The World Values Survey is a 
global network of social scientists studying social and political life. Like ESS, WVS 
has made substantial efforts to ensure the equivalence of comparative quantitative 
data (Welzel & Inglehart, 2015). Round 6 data were collected in representative 
national samples between 2010 and 2014 among 74,042 individuals across the world 
(N = 52 countries; see Appendix A; mean number of observations per country M = 
1,424). The WVS-6 was used because it also provides unique cross-regional data on 
ageism (i.e., negative attitudes towards the elderly) in addition to data concerning 
two other types of prejudice, i.e., negative attitudes towards multiculturalism and 
towards women.  
To test our person-context interactions for these specific outcomes, we 
selected three subsamples. Specifically, similar to Study 1, all respondents younger 
than 50 years formed the ‘young’ sample (Syoung, N = 49,370), and to compose the 
‘non-immigrant’ sample (Snon-immigrant, N = 54,775), we dropped all respondents 
without national citizenship, with place of birth outside the country of data 
collection, or with at least one parent being immigrant. To run our analyses 
concerning negative attitudes towards women, we considered male respondents only 
(i.e., Smale, N = 35,032).  
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Measures  
Background Characteristics.  
Means and distributions of age, gender, income and education for each 
sample are provided in Appendix B. 
Individual-level Measures.  
Similar to Study 1, we performed PCA to create a single measure for each 
specific construct. For all scales, PCA corroborated the one-dimensional nature of 
the construct. Explained variance and range of factor loadings for each measure in 
each sample are displayed in Appendix C.  
Social-cultural Attitudes. We selected seven items previously used by 
Marien and Hooghe (2011) that closely relate to the construct of social-cultural 
attitudes, especially tapping into conservative, norm-driven moral orientations. 
Participants were asked the following: “Please tell me for each of the following 
actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something 
in between: homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce, sex before marriage, 
suicide and euthanasia. Response scales ranged from 1 (“Never justifiable”) to 10 
(“Always justifiable”). All items were reverse coded before computing a factor 
score.  
Economic-hierarchical Attitudes. We selected three items tapping into 
economic-hierarchical attitudes. The first two items were based on Onraet and 
colleagues (2013). Respondents answered the question “How would you place your 
views on this scale?” on a ten-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 10 for two bipolar 
scales: “Incomes should be made more equal” (1) to “We need larger income 
differences as incentives for individual effort” (10) and “Government should take 
more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (1) to “People should 
take more responsibility to provide for themselves” (10).  
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The third item was “The state should make people’s incomes equal”, which 
ranged from 1 (“Not an essential characteristic of democracy”) to 10 (“An essential 
characteristic of democracy”). The last item was reverse scored so that higher values 
indicate preference for economic and societal inequality. 
Left-right Political Orientation. The same measure as in Study 1 was used, 
asking respondents to place themselves on a 10-point scale with lower values 
representing the left side of the political spectrum and higher values representing the 
right side.  
Negative Attitudes towards the Elderly. Negative attitudes towards the 
elderly were measured with four items: “Older people get more than their fair share 
from the government”, “Older people are a burden on society”, “Companies that 
employ young people perform better than those that employ people of different 
ages”, and “Old people have too much political influence”. Respondents answered 
on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly agree”) to 4 (“Strongly 
disagree”). All items were reverse coded.  
Negative Attitudes towards Multiculturalism. Negative attitudes towards 
multiculturalism were assessed by showing respondents a list of various social 
groups (see Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2011) asking them which groups they would 
not like to have as neighbors. Three of these groups were relevant for our measure: 
people of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers, and people who speak a 
different language. The responses were recoded as 0 corresponding to “not 
mentioned” and 1 corresponding to “mentioned”.  
Negative Attitudes towards Women. Similar to Paxton & Kunovich (2003), 
sexist attitudes were measured by six items tapping into prejudice against women. 
The first two read “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than 
women”, and “If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to 
cause problems”.  
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Respondents selected 1 (“Agree”), 2 (“Neither”), or 3 (“Disagree”). The 
other four items (“When a mother works for pay, the children suffer”, “On the 
whole, men make better political leaders than women do”, “A university education is 
more important for a boy than for a girl”, and “On the whole, men make better 
business executives than women do”) were answered on a four-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (“Strongly agree”) to 4 (“Strongly disagree”). All items were reverse 
coded.  
Climate Measures.  
Similar to Study 1, individual scores on each indicator of right-wing 
ideological attitudes within each country were averaged to form national indicators 
of the right-wing climate. Higher scores refer to a country where, on average, 
popular beliefs tend to be more right-wing. 
Results 
Main Analyses  
Analogous to Study 1, we used MLM because respondents were nested 
within countries. All ICCs were medium to large (0.15 for anti-elderly, 0.13 for anti-
immigrant, and 0.35 for anti-women attitudes, respectively), indicating that there 
was substantial between-level variance. We modelled a random coefficient model in 
which the intercept and the slope coefficients were allowed to vary across countries. 
Again, we investigated the ‘Social-cultural Model’, the ‘Economic-hierarchical 
Model’ and the ‘Left-right Model’.  
For all analyses, the step-wise inclusion of predictors improved the 
goodness-of-fit statistics (see Appendix D) of each model significantly. Importantly, 
there was significant variance in the slopes for all models (i.e., Wald Z-scores for 
slope variance were significant; see Appendix E). Correlations among all study 
variables are shown in Appendix G. Final model results are summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Unstandardized estimates (standard errors in brackets) of multilevel regression 
analyses on outgroup attitudes in Study 2 (World Values Survey data) 
 
 Syoung Snon-immigrant Smale 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Social-cultural Model    
Social-cultural attitudes (SCA) 0.06** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 
Social-cultural climate (SCC) 0.23 (0.09) 0.31* (0.12) 0.60*** (0.12) 
SCA X SCC -0.02* (0.01) -0.04** (0.02) -0.06*** (0.01) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 7.45% / 13.20% 13.94% / 14.83% 10.04% / 66.86% 
Total Explained Varianceb 9.04% 14.02% 27.65% 
Explained Slope Variance 2.81% 3.63% 7.53% 
Economic-hierarchal Model    
Economic-hierarchical attitudes (EHA) 0.07** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.08** (0.03) 
Economic-hierarchical climate (EHC) 0.13 (0.09) 0.18 (0.13) 0.28* (0.07) 
EHA X EHC -0.06*** (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.08* (0.05) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 8.15% / 9.97% 12.63% / 0.38% 9.97% / 9.96% 
Total Explained Varianceb 8.66% 11.57% 9.82% 
Explained Slope Variance 9.52% 0.22% 9.17% 
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Left-right Model 
Right-wing orientation (RWO) 0.02* (0.01) 0.08* (0.02) 0.12*** (0.02) 
Right-wing climate (RWC) 0.22 (0.11) 0.17* (0.06) 0.47* (0.19) 
RWO X RWC -0.03a (0.02) -0.05* (0.02) -0.02a (0.01) 
Explained Variance by Level 1/2 0.92% / 12.29% 14.57% / 4.56% 10.40% / 19.44% 
Total Explained Varianceb 4.07% 13.71% 13.20% 
Explained Slope Variance 3.37% 0.94% 2.27% 
Note: : 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
b
: Total explained variance = explained variance level 1* (1-ICC) + explained 
variance level 2*ICC. 
The outcomes are negative attitudes towards older people in the ‘young’ sample 
(left), towards multiculturalism in the ‘non-immigrant’ sample (middle), and 
towards women in the ‘male’ sample (right). 
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Social-cultural Model.  
The first model examined the cross-level interactions between social-
cultural attitudes and a social-cultural right-wing climate. At the individual level, 
right-wing attitudes were positively related to all prejudice outcomes. At the 
contextual level, right-wing climate was significantly positively related to negative 
outgroup attitudes towards immigrants and women (but not significantly to attitudes 
towards the elderly), indicating that negative attitudes toward immigrants and 
women at the individual level tended to be higher in regions with a higher right-wing 
climate.  
Most importantly, significant interaction effects between individual right-
wing attitudes and national climate emerged (see Table 2, and Figure 4, Panel A-C 
for cross-level interactions on negative attitudes towards the elderly, towards 
multiculturalism, and towards women, respectively).  
Multilevel simple slope analyses showed weak and sometimes non-
significant relationships between right-wing attitudes and negative outgroup 
attitudes in countries with a high (i.e., 1SD above the mean) right-wing climate 
(bSyoung = 0.04, p = .30; bSnon-immigrant = 0.03, p = .18; bSmale = 0.09, p < .001), whereas 
in countries with a low (i.e., 1SD below the mean) right-wing climate, the slope lines 
showed a substantial incline (bSyoung = 0.08, p < .001; bSnon-immigrant = 0.09, p < .001; 
bSmale = 0.14, p < .001).  
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Figure 4. Cross-level interactions between social-cultural right-wing attitudes and social-
cultural right-wing climates on negative attitudes towards the elderly (Panel A, upper panel), 
towards multiculturalism (Panel B, middle panel), and towards women (Panel C, lower 
panel) in Study 2. 
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Economic-hierarchical Model.  
Model 2 investigated cross-level interactions between economic-hierarchical 
attitudes and an economic-hierarchical right-wing climate. At the individual level, 
significant and positive within-level effects of right-wing attitudes on all prejudice 
outcomes were found. At the social context level, a significant, positive between-
level effect emerged in the ‘male’ sample. Sexist attitudes tended to be higher in 
regions with a higher right-wing climate. Furthermore, significant cross-level 
interaction effects were obtained (see Table 2, and Figure 5, Panel A-C for cross-
level interactions on negative attitudes towards the elderly, towards 
multiculturalism, and towards women, respectively).  
Simple slope analyses indicated weak relationships between right-wing 
attitudes and anti-elderly and anti-women attitudes in countries with a high right-
wing climate (bSyoung = 0.03, p = .08; bSmale = 0.06, p = .007), while the slope lines 
showed a substantial incline in countries with a low right-wing climate (bSyoung = 
0.11, p < .001; bSmale = 0.10, p < .001).  
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Figure 5. Cross-level interactions between economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes and 
economic-hierarchical right-wing climates on negative attitudes towards the elderly (Panel A, 
upper panel), towards multiculturalism (Panel B, middle panel), and towards women (Panel 
C, lower panel) in Study 2. 
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Left-right Model.  
The third model targeted a political indicator of right-wing attitudes and 
right-wing climate. At the individual level, political orientation was significantly and 
positively related to all outcomes. At the social context level, right-wing political 
climate was significantly and positively related to negative attitudes in the ‘non-
immigrant’ and the ‘male’ sample. Moreover, a significant cross-level interaction 
effect was obtained predicting negative attitudes towards immigration and 
multiculturalism, and marginally significant cross-level interactions were found for 
outgroup attitudes in the ‘young’ and the ‘male’ sample (see Table 2, and Figure 6, 
Panel A-C for cross-level interactions on negative attitudes towards the elderly, 
towards multiculturalism, and towards women, respectively).  
Multilevel simple slope analyses revealed weak and sometimes non-
significant relationships between right-wing orientation and negative outgroup 
attitudes in countries with a high right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.01, p = .12; bSnon-
immigrant = 0.05, p = .009; bSmale = 0.11, p < .001), and they generally showed a 
moderate incline in countries with a low right-wing climate (bSyoung = 0.03, p = .04; 
bSnon-immigrant = 0.11, p < .001; bSmale = 0.13, p < .001).  
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Figure 6. Cross-level interactions between right-wing political orientation and right-wing 
political climate on negative attitudes towards the elderly (Panel A, upper panel), towards 
multiculturalism (Panel B, middle panel), and towards women (Panel C, lower panel) in 
Study 2. 
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Additional Analyses  
Similar to Study 1, we tested the restriction-of-range hypothesis by 
investigating the correlations between mean-level ideology and standard deviation 
(SD) in ideological attitudes of our 52 countries, and by entering the SD of the 
particular attitude in the first step of our multilevel regression analyses. Correlations 
between climate and mean SD ranged from r = -0.13 (p < .01) to r = 0.15 (p < .01), 
indicating that there is no overall restriction of variance in right-wing ideology in 
regions with a high right-wing climate.  
Moreover, the inclusion of SD of ideology into our analyses did not alter the 
findings, and did not explain variance in negative outgroup attitudes above the other 
predictors. Additional inclusion of cross-level interactions between individual 
ideology and contextual SD in ideological climate also did not alter the findings. 
Finally, we tested for outlier effects. One outlier below 3SD for social-
cultural climate was detected in the ‘young’ sample (i.e., the Netherlands). In the 
‘male’ sample, one outlier above 3SD for right-wing political climate emerged (i.e., 
Pakistan). Nevertheless, the final model results were unaffected when excluding 
these countries from either the sample-specific analysis or from all our analyses (i.e., 
across samples). Results from all additional analyses are available upon request with 
the first author. 
General Discussion 
 Unique in its breadth and the magnitude of its samples, the present research 
provides a large-scale examination of individual and contextual bases of different 
forms of outgroup attitudes from a multilevel interactionist perspective. The aim was 
to apply this perspective on negative attitudes towards outgroups, and more 
specifically to investigate the additive and interactive contributions of right-wing 
ideological attitudes and climates herein.  
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The studies tested the interactionism model for several variations of right-
wing ideology (social-cultural, economic hierarchical, and left-right political 
orientation), for multiple forms of outgroup attitudes (i.e., based on age, ethnicity, 
and gender), and at two different contextual levels (i.e., regional and national), 
thereby allowing to establish generalizable patterns.  
In accordance with previous findings at the individual level (e.g., Asbrock et 
al., 2010), an overall, positive relationship between right-wing ideology and negative 
outgroup attitudes emerged across target groups. This association was clearest for 
the social-cultural and economic-hierarchical dimensions of right-wing ideology (as 
compared to political orientation). At the contextual level, a right-wing climate 
within a region (Study 1) or a country (Study 2) was also related to more negative 
outgroup attitudes of its inhabitants towards the different target groups, over and 
above the influence of individual-level ideologies. Again, this effect was clearest for 
the social-cultural and economic-hierarchical dimensions of ideology. 
Most importantly, we obtained several cross-level interactions indicating 
that the slope of the right-wing ideology - negative outgroup attitude relation is 
steeper in low right-wing contexts as compared to high right-wing contexts. In Study 
1, the individual-level relationship between the two dimensions of right-wing 
attitudes (social-cultural and economic-hierarchical) and the three types of outgroup 
attitudes was significantly weaker in European regions with a high rather than low 
social-cultural or economic-hierarchical right-wing climate. Moreover, these effects 
were largely replicated with an indicator of political orientation. Similarly, in Study 
2, using country-level indicators of right-wing climate across the world, these 
person-context interactions on age-based and ethnicity-based outgroup attitudes 
were replicated. Additionally, we found a similar cross-level interaction on men’s 
negative attitudes towards women.  
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Although the effects in Study 2 were somewhat smaller in size, these 
replication results yielded strong additional support for the interactionism 
perspective, not in the least because in Study 2 the number of available contextual 
units (i.e., 52 countries) was considerably lower than in Study 1 (i.e., 218 NUTS-
regions), and the influence of country-level climate is expected to be more diffuse 
than that of the more proximal, regional environment where people spend most of 
their time and have their day-to-day interactions (Van Assche, Roets, Dhont, & Van 
Hiel, 2014). Moreover, statistical control for demographic influences (i.e., age, 
gender, income, and education) and possible statistical artefacts (i.e., the presence of 
outliers and a restriction of range effect) did not alter the findings, further attesting 
to their robustness.  
Mobilizing Right-Wing Climates  
The conclusion across the different samples and forms of outgroup attitudes 
is straightforward: right-wing ideological climates moderate the relationship 
between right-wing ideologies and negative outgroup attitudes. A high right-wing 
climate appears to eclipse the influence of the individuals’ own social beliefs, 
causing individuals’ outgroup attitudes within that context to converge towards 
higher levels, regardless of personal ideology. In contrast, in a low right-wing 
climate, the relationship between a person’s ideological attitudes and outgroup 
attitudes remains highly significant.  
These findings thus reveal an interesting asymmetry. In a high right-wing 
climate, people low in right-wing ideological attitudes are drawn to increased levels 
of negative outgroup attitudes by the contextual climate, whereas in a low right-wing 
climate people high on these ideological attitudes do not show a similar tendency to 
adapt their prejudice levels in the opposite direction.  
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In other words, a right-wing context seems to have power to influence 
citizens of all ideologies when it comes to negative outgroup attitudes, whereas a 
more progressive context does not seem to have the same mobilizing impact on the 
general population. This observation is reminiscent of other studies in social 
psychology that have amply illustrated that “the monster of prejudice” is easily 
evoked in the individual’s mind. The classic Robber’s Cave studies of Sherif, 
Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) attest to this issue. In these studies, twelve-
year-old boys were divided into two groups that had to compete for valuable 
resources, which was shown to quickly lead to conflict and even intergroup violence. 
Restoring the peace between the two, however, proved to be much more difficult.  
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) even showed that the mere 
presence of an outgroup is enough to elicit prejudice and discrimination, further 
attesting to the ease with which a negative orientation towards outgroups arises. In 
line with these classic studies, our results show that the presence of a “prejudice-
friendly” climate within a society has the potential to elicit negative outgroup 
attitudes, even among people who do not have prejudice-prone ideological attitudes.  
Sniderman and colleagues (2004) advanced the mobilizing hypothesis to 
account for the potential of a right-wing context to increase prejudice “across-the-
board” (p. 43); that is, among citizens all across the ideological spectrum. To 
understand the nature of this mobilizing effect, we argue that norm setting plays a 
pivotal role. Social-cultural right-wing climates emphasize conformity and 
adherence to traditional norms, which may create the perception of greater collective 
ingroup identity and uniformity of shared norms and values (Cohrs, 2012), 
especially affecting those who do not already adhere to these norms themselves. The 
more widely shared and supported these social beliefs become, the more they fuel 
perceptions of outgroups as threatening and the less likely positive intergroup 
attitudes will develop (see Fischer, 2009).  
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Likewise, norm setting in economic-hierarchical right-wing climates 
legitimizes inequality within the societal context, emphasizes widely-shared beliefs 
of ingroup dominance over outgroups, and hence increases the public support for 
outgroup intolerance and derogation. Embedding this idea within the Justification 
Suppression Model (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), such shared norms might offer a 
justifying social context that affords an opportunity for the expression of prejudice, 
and, hence, prejudiced attitudes “bubble up past suppression” (Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003, p. 421), even among those holding rather liberal economic-
hierarchical ideologies.  
Building on the works of Sniderman and colleagues (2004) and Crandall and 
Eshleman (2003), we propose that “popular” negative representations of outgroups 
within right-wing climates justify the prevailing societal arrangement and, 
eventually, become so ingrained and embedded within day-to-day interactions that 
they also influence those low in right-wing attitudes to embrace exclusionary 
attitudes. Interestingly, when the social norms within a region support outgroup 
tolerance, only individuals low in right-wing attitudes tend to display tolerant 
outgroup attitudes. Our reasoning for the smaller (or even non-existent) mobilizing 
effect of low right-wing climates would be that liberal norms of not expressing 
prejudice do not affect right-wing individuals to the same degree. Instead, these 
individuals tend to stick to their personal cognitions, beliefs, and values that serve to 
justify prejudice.  
Generalized Cross-Level Patterns across Various Prejudices 
Notably, the mobilizing effects of right-wing climates generalize across 
outgroups based on age, ethnicity, and gender. Specifically, the observation that 
individual differences, social contexts, and their interaction effects yield similar 
findings for three of the most common forms of negative outgroup attitudes attests to 
the functional equivalence of all these prejudices in the individual’s mind.  
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This finding reminds us of studies that have shown that prejudice 
generalizes to different ethnic outgroups, and even to unknown groups or fictitious 
groups (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Moreover, prejudice towards ethnic outgroups 
also spreads over to other social groups, like women (Roets et al., 2012), physically 
or mentally impaired people (Akrami, Ekehammar, Claesson, & Sonnander, 2006), 
gay people (Poteat & Spanierman, 2010), and individuals with another religion 
(Aosved et al., 2009). The present demonstration further extends the idea that the 
specific target group in itself is only of secondary importance, presenting the first 
evidence on the functional resemblance of negative outgroup attitudes even in cross-
level patterns.  
Our results thus corroborate the idea of unity in various negative outgroup 
attitudes (Allport, 1954; Asbrock et al., 2010), which leads to some remarkable 
observations, especially with respect to age-based groups. Because social-cultural 
attitudes reflect conservative and traditional views, one could expect these attitudes 
to relate to respect for older people, given their potential status as the guardians of 
conventional, old-fashioned values and traditions. Hence, decreased levels of 
negative attitudes about the elderly may have been expected (see Lambert & 
Chasteen, 1997). However, both at the individual and social context level, right-
wing attitudes were positively related to such negative attitudes. It is possible that 
young individuals adhering to right-wing ideological views consider the elderly as 
weak and resource-draining, rather than esteemed and honored.  
Moreover, the finding of individual, context, and interaction effects on 
negative attitudes about age groups in both directions (young versus old, and vice 
versa) is notable. Outgroup borders are fluid for this social category and such 
attitudes can be considered to reflect prejudice towards one’s own future or past 
ingroup (Kogan, 1961; Lambert & Chasteen, 1997).  
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It seems strange to exhibit negative attitudes towards a social category that 
one will belong to, or has belonged to oneself. However, other research has found 
evidence that people may even exhibit prejudice towards their current ingroup. For 
example, Roets and colleagues (2012) reported that women often show sexism 
against their own gender group, and argued that prejudice does not stem from group 
differences, but rather reflect individual differences in people’s perspective on the 
social world (in particular social-cultural and economic-hierarchical attitudes) that 
stem from their motivated cognitive style.  
Limitations, Implications and Directions for Future Research  
Our study holds some notable limitations which we discuss below. First, in 
our studies, we operationalized ideological climate as the aggregate of self-reported 
ideology of the inhabitants of a particular area. However, alternative approaches to 
operationalize ideological climate within a given region may be useful. For example, 
objective bottom-up measures such as (extreme) right-wing voting behavior 
(Sarrasin et al., 2012), or top-down measures such as integration policies at the 
regional or national level (Schlueter, Meuleman, & Davidov, 2013) could sort a 
similar mobilizing effect on individuals low in right-wing attitudes.  
Importantly, the combination of analyses at a more proximal, regional level 
within European countries in Study 1, and at a broader, national level across the 
world in Study 2, showed that the interactionism perspective applies at different 
scales, demonstrating both the specificity and generalizability of the effects. We 
acknowledge that the effect sizes in Study 2 were more modest compared to Study 1, 
possibly due to the lower number (i.e., 52 countries) of context-level units. Note that 
the even lower number (i.e., 29 countries) of country-level units in Study 1 
precluded us from performing cross-level interaction analyses between individual-
level and country-level ideology.  
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Also, theoretically, norm setting is more likely to take place, and to have the 
most impact in a fine-grained context as opposed to large context units. Indeed, 
people spend most of their social time in (within-country) regions and even in cities 
and neighborhoods. A next step could be to use longitudinal designs in order to 
detect how climates can change over time, and how such evolutions may affect the 
individual’s outgroup attitudes. Future studies could also include climate-level 
measures of social norms to test our hypothesis that norm setting serves as the 
mobilizing mechanism through which a right-wing climate develops and curbs the 
influence of individual right-wing social-ideological attitudes on outgroup attitudes.  
Finally, the present studies aimed to meet the recurrent calls for a more 
integrated and situated theorizing of intergroup dynamics (e.g., Doise, 1986). The 
finding that right-wing ideological climates instill exclusionary social norms that 
steer individuals to react more negatively and discriminatory towards outgroups, 
even when not personally endorsing right-wing attitudes, is certainly most relevant 
to understand intergroup attitudes and conflict. In particular, it points out the danger 
of right-wing ideology among citizens reaching a critical mass so as to form a social 
norm which drags even people who do not endorse the ideology into outgroup 
derogation. The history of Europe and other regions has taught us how such process 
may spiral out of control and, in the worst of cases, may end in a society that allows 
for violent repression or even genocide of outgroups to happen. 
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Notes 
1 
See http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
2 
We report the results using the original regional codes provided with the ESS data. 
However, when we reclassified the NUTS-2 codes into their overarching 
NUTS-1 codes and conducted all analyses using these superordinate regions 
(N = 101 NUTS-1 regions; mean number of respondents per 
region, M = 556), the pattern of results was similar (i.e., all significant 
results remained significant). 
3 
Running all analyses with or without statistical control for the demographic 
variables did not alter the findings. For clarity reasons, we therefore reported 
results from the analyses without inclusion of the demographic variables. 
The results from the analyses including demographics are available upon 
request with the first author. 
4 W
e chose PCA to obtain a measure capturing as much of the total variance in the 
items as possible. Measures based on alternative data-reduction methods 
such as Exploratory Factor Analyses yielded virtually identical results. 
5 
See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Appendix A. List of Countries and Sample Sizes per Country in Study 1 
(European Social Survey) and Study 2 (World Values Survey) 
European Social Survey World Values Survey 
Country Sample size Country Sample size Country Sample size 
Belgium 1760 Algeria 1200 New Zealand 841 
Bulgaria 2230 Armenia 1100 Nigeria 1759 
Croatia 1484 Australia 1477 Pakistan 1200 
Cyprus 1215 Azerbaijan 1002 Palestine 1000 
Czech Republic 2018 Belarus 1535 Peru 1210 
Denmark 1610 Chile 1000 Philippines 1200 
Estonia 1661 China 2300 Poland 966 
Finland 2195 Colombia 1512 Qatar 1060 
France 2073 Cyprus 1000 Romania 1503 
Germany 2751 Ecuador 1202 Russia 2500 
Greece 2072 Egypt 1523 Rwanda 1527 
Hungary 1544 Estonia 1533 Singapore 1972 
Ireland 1764 Germany 2046 Slovenia 1069 
Israel 2490 Ghana 1552 South Korea 1200 
Latvia 1980 Iraq 1200 Spain 1189 
Netherlands 1778 Japan 2443 Sweden 1206 
Norway 1549 Jordan 1200 Taiwan 1238 
Poland 1619 Kazakhstan 1502 Trinidad & Tobago 999 
Portugal 2367 Kuwait 1303 Tunisia 1205 
Romania 2146 Kyrgyzstan 1500 Turkey 1605 
Russia 2512 Lebanon 1200 Ukraine 1500 
Slovakia   1810* Libya  2131 United States 2232 
Slovenia 1286 Malaysia 1300 Uruguay 1000 
Spain 2576 Mexico 2000 Uzbekistan 1500 
Sweden 1830 Morocco 1200 Yemen 1000 
Switzerland 1819 Netherlands 1902 Zimbabwe 1499 
Turkey 2416     
Ukraine 1845     
United Kingdom 2352     
Note: 
*
: In Study 1, two Slovakian respondents were excluded from all analyses 
since no higher-level regional code was assigned to them. 
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Appendix B. Distributions of Background Variables per Subsample 
 
 European Social Survey World Values Survey 
 Syoung Sold Snon-immigrant Syoung Snon-immigrant Smale 
Age       
Mean (SD) 33 (9.70) 65 (9.75) 48 (18.53) 32 (9.09) 41 (16.54) 42 (16.77) 
Gender       
Percentage of men 46.9 43.7 45.3 47.7 47.2 100.0 
Household income        
1st decile 7.0% 11.2% 8.3% 6.0% 6.9% 6.5% 
2nd decile 7.4% 16.4% 11.2% 6.0% 6.6% 6.6% 
3rd decile 10.6% 14.0% 11.9% 10.7% 11.4% 11.1% 
4th decile 10.9% 12.7% 11.6% 13.6% 13.9% 14.2% 
5th decile 11.1% 10.3% 10.8% 22.1% 22.1% 21.9% 
6th decile 10.2% 8.8% 9.7% 16.8% 16.2% 15.9% 
7th decile 11.3% 7.9% 10.0% 13.5% 12.7% 12.9% 
8th decile 10.6% 7.1% 9.3% 7.6% 7.1% 7.4% 
9th decile 10.4% 6.4% 8.8% 2.0% 1.9% 2.0% 
10th decile 10.4% 5.3% 8.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.6% 
Education (ESS)       
ISCED 0-1 6.8% 23.4% 13.8%    
ISCED 2 17.8% 20.4% 18.6%    
ISCED 3 41.8% 31.6% 37.6%    
ISCED 4 2.8% 2.0% 2.4%    
ISCED 5-6 30.7% 22.6% 27.6%    
Education (WVS)       
1    4.1% 6.1% 4.1% 
2    4.0% 5.5% 4.7% 
3    8.1% 9.8% 10.2% 
4    7.0% 7.5% 7.3% 
5    21.2% 20.8% 20.2% 
6    7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 
7    17.8% 15.7% 17.1% 
8    9.6% 8.5% 8.9% 
9    20.4% 18.3% 19.7% 
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Appendix C. Explained Variance (Range of Factor Loadings in Brackets) of 
Principal Component Analyses for All Individual-Level Measures  
 European Social Survey World Values Survey 
 Syoung Sold Snon-immigrant Syoung Snon-
immigrant 
Smale 
Social-cultural  
attitudes 
38.0% 
(.57-.67) 
38.9%  
(.55-.70) 
39.1% 
(.56-.69) 
59.6% 
(.66-.82) 
59.6% 
(.67-.82) 
60.4% 
(.66-.83) 
Economic-hierarchical  
attitudes 
71.7% 
(.85-.85) 
70.0%  
(.84-.84) 
71.3% 
(.84-.84) 
45.7% 
(.62-.75) 
46.8% 
(.63-.74) 
47.3% 
(.63-.74) 
Negative age- 
based attitudes 
57.8% 
(.85-.87) 
57.5%  
(.87-.89) 
 42.6% 
(.62-.68) 
  
Negative race- 
based attitudes 
  61.9% 
(.74-.83) 
 61.0% 
(.76-.81) 
 
Negative gender- 
based attitudes 
     47.9% 
(.57-.81) 
 
 
Appendix D. Changes in Model Fit in Multilevel Hierarchical Regression Steps  
 European Social Survey World Values Survey 
 Syoung Sold Snon-immigrant Syoung Snon-immigrant Smale 
Social-
cultural 
Model 
      
Step 1 - 2  5309.64*** 12003.52*** 24858.99*** 11.20*** 104205.18*** 509.63*** 
Step 2 - 3  22.82*** 21.87*** 3.11a 4.90* 6.46** 43.48*** 
Step 3 - 4  279.33*** 277.51*** 618.76*** 141.19*** 92.38*** 284.19*** 
Step 4 - 5  29.95*** 26.20*** 48.87*** 3.87* 4.01* 6.75** 
Economic-
hierarchical 
Model 
      
Step 1 - 2  2104.44*** 36.83*** 97.90*** 4.19* 10.48*** 65.37*** 
Step 2 - 3  9.34** 9.47** 33.02*** 5.69** 0.40 10.54*** 
Step 3 - 4  179.62*** 48.94*** 205.35*** 137.09*** 110.73*** 124.78*** 
Step 4 - 5  22.76*** 10.17*** 10.59*** 3.91* 1.22 4.24* 
Left-right 
Model 
      
Step 1 - 2  10.73*** 10735.10*** 415.26*** 10.47*** 32478.67*** 169.29*** 
Step 2 - 3  0.83 6.35** 1.91 5.95** 4.31* 10.77*** 
Step 3 - 4  103.94*** 3.82a 702.32*** 42.61*** 79.02*** 137.71*** 
Step 4 - 5  21.78*** 5.97** 15.39*** 2.88a 4.58* 3.59a 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Appendix E. Unstandardized Estimates of Slope Variances and Wald Z-Scores  
 European Social Survey World Values Survey 
 Syoung Sold Snon-immigrant Syoung Snon-
immigrant 
Smale 
Social- 
cultural 
Model 
      
b  
(SE) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.02  
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Wald Z 6.28*** 6.42*** 7.06*** 4.02*** 2.40* 2.15* 
Economic-
hierarchical 
Model 
      
b  
(SE) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01  
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
Wald Z 5.79*** 4.67*** 5.77*** 3.88*** 3.67*** 3.97*** 
Left-right 
Model 
      
b  
(SE) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02  
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
Wald Z 4.67*** 1.77a 7.58*** 2.86*** 3.50*** 3.82*** 
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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Appendix F. Correlations Among Individual-Level and Higher-Level Study 
Variables in Study 1 (Upper Panel) and Study 2 (Lower Panel) 
 Syoung Sold Snon-immigrant 
 1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
1 Social-
cultural 
attitudes 
           
2 Economic-
hierarchical 
attitudes 
.22***    .25***    .23***   
3 Right-wing 
political 
orientation 
.17*** .14**   .10** .17***   .14** .15***  
4 Negative 
attitudes 
.08** .05** .02*  .01 .04** .02*  .26*** .11** .11** 
1 Social-
cultural climate 
           
2 Economic-
hierarchical 
climate 
.54***    .54***    .53***   
3 Right-wing 
political climate 
.25*** .04**   .21** .06**   .24*** .02**  
 
 Syoung Snon-immigrant Smale 
 1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
1 Social-
cultural 
attitudes 
           
2 Economic-
hierarchical 
attitudes 
.06**    .09**    .12**   
3 Right-wing 
political 
orientation 
.13** .13**   .12** .15***   .13** .17***  
4 Negative 
attitudes 
.15*** .04** .04*  .21*** .02* .05*  .42*** .09** .14** 
1 Social-
cultural climate 
           
2 Economic-
hierarchical 
climate 
.24***    .30***    .39***   
3 Right-wing 
political climate 
.54*** .05**   .48*** .19***   .47*** .20***  
Note: 
a
: p < .10; *: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001 
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English Summary and General Discussion  
The present dissertation started out with introducing intergroup relations as 
one of the most difficult and complex knots which we are confronted in 
contemporary society. Given that intergroup dynamics permeate all spheres of our 
daily social lives, it seems vital to systematically investigate how to best predict and 
explain when, why, and for whom intergroup relations symbolize conflict rather than 
harmony. By adopting a person x context interaction approach, six empirical studies 
drawing from nine samples examined how the societal context in which individuals 
live shapes how their personal social-ideological views, their values, norms and 
beliefs, are associated with their intergroup and related attitudes.  
Crucial to this project, such an approach not only examines 
psychological/individual and sociological/contextual levels of analysis 
simultaneously, it also assesses how both work together (i.e., interact) in influencing 
intergroup relations across various domains of life – ranging from attitudes towards 
ethnicity-, gender, and age-based outgroups, over specific expressions of ethnic 
prejudice, outgroup negativity, outgroup threat, intergroup contact, and trust within 
and between ethnic-cultural groups, to more distal political attitudes, political party 
support, and even neighborhood attitudes and moving intentions.  
This final chapter summarizes the main findings reported in the empirical 
chapters and situates these findings within the global research goals of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, some key contributions and implications of the present 
findings are briefly discussed. Finally, I point to the limitations of the current set of 
studies and highlight interesting pathways for future research. 
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English Summary 
The study of intergroup relations and its correlates (e.g., stereotypes, 
prejudice, and discrimination, but also neighborhood satisfaction, moving intentions, 
political attitudes and voting behavior) continues to be an important area of inquiry 
for both scholars and policymakers. Individuals around the world belong to many 
different types of groups, and these groups often exert a powerful influence on the 
attitudes and behaviors of their members towards other groups (i.e., outgroups). 
Recent global events (such as the refugee inflow and terrorist attacks) underscore the 
importance of social psychological studies aimed at explicating the conditions that 
exacerbate and those that improve intergroup relations. 
A major advantage of social psychological research is that it places social 
phenomena in their context. This focus was already articulated by Kurt Lewin’s 
(1936) classic heuristic equation: Behavior = f(Person, Environment), and also more 
recently, recurrent calls were made for a more integrated and situated theorizing of 
intergroup dynamics (e.g., Doise, 1986; Pettigrew, 1991). In joining with these 
earlier calls, this project systematically took into account the additive and interactive 
effects of crucial psychological and social-structural predictors in explaining several 
facets of intergroup dynamics. 
Overview per Empirical Chapter 
Chapter 2 provided evidence for the claim made by Allport (1954) that a 
large presence of ethnic and cultural outgroups in itself is unlikely to trigger 
negative attitudes towards these outgroups. Indeed, we confirmed the general 
hypothesis of Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004) that ethnic diversity 
galvanizes only those already worried about it. We found that a large immigrant 
proportion solely accentuates the negative outgroup attitudes that already exist 
among certain individuals (e.g., those high in right-wing authoritarianism and those 
perceiving high levels of threat in their local neighborhood). 
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By showing that the relationship between (objective and perceived) ethnic 
diversity within a community and the attitudes majority members hold towards 
immigrants is moderated by individual differences in authoritarianism as well as by 
social threat in the neighborhood (either objectively measured or perceived as such), 
we were able to cross-validate our findings and embed them within a larger person x 
context interaction framework. The results of this chapter also put into perspective 
the rather pessimistic assumption of Putnam (2007) that ethnic diversity is 
detrimental for intergroup relations across the board. Indeed, not all individuals 
seem to hunker down in the face of diversity. To understand this complex and 
multifaceted relationship between ethnic diversity and outgroup attitudes, it seems 
crucial to take into account both individual (such as right-wing authoritarianism) and 
contextual moderators (such as perceived and objective social threat in the 
neighborhood).  
In Chapter 3, the aim was to bring together the hitherto dissociated research 
lines of ethnic diversity effects on the one hand, and political attitudes and political 
party support on the other. Applying Putnam’s (2007) constrict claim to the field of 
political psychology, our reasoning was that diversity not only has an impact on 
outgroup attitudes. Indeed, the presence of ethnic-cultural minority members might 
also influence citizens’ views on politics and politicians, and even their support for 
populist and anti-establishment political agendas. Hence, we carefully delineated a 
coherent political-psychological model providing a valuable perspective to 
understand the mechanisms through which high levels of ethnic diversity may push 
citizens with right-wing social-ideological attitudes (i.e., those high in right-wing 
authoritarianism and those high in social dominance orientation) to support populist 
parties.  
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Our primary objective was to outline the interplay between neighborhood 
ethnic diversity and social-ideological attitudes to predict right-populist party 
support via political cynicism and trust. Our results provided clear evidence that the 
galvanizing effect of ethnic diversity “spills over” to people’s stances on politics, 
making especially those already prone to the alleged threat of diversity reacting 
distrustful and leery towards politics and politicians. Again, we assessed both 
objective and perceived diversity measures and we showed that diversity was related 
to more cynicism and less trust in politics and politicians, but only for those high in 
right-wing social-ideological attitudes. By including both dimensions of right-wing 
social-ideological attitudes, we were able to test the robustness of the person x 
context interactions (by testing them separately), and to test their unique moderating 
influence (by testing them simultaneously).  
A key conclusion here is that, at least with regards to political attitudes and 
populist party support, ethnic diversity much more threatens peoples’ social-cultural 
motives of ingroup safety and security (captured by right-wing authoritarianism) 
than their economic-hierarchical motives of intergroup superiority and power 
(captured by social dominance orientation). Finally, we found that “active” and 
antagonistic feelings of political cynicism rather than a “passive” lack of political 
trust predicted greater populist party support, which sheds an interesting light on 
some of the recent successes of populist and anti-establishment political movements 
across the world. 
Chapter 4 started from the assumption that the association between 
objective and perceived diversity itself might be moderated by social-ideological 
attitudes. As social dominance orientation appeared to be of less relevance when it 
comes to shaping diversity effects, we only focused on the role of right-wing 
authoritarianism in the association between the actual proportion of ethnic minorities 
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(objective diversity) within a neighborhood and majority members' subjective 
perception thereof (perceived diversity). 
The results of this chapter demonstrated that people’s perception of diversity 
is not only a function of where they live, but also of their individual level of right-
wing authoritarianism. This has implications for people’s feelings of threat, anxiety, 
and mistrust towards outgroups; again pointing to the importance and even the 
necessity of integrating the psychology of individual differences in sociological and 
social psychological theories of diversity. Previously reported effects of cultural 
diversity on majority members’ intergroup attitudes seem to be rather inconsistent, 
which suggests that such effects may depend on both contextual and individual 
characteristics (see Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner, & Wagner, 2013; Sibley et al., 2013). 
As such, Chapter 4 took this approach one step further by focusing on the role of 
context and individual differences in the genesis of subjective perception of 
diversity. 
 Specifically, our findings revealed that the relationship between the actual 
proportion of minorities in a given area and the perception of neighborhood diversity 
by the majority members living in this area is more pronounced among high 
authoritarians. Furthermore, such differential relations between objective and 
perceived diversity may, in turn, result in a differential impact on experienced 
outgroup threat, anxiety, and mistrust for majority members high versus low in 
authoritarianism. In particular, we found a significant direct effect from greater 
objective diversity to lower outgroup negativity for low authoritarians, whereas we 
found a significant indirect effect from greater actual – over greater perceived – 
diversity to greater outgroup negativity for high authoritarians.  
In sum, our results indicated once more how ethnic diversity galvanizes 
intergroup dynamics (in casu: specific expressions of outgroup negativity) in a 
multipart social world where individuals are enclosed and influenced by their 
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immediate environment. Moreover, our findings again point to the crucial role of 
individual differences in right-wing authoritarianism as a moderator within the larger 
person x context interaction model. 
Chapter 5’s main goal was to integrate the moderation framework (which 
was successfully applied in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4) and the mediation 
framework which already captured the interest of social psychological scholars (see 
Laurence, Schmid, & Hewstone, 2017; Hewstone, 2015; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & 
Hewstone, 2014). Firstly, our findings indicated that not everyone is equally 
sensitive to diversity, and diversity’s repercussions seem to depend on the levels of 
authoritarianism of the perceiver. Notably, the galvanizing effect of diversity applies 
not only to commonly studied outcomes (e.g., subtle and blatant prejudice, and 
generalized, ingroup, and outgroup trust) but also to its association with the 
theoretical mediators intergroup contact and threat.  
Furthermore, the results of the multilevel models in two large, nested 
samples indicated that the non-significant overall associations of objective diversity 
with generalized, ingroup, and outgroup trust, as well as with subtle and blatant 
prejudice, were the result of mediating processes through positive and negative 
intergroup contact, working in opposite directions, while intergroup threat played no 
meaningful role. Hence, the net effect of diversity on intergroup dynamics appears to 
be a result of high authoritarians engaging in more positive and more negative 
contact with minority members, versus low authoritarians not engaging in more 
contact to the same extent. The longitudinal results in Study 2 even showed that, also 
over time, moderate and high authoritarians engage in more positive as well as more 
negative contact when diversity levels are higher in their local environment.  
Finally, the results concerning perceptions of diversity yielded an interesting 
insight into the dynamics of diversity ‘in the eye of the beholder’. Corroborating the 
associations found in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, higher perceived ethnic 
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diversity (asking for respondents’ general impressions of diversity on scales ranging 
from “no diversity” to “a great degree of diversity”) showed no associations with 
prejudice. Remarkably, higher estimates of minority proportions (measured via 
percentage-guesses) were related to lower levels of trust and higher levels of 
prejudice via more negative intergroup contact and more outgroup threat, but not via 
positive intergroup contact.  
Our results as such add a crucial piece of the puzzle that goes beyond 
previous research unraveling the complex and multifaceted diversity effects. By 
providing new insights into the mediating role of contact and threat and the 
moderating role of authoritarianism in the associations of diversity with various 
facets of intergroup relations, this chapter will hopefully encourage future research 
to further develop the interesting theoretical framework of ethnic diversity, right-
wing social-ideological attitudes and intergroup processes and attitudes. 
In Chapter 6, a series of studies investigated a model showing the interplay 
between neighborhood norms and ethnic diversity in neighborhood satisfaction, 
perceived neighborhood disadvantage, and moving intentions, concluding that 
positive norms can buffer against negative diversity effects. We aimed to go beyond 
the previous chapters, by using a different yet equally important moderator (i.e., 
positive neighborhood norms), and applying the person x context interaction 
approach to the field of neighborhood attitudes. The results across two studies, using 
various indicators of diversity and various indicators of norms, indicated that the 
galvanizing effect of diversity also applies to people’s views and behaviors within 
their local neighborhood, making especially (or even exclusively) those who 
perceive negative local norms to react to diversity with lower neighborhood 
satisfaction and greater perceived neighborhood disadvantage.  
In other words, the negative consequences of diversity did not occur when 
perceived social norms were positive. This conclusion is crucial and can contribute 
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to the ongoing public and political debate concerning diversity and social and 
communal life. Positive norms can form the “social glue” that holds communities 
together, with a range of positive outcomes for local neighborhood life (Putnam, 
1993). Even further, such positive local norms maintain social cohesion in a 
neighborhood, even under a potential threat like high ethnic diversity. Notably, when 
residents experience greater satisfaction with their neighborhood and perceive lower 
disadvantage within their local area, they become far less likely to move away, and 
will rather remain within their neighborhood and community. 
In Chapter 7, we focused more elaborately on the role of norms and norm 
setting. In the first six chapters, we mainly focused on the galvanizing effects of 
local ethnic diversity in several domains of social life. Yet, Sniderman, Hagendoorn, 
& Prior (2004) also developed an understanding of mobilizing effects as situational 
triggers that evoke strong reactions among citizens that were originally not 
concerned about the issue. Such contexts that facilitate mobilizing effects are 
characterized by strong normative cues. As such, in this final empirical chapter, we 
introduced the concept of right-wing ideological climates as socially shared stances 
on social-cultural and economic-hierarchical dimensions of ideology within a certain 
societal context. Ideological climates can provide social groups, organizations, and 
even whole societies with a set of unifying, collectively shared norms and values 
that guide how individuals within these contexts think about, understand, and 
evaluate other social groups (Cohrs, 2012).  
Unique in its breadth and the magnitude of its samples, Chapter 7 provided a 
large-scale examination of individual and contextual bases of different forms of 
outgroup attitudes from a multilevel interactionist perspective. The aim was to apply 
this perspective on negative attitudes towards outgroups, and more specifically to 
investigate the additive and interactive contributions of right-wing ideological 
attitudes and climates herein. Two studies (one focusing on regions within Europe, 
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the other focusing on countries across the world) tested a person x context 
interaction model for several variations of right-wing social-ideological attitudes 
(social-cultural, economic hierarchical, and left-right political orientation), for 
multiple forms of outgroup attitudes (i.e., based on age, ethnicity, and gender), and 
at two different contextual levels (i.e., regional and national), thereby allowing to 
establish generalizable patterns.  
We obtained several cross-level interactions indicating that the slope of the 
right-wing social attitude - negative outgroup attitude relation is steeper in low right-
wing contexts as compared to high right-wing contexts. Interestingly, this pattern 
was found for attitudes towards ethnicity-, gender-, and age-based outgroups. 
Moreover, statistical control for demographic influences and possible statistical 
artefacts did not alter the findings, further attesting to their robustness. Across 
several contexts, the findings thus indicate that right-wing climates mobilize those 
least likely to be prejudiced to adopt negative stances towards a variety of outgroups, 
even beyond their personally endorsed worldviews, values and beliefs.  
This result shows that norm setting as a mobilizing mechanism operates at 
different geo-political levels, expressed in everyday personal interactions as well as 
in local, regional, and even national institutions and decision-making processes. Our 
studies revealed that it was especially individuals low on right-wing social-
ideological attitudes that were mobilized, indicating the powerful impact of strong, 
exclusionary right-wing climates. Individuals strongly endorsing right-wing social-
ideological attitudes, in turn, seemed little affected by low right-wing, inclusive 
climates. These findings confirm a certain persistency in the outgroup stances of 
right-wing individuals (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998), where they actively try to make sense 
of their social world and are willing to reject prevailing norms when perceiving them 
as incompatible with the ingroup’s best interest (see Falomir, Gabarrot,& Mugny, 
2009). 
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General Discussion 
This dissertation provides some new and important insights in the intriguing 
interplay between ethnic diversity, social-ideological attitudes, ideological climates, 
and various facets of intergroup relations. Throughout the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation, I have highlighted the major contributions and implications of the 
findings of each chapter individually. Here, I will discuss some general contributions 
and implications of our research. Also, I will formulate some limitations and 
avenues for future research.  
In general, I believe that scholars in social psychology and related fields 
should use their research findings on intergroup phenomena to help generate greater 
understanding of multicultural nature of our societies. At the same time, policy 
makers should welcome attempts from researchers to descend from their “ivory 
tower” and engage in societal debates. For example, in light of the sudden and 
considerable influx of refugees in Germany in 2015, over a hundred German social 
psychologists sent a petition to the German parliament.  
In this “manifesto”, they bundled their social psychological knowledge from 
several scientific studies and offered clear recommendations for a humanitarian 
welcoming of these immigrants and a well-organized handling of this abrupt rise in 
ethnic and cultural diversity. In this way, social psychological knowledge 
accompanied the political debate, and Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed her 
most famous quote: “Wir schaffen das” [“We will make it work”]. 
Three Major Lessons and Their Implications for Policy Making 
Taken together, three major lessons can be inferred from this project that 
may inform policy makers, agencies, and organizations aiming to reduce prejudice, 
ameliorate tolerance, and build more harmonious intergroup relations in their local 
communities. It is important to note that these three lessons do not stand alone.  
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Rather, they interact with each other, and - ideally - policy making 
initiatives should take them into account simultaneously.  
 
Lesson 1: Diversity Is Neither Good Nor Bad! 
Firstly, it is important to note that ethnic diversity in a local environment is 
not by default harmful for intergroup relations, as Putnam (2007) notoriously 
claimed. In fact, diversity is a potential source of strength if it is recognized, valued, 
and properly managed. Across various chapters, our results indicated that the actual 
number of ethnic-cultural minorities in the local environment is not related to most 
intergroup outcomes. In general, the conclusion seems very straightforward: 
diversity is neither bad nor good in itself. In the same vein, perceptions of diversity 
seem to have little to do with outgroup stances, though they do play a role in 
combination with pre-existing social-ideological attitudes (see Chapter 2, Chapter 3, 
and Chapter 4).  
In particular, those low in right-wing social-ideological attitudes seem little 
affected by the proportion of minority members in their immediate living area. If 
anything, they react with even more general positive attitudes towards outgroups, 
though their levels of intergroup contact, outgroup threat, and political cynicism and 
trust remain unchanged. Contrariwise, for those high in right-wing social-ideological 
attitudes, diversity seems to galvanize and aggravate their previously held (negative) 
stances on intergroup relations. Indeed, in the face of diversity, those individuals are 
driven towards more prejudice, more outgroup negativity, more cynicism towards 
politics and politicians, more mistrust (in politic(ian)s, in outgroups, and in general), 
more populist party support, more outgroup threat feelings, more negative intergroup 
contact experiences. Interestingly, most individuals (and in particular high 
authoritarians) engage in more intergroup contact in diverse settings.  
 
Chapter 8 
 
 
274 
This fact is a hopeful and encouraging side-effect of diversity. In diverse 
environments (ideally with positive, inclusive norms), contact opportunities will be 
plenty, and right-wing individuals will be the ones most likely to engage in contact 
and benefit from its consequences (see Brune, Asbrock, & Sibley, 2016). Where 
contact opportunities are few and far between, in turn, the visibility of minorities 
could be increased, so that the few contact experiences that do take place are 
generalized onto other outgroup members. This can be done by acknowledging 
ethnic-cultural minority members in local events, in advertisements, and in the 
media. Hence, there are plenty of opportunities for local policy makers to organize 
small and non-intrusive events where residents have the opportunity to get to know 
one another and learn to get along well. Such interventions have been shown to 
effectively boost residents’ local bonds and satisfaction with their neighborhood 
(e.g., Kleinhans, 2009) and to promote tolerant intergroup norms and customs, 
which are central conditions for reducing exclusionary attitudes in culturally diverse 
communities and societies (Allport, 1954; Blumer, 1958). 
 
Lesson 2: Knowing You, Knowing Me… Individual Differences Matter! 
Secondly, since long at the center of prejudice research, the social-
ideological attitudes of social dominance orientation and particularly right-wing 
authoritarianism have proven to be firm and stable individual-level predictors of 
people’s stances towards intergroup dynamics. Indeed, across various chapters 
(Chapter, 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 7), we found that 
individual differences in social-ideological attitudes explain variance in attitudes 
towards ethnic-cultural outgroups, towards other gender and age groups, towards 
politics and politicians, and even towards political party programs. Knowing which 
worldview an individual adheres to can thus guide agents towards specific 
interventions.  
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Again, a most excellent example resides in simple intergroup contact 
experiences (Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998, 2008; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; 2008). Positive contact experiences reduce prejudice, their 
largest beneficial effects being among those high in right-wing authoritarianism and 
social dominance orientation (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009, 2011; Hodson, 2011). Even 
further, social-ideological attitudes are to some degree malleable, and positive 
contact with outgroup members over time decreases levels of right-wing social-
ideological attitudes (Dhont, Van Hiel, & Hewstone, 2014). As such, promoting 
intergroup contact experiences is beneficial in both local and personal interventions. 
In conclusion, individual differences in social-ideological attitudes matter, and they 
should be taken into account in policy making initiatives. Awareness of such 
individual differences is essential, not only because they determine how people react 
to diversity, but also because such knowledge provides useful information with 
regards to the potential effectiveness of certain person-centered approaches. 
 
Lesson 3: Mind the Norms!  
A third and final conclusion is that norms are key to intergroup relations. 
Whether they represent perceptions of the local norms and atmosphere within one’s 
living area, or socially shared stances within a certain societal context (i.e., 
normative climates), they exert a certain influence on our daily lives (see Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7). For instance, individuals who perceive positive norms in their 
neighborhood tend to be more satisfied with their neighborhood, they are less 
inclined to perceive their neighborhood as disadvantaged and deteriorated, and they 
are less inclined to move away from their neighborhood – even when this 
neighborhood has a large population of ethnic-cultural minority members.  
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In the same vein, such norms will likely install an optimal intergroup 
climate (see Aberson, 2010) where residents of various ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds engage in positive contact experiences and are tolerant towards each 
other. On the other hand, right-wing normative climates can instill a hostile and 
exclusionary intergroup atmosphere, fueling tension, conflict, and feelings of threat, 
anxiety and mistrust towards “them” (i.e., the outgroup). Somewhat ironically, such 
right-wing climates seem to primarily affect those who are the least “prone to 
prejudice”. That is, in right-wing climates particularly mobilize those low in right-
wing social-ideological attitudes towards heightened outgroup negativity. This 
situation indicates that norms and intergroup relations are inextricably intertwined, 
for better and for worse.  
This conclusion further demonstrates that local policy makers should be 
extremely wary when propagating initiatives that target local norms. No matter how 
noble and honorable, if their interventions don’t succeed, the backlash might be 
disastrous. Indeed, failed interventions might push especially the most tolerant 
individuals towards more hostile outgroup opinions. As evinced throughout all 
chapters within this dissertation, intergroup dynamics are delicate and fragile, and 
should be handled with care and caution. 
Further Avenues for Methodological Fine-tuning 
Apart from those key lessons and their accompanying implications for 
policy making, this dissertation provides an interesting methodological framework 
which might be useful to social psychological scholars. In the following section, I 
highlight some the advantages and drawbacks of this framework, and I offer some 
opportunities for methodological fine-tuning.  
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The person x context interaction perspective offers a novel approach to the 
study of intergroup relations in “real-world” societal contexts. This perspective was 
introduced by the research labs of Eva Green (e.g., Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013; 
Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin, 2010; Sarrasin et al., 2012) and Christopher Sibley (e.g., 
Brune, Asbrock, & Sibley, 2017; Christ, Sibley & Wagner, 2012; Sibley et al., 
2013), and was systematically applied throughout this project. Moreover, this 
approach allows us to examine how personal characteristics play out differently 
depending on where a person lives. Such examination is timely, given that “real-
world” contexts are likely to differ in several ways from contexts created in a 
laboratory setting.  
The Need for Experimental and Longitudinal Validations. 
Despite the high ecological validity of our survey studies, experimental lab 
studies also have advantages (e.g., controlled environment, causal inferences), and 
the validation of our findings using experimental designs might therefore be 
informative. For example, vignette studies could present different scenarios to 
different participants where diversity and/or change in diversity is manipulated (e.g., 
imagining living in a non-diverse, rapidly changing neighborhood versus a high-
diverse slowly changing neighborhood). As such, researchers could compare 
attitudes towards outgroups between conditions, and also investigate the moderating 
influence of individual differences in social-ideological attitudes (ideally measured 
before the experiment).,However, investigating the impact of norms and shared 
values may play out differently in a laboratory setting as opposed to the “real-world” 
context. For instance, presenting extracts of a regional climate in the lab probably 
means less to a person compared to talking about politics with neighbors and 
colleagues, or watching the daily news on television. 
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Also, most of our results are based on correlation analyses (but see Study 2 
of Chapter 5 for a notable exception) and therefore do not allow to draw firm causal 
claims. Although longitudinal studies are expensive, time-consuming, and certainly 
not without shortcomings (e.g., participant dropout), they offer better insights in the 
developments of individuals and environments over time. This could be done by 
examining the shift in individuals’ attitudes across a long time span, or by 
monitoring changes in their residential environments. A neighborhood can become 
more diverse, and an intergroup climate can become more exclusionary over time, 
which could impact different individuals in a different way. 
Canceling Out Self-Selection Effects. 
A second limitation stems from the causality debate and concerns the self-
selection bias in neighborhood choice (Hopkins, 2010). Indeed, individuals tend to 
actively choose a living area that matches and promotes their social-ideological 
attitudes. Across all empirical chapters, we found small and often non-significant 
relations between actual diversity and social-ideological attitudes, indicating that it 
diversity effects are not merely driven by self-selection effects. Nonetheless, 
longitudinal analyses could provide a better view on how individuals move and 
make residential choices according to their social-ideological stances.  
Up to Scale: Levels of Analysis in Multilevel Research. 
Thirdly, studying different societal contexts, especially at different scales of 
analyses (i.e., neighborhoods, municipalities, cities, regions, and even whole 
countries), implies that scholars should do full justice to their particularities. In 
Chapter 2, we tried to contribute to the broader “level-of-analysis” debate within 
diversity studies (e.g., Evans & Need, 2002; Hjerm, 2007, 2009; Schlueter & 
Scheepers, 2010). Indeed, our studies largely focused on the neighborhood as the 
most proximal, most fine-grained (and most influential?) context (see also van der 
Meer & Tolsma, 2014), but our results may not necessarily hold for more distal 
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contexts (Pettigrew, 2010). In Chapter 7, however, it was revealed that the 
mobilizing effect of right-wing climates is strong at the regional level as well as the 
national level. It is logical that most of the variation in personal attitudes, intentions, 
and behaviors is due to variation between individuals. It is thus surprising and even 
fascinating that part of that variance is due to variation between the areas these 
individuals live in, the schools and work places they attend, or the peer groups they 
acquaint with (see Davidov & Meuleman, 2012). 
Future research should empirically assess the most relevant contextual level 
for the social phenomenon under investigation, and take into account that 
surrounding contexts also impact individuals’ attitudes. This could be done by 
performing 3-level multilevel analyses (Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot, 2010) to 
investigate which predictors and mediators play a role at which level. For example, 
in line with the results found in Chapter 5, it would be insightful to examine ethnic 
diversity at the local, intermediate, and national level, to see whether contact effects 
outperform threat effects at each level. A tentative hypothesis would be that at the 
local level, personal contact experiences would indeed mediate positive diversity 
effects; but at the national level, diversity would not necessarily translate into direct 
contact, but rather introduce feelings of threat (e.g., via negative media and news 
coverage; see van der Linden & Jacobs, 2017).  
To Include or Not to Include? On Control Variables. 
In line with the first three future research directions, the use of control 
variables should be given thoughtful attention. In each chapter, we carefully 
considered which individual socio-demographic background characteristics, context-
level characteristics and/or known correlates of our outcome measure we wanted to 
take into account. In all studies, including or excluding these control variables did 
not alter the results in a significant way; and we examined several alternative models 
that yielded worse model fits.  
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Nevertheless, there is a remaining risk of unexamined covariates, 
particularly at the contextual level (e.g., regional unemployment). Along the same 
line of thought, Thomas Pettigrew and Miles Hewstone (2017) recently coined ‘the 
Single Factor Fallacy’ (i.e., the missing of key variables which might distort results 
and conclusions) as one of the greatest dangers within social psychological research. 
I therefore would advice researchers in this field to think before they act, and 
consider whether or not control variables should be included in order to answer their 
specific research question.  
Measurement Issues. 
As a final recommendation for methodological fine-tuning, the quality of the 
measures used to tap into the underlying key constructs deserves consideration. In 
setting up our research designs, we were able to administer full and well-established 
scales of our study variables in most chapters. Nevertheless, sometimes we only had 
limited space for elaborated measures, or we had to rely on already existing datasets 
(cf., Chapter 7, although there is extensive methodological research ensuring that 
ESS and WVS survey items are of high quality). Similarly, for some concepts, there 
is no consensus on their best assessment. For example, in Chapter 5, we found that 
perceptions of diversity were unrelated to intergroup attitudes, whereas estimates of 
diversity showed a negative correlation. This might indicate that the measurement of 
estimated diversity is more inflated and biased compared to the more ‘neutral’ 
formulation of Likert-scale perceived diversity items. Future studies could dig 
deeper into this measurement issue. 
As for the measurement of ideological climates, aggregation across 
individual responses in a context may be a less-than-perfect assessment. Hence, it 
could be argued that such assessment should be cross-validated with measurements 
of perceptions of climates. Although the presented set of studies did not directly 
assess perceptions of ideological climates, future studies could examine whether 
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similar dynamics play a role for perceptions versus aggregations of ideological 
climates. One should be careful, though, since individuals lack direct access to the 
thoughts of those around them, they infer what others value and believe. As 
reflexive beings, these inferences about others might be shaped (and misguided) by 
our own perceptions, feelings, attitudes and behaviors.  
Further Avenues for Theoretical Fine-tuning 
It is my personal opinion that the field can move forward in several 
additional ways, which were not directly addressed within this project. I already 
hinted at some speculative research directions throughout the empirical chapters. In 
this concluding section of my dissertation, I will briefly touch upon a few potentially 
fruitful paths for future theorizing.  
What Makes a Context Galvanizing or Mobilizing? 
A first point that needs to be addressed is the necessity for more elaborated 
research on what defines and what is measured by a galvanizing versus mobilizing 
context. A clear demarcation of galvanizing and mobilizing effects is lacking in the 
literature. As such, this vital question is open to philosophical deliberations. In my 
personal view, a key factor in galvanizing contexts is that they are ambiguous. 
Ambiguous contexts that do not provide clear normative cues for individuals (such 
as the mere presence of a large immigrant proportion) may galvanize the bigoted 
views in right-wing individuals, while they might stimulate tolerance in more broad-
minded individuals.  
In other words, galvanizing contexts lack clear normative guidance, are not 
a priori beneficial or detrimental for intergroup dynamics, but rather provide 
opportunities to express one’s values and act upon one’s beliefs (see Katz, 1960). 
Indeed, individuals not only react to and make sense of their surroundings (cf., 
authoritarians’ heightened feelings of threat, anxiety and mistrust in the face of 
diversity), they also actively shape this environment (cf., authoritarians engaging in 
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more positive and more negative intergroup contact in diverse settings). At first, 
diversity as a galvanizing context could thus enlarge the prejudice-gap between 
those low and those high in right-wing social-ideological attitudes. In the long run, 
however, contact quantity (which strongly correlates with positive contact quality; 
see Barlow et al., 2012) should make those high in right-wing social-ideological 
attitudes more tolerant, up to similar levels as those low in right-wing social-
ideological attitudes. Future social psychological research could tap into the alleged 
ambiguous nature of (ethnic) diversity, as such shedding light on why exactly it 
exerts a galvanizing effect on almost every aspect of our daily intergroup reflections. 
As mentioned in my contemplations on methodological fine-tuning, this could be 
done using longitudinal and experimental designs. 
A second imperative enquiry is what makes a context or stimulus 
mobilizing, and why are right-wing ideological  climates mobilizing? I believe that 
contexts facilitating mobilizing effects are characterized by strong normative cues, 
which especially amplify prejudices within those low in right-wing social-
ideological attitudes (see Chapter 7). Yet again, the norm setting power of such 
mobilizing effects could drop over time. Examinations of prejudice in Western 
societies over the past decades have taught us that what used to be consensually 
accepted in the past (e.g., blatant racism) is now (almost) consensually rejected (see 
Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).  
Processes such as collective action might thus counter the adoption of anti-
outgroup stances among broad-minded individuals. In that respect, one may argue 
that the mobilizing effect is in fact a masked galvanizing effect due to ceiling 
effects. Indeed, rather than mobilizing those low in right-wing social-ideological 
attitudes, there might just not be enough room to galvanize those high right-wing 
social-ideological attitudes who are already prejudiced.  
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Our findings in Chapter 7, however, did indicate that the slopes for low 
right-wing individuals were always significant and positive. In addition, we did not 
find any evidence for a methodological ceiling effect, but future studies could 
purposefully select individuals within different contextual levels (ranging from peer 
groups to neighborhoods, regions, and countries) in which they assess both ethnic 
diversity, individual social-ideological attitudes and ideological climates. Various 
person x context and context x context interactions between these constructs could 
then be tested in order to provide a more elaborated view on the interplay between 
various intergroup mechanisms at various levels of analysis. 
The Bigger Picture: Connecting the Dots with Other Fields. 
Apart from fine-tuning our theorizing of galvanizing and mobilizing effects, 
integrating the findings of this project within other segments of the social 
psychological literature might be a fascinating avenue for future research. For 
instance, throughout the whole dissertation, the minority perspective remained 
underexposed. This is a pity, since it might yield a new and potentially diverging 
viewpoint on the intergroup dynamics literature. John Berry (1984) offered a 
framework to help understand the different types of identity processes that 
immigrant groups experience within the dominant culture of the host society. 
Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kafati (2000) later adapted this acculturation framework to 
represent intergroup relations between majority and minority groups more in depth.  
Within this body of literature, Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) 
expanded the premise that effects found for majority members don’t necessarily 
translate into similar effects for minorities. In short, they maintained that for 
minority members, intergroup contact experiences with majority members would 
negatively predict collective action and support for policies benefiting the ingroup 
(i.e., the “sedative” effect of intergroup contact).  
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This finding became topic of heated scholarly debates (e.g., Cakal, 
Hewstone, Schwär, & Heath, 2011), but – to our knowledge – was never united with 
the knowledge on ethnic diversity effects and the effects of (both individual and 
contextual) norms. 
Similarly, sociologist Eric Uslaner (2012) proposed that it is segregation 
rather than diversity that is detrimental to social cohesion. Intergroup contact plays a 
significant role in prejudice reduction at various societal levels, but its potential to 
improve intergroup relations and shape tolerant norms cannot be fully expanded 
when there are no opportunities. Luckily, indirect contact experiences also impact a 
large number of people who do not themselves experience such contact (Wright, 
Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997).  
Mere knowledge of ingroup members having positive interactions with 
outgroup members can boost one’s tolerance levels. Even individuals living in a 
segregated neighborhood within a diverse city can benefit from living in such mixed 
contextual setting where fellow ingroup members do engage in such contact, even if 
they themselves rarely experience such direct, face-to-face intergroup encounters 
(see Christ et al., 2014). On a side note, future intergroup contact research could 
focus on understanding the reasons for contact avoidance by right-wing individuals 
in low-diverse contexts. Perhaps, positive contact experiences may be easily 
dismissed as personal affinity in a non-diverse environment, impeding the 
generalization of positive attitudes to other outgroup members. To my knowledge, 
this tentative hypothesis has not been examined yet. 
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Focusing on Intergroup Tolerance and Harmony. 
Fourthly, although a host of studies have addressed the sources and remedies 
for negative intergroup attitudes, it is fundamental to note that, from a theoretical 
perspective, the reduction of negative attitudes does not equal an increase of positive 
attitudes. In this regard, Cacioppo, Gardner, and Bernston (1997) already 
distinguished between a positive and a negative attitudinal dimension, which are 
independent rather than representing two poles of a one-dimensional construct. 
Moreover, research has revealed a valence congruency effect indicating that positive 
predispositions are better predictors of positive attitudes, whereas negative 
predispositions better predict negative attitudes (Pittinsky, Rosenthal, & Montoya, 
2011).  
A relative caveat in the present literature on intergroup relations pertains to 
the rather one-sided focus on negative intergroup outcomes. Recent accounts (e.g., 
Nagda, Tropp, & Paluck, 2006; Pittinsky et al., 2011) explicitly called for research 
to move beyond prejudice reduction, exploring pathways to positive intergroup 
relations, which, to date, have only received scant attention in social psychological 
research. As such, it seems warranted to look at positive predispositions and positive 
intergroup outcomes, such as allophilia (i.e., a positive feeling and attitude of 
openness toward an outgroup), reconciliation (i.e., the restoration of mutual respect, 
understanding and forgiveness between social groups), and support for affirmative 
action (i.e., policies that benefit an underrepresented group in 
employment/education).  
Theoretically, models predicting individual differences in such positive 
intergroup attitudes could be supplemented by a construct such as universal-diverse 
orientation. A universal-diverse orientation is defined as a social attitude of 
awareness and acceptance of similarities and differences among people with 
different backgrounds, and may be considered to complement right-wing 
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authoritarianism as its “left-wing” social-cultural counterpart (Miville et al., 1999). 
Together with other personality (e.g., Five-Factor Model dimensions), social-
ideological (e.g., social dominance orientation) and cognitive (e.g., need for closure) 
factors that underlie intergroup attitudes, such positive predispositions would deepen 
our understanding of intergroup dynamics at the individual level (see Van Assche, 
Bostyn, De keersmaecker, Dardenne, & Hansenne, 2017). At the contextual level, 
local multiculturalism policies and income equality could enhance our knowledge on 
these issues. Most importantly, an interactionist perspective accounting for the 
interplay between personal and contextual factors seems a most promising 
framework to develop a comprehensive understanding of positive intergroup 
relations. 
The WEIRD World is Not Enough.  
As a final avenue for future research, I would like to highlight the need for 
cross-cultural validations of our findings. As an overwhelming majority (i.e., 96%) 
of samples for psychological studies are drawn from Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (“WEIRD”) societies, research across cultures 
has been put high on the research agenda, to allow for generalizations of research 
findings (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). In Europe, there is ample evidence 
on how intergroup tensions arise due to immigration (see Green et al., 2010; 
Hewstone, 2015). In other countries, however, intergroup dynamics developed in a 
totally different historical setting. Hence, generalizations of our results are not self-
evident, as portrayed in the two examples below. 
As a prime example, South Africa represents a most relevant context to 
investigate the pathways towards positive intergroup relations. Given its history of 
extreme intergroup conflict, oppression, and segregation (i.e., Apartheid), as well as 
the subsequent explicit commitment to rebuild the nation’s intergroup relations 
through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is a unique setting to explore 
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whether similar mechanisms for reducing prejudice and promoting positive 
intergroup relations apply. In this respect, the seminal work of Hermann Swart (e.g., 
Swart, Hewstone, Christ, & Voci, 2011) indicated that positive outgroup emotions 
(e.g., empathy) serve as key affective mechanisms through which intergroup contact 
experiences lead to positive outgroup attitudes.  
Where the former study largely replicated previous “Western” contact 
studies, a prominent study in Singapore (Roets, Au, & Van Hiel, 2015) showed 
divergent results. Although the history of ethnic conflict (between Chinese, Malays, 
Indians, and Eurasians) in Singapore is considered far less cruel and violent 
compared to South Africa’s, intergroup relations have been tense, and even 
nowadays, the encouragement of positive changes at social and societal levels is a 
hot topic in political discussions.  
The provocative findings of this particular study challenged the widely 
adopted postulate that authoritarianism is inevitably associated with increased 
prejudice. In particular, their results demonstrated that in Singapore, a positive 
relation was found between right-wing authoritarianism and positive outgroup 
attitudes. The rationale is that the government as a strong authority explicitly and 
relentlessly endorses diversity and multiculturalism, thereby enforcing a social norm 
that is in direct opposition to authoritarians’ “natural” negative stances towards other 
social groups. In sum, these illustrative cases show that wherever several ethnic 
groups live together, studies that provide a better understanding of possible 
pathways towards positive intergroup relations are highly relevant.  
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Conclusion 
In the present dissertation, we started from the rather negative and 
pessimistic view of Putnam (2007) on ethnic diversity that has dominated the 
literature on intergroup relations. Our aim was to investigate this complex issue from 
a person x context interaction perspective, elaborating on the more nuanced 
hypothesis of Allport (1954) that diversity only aggravates the already-present 
prejudice in certain individuals. Across various studies, we consistently found 
evidence that supports this nuanced interpretation. Furthermore, we aspired to 
increase our understanding of how ideological climates as shared, collective norms 
guide how certain individuals feel, think about, and behave towards other social 
groups. Where diversity showed the potential to magnify the influence of individual 
differences (i.e., as a galvanizing context), right-wing ideological climates 
attenuated them by steering everybody into a certain direction (i.e., as a mobilizing 
context). 
As such, the present dissertation offers important new insights in the 
complex and fascinating research domain of ethnic diversity, ideological climates, 
and intergroup dynamics in particular. As Pettigrew (2017) pointed out: “New 
theory and methods have aided social psychology to begin to situate its phenomena 
in their broad social contexts. This is an extremely significant advance in the 
discipline that should be celebrated and continued. Contextual social psychology is 
finally emerging.” I fully agree: now that scholars are able to accommodate 
individuals’ attitudes, values and beliefs within their larger normative context, we 
are one step further in finding out how to effectively counter prejudice and promote 
inclusion. Such awareness will further help to create an environment in which 
tolerance and equality principles embrace all, which, in the end, will hopefully 
improve intergroup relations. 
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Etnische diversiteit, ideologische klimaten, en 
intergroep relaties: Een persoon x context 
benadering 
 
 
Inleiding 
 
De relaties tussen de verschillende sociale groepen in onze samenleving 
domineren tegenwoordig de krantenkoppen. Of het nu gaat over de instroom van 
vluchtelingen, het hoofddoekdebat, Zwarte Piet, of terreurdreiging, iedereen deelt 
zijn of haar mening in blogs, op sociale media, of aan de toog op café. Ook politici 
debatteren over deze kwesties en vaak laaien die verhitte discussies hoog op. Het 
lijkt erop dat er een tweespalt is opgetreden binnen de huidige multiculturele 
maatschappij, waarbij sommigen de aanwezigheid van verschillende etnische en 
culturele groepen als een dreiging waarnemen, terwijl anderen een gelegenheid zien 
om andere culturen en gewoonten te leren kennen. Het doel van het huidige 
doctoraat is om nuance toe te voegen aan dit gevoelige en gepolariseerde debat. Dit 
doen we door de antecedenten en consequenties van intergroep relaties in 
verschillende domeinen van het leven wetenschappelijk onder de loep te nemen. 
De bekende sociaal psycholoog Gordon Allport was één van de eerste 
onderzoekers die systematisch het academisch onderzoek naar vooroordelen en 
intergroep dynamieken samenvatte. In de naweeën van Wereldoorlog II schreef hij 
het boek De Oorsprong van Vooroordelen (1954), waarin hij de basis legde voor wat 
tegenwoordig de studie van intergroep relaties heet.  
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Sinds die tijd hebben vele studies in de sociale wetenschappen bijgedragen 
tot een beter begrip van intergroep relaties. De klassieke definitie van intergroep 
relaties werd oorspronkelijk geformuleerd door Muzafer Sherif (1966), die 
suggereerde dat “wanneer personen die tot de ene groep behoren, collectief of 
individueel, met een andere groep of haar leden in termen van hun 
groepsidentificatie communiceren, we een voorbeeld hebben van intergroep gedrag” 
(p.12). Vandaar dat intergroep relaties een breed scala aan sociale groepen kunnen 
omvatten (bijvoorbeeld: op basis van geslacht, leeftijd, of seksuele geaardheid), 
waarbij de meest prominente en meest bestudeerde relaties degene zijn tussen 
etnisch-culturele minderheidsleden en meerderheidsleden. 
Henri Tajfel, een overlevende van een krijgsgevangenenkamp uit de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog, benadrukte verder dat het potentiële probleem voor intergroep relaties 
ligt in de natuurlijke tendens van mensen om sociale categorisaties te maken (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). Vanwege de complexiteit van de sociale wereld zijn 
individuen geneigd om sociale informatie op te delen in afzonderlijke categorieën. 
Volgens de Sociale Identiteitstheorie (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) zullen we nieuwe 
personen quasi-automatisch indelen als lid van de eigen groep (de ingroep; “wij”) of 
als lid van een andere groep (de uitgroep; “zij”), en identificatie met de ingroep is 
bijna onvermijdelijk. 
De attitudes die we hebben ten opzichte van uitgroepen kunnen sterk 
variëren over een breed spectrum gaande van grof racisme en dehumanisatie, over 
subtiele vormen van vooroordelen, tot ruimdenkende openheid, acceptatie en 
tolerantie (Pettigrew, 1969). Of iemands standpunten ten aanzien van intergroep 
relaties negatief of positief zijn hangt af van een reeks factoren, en inzichten uit de 
onderzoeksdomeinen van sociale psychologie, persoonlijkheidspsychologie, 
politieke wetenschappen en sociologie voegen allemaal een stukje toe aan deze 
complexe en veelzijdige attitudinale puzzel.  
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Voorbij vooroordelen: Een Persoon X Context Perspectief 
Diversiteit, multiculturalisme, immigratie en integratie zijn centrale thema’s 
binnen de hedendaagse politiek, en ook sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoek probeert 
de attitudes, gevoelens en gedragingen van etnische meerderheidsleden te 
voorspellen en te verklaren door antwoorden te zoeken naar vragen over de 
oorsprong van vooroordelen, stereotypen, discriminatie en uitsluiting.  
Psychologisch onderzoek heeft deze kernvraag vaak benaderd vanuit een 
individueel verschillenkader. Verschillende studies onderzochten bijvoorbeeld de rol 
van persoonlijkheidstrekken (e.g., Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009; Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2008), cognitieve stijlen en gemotiveerde cognitie (e.g., Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski , & Sulloway, 2003; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), en sociaal-ideologische 
attitudes (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Whitley, 1999) als voorspellers van 
vooroordelen. Deze laatste categorie van individuele verschillen (i.e., sociaal-
ideologische attitudes) bleek één van de meest robuuste en betrouwbare voorspellers 
van vooroordelen en uitgroep attitudes te zijn (zie Duckitt & Sibley, 2009, 2010). In 
zijn Duaal Proces Model stelde John Duckitt (2001) dat individuen lijken te 
verschillen in hun neiging om vooringenomen en etnocentrische houdingen aan te 
nemen, en deze verschillen komen voort uit hun meer algemene opvattingen, 
overtuigingen of ideeën over hoe een samenleving moet worden georganiseerd en 
zou moeten functioneren. 
Sterker nog, individuen verankeren hun uitgroep attitudes in hun sociaal-
ideologische waarden en overtuigingen, en deze sociaal-ideologische attitudes 
kunnen worden onderverdeeld in twee brede en onderling verbonden dimensies. In 
het sociaal-culturele domein verschillen individuen in de waarde die zij hechten aan 
conformiteit, traditionele normen en waarden, sociale cohesie en collectieve 
veiligheid (versus openheid voor nieuwe ervaringen). Deze dimensie wordt vaak 
aangeduid als Rechts Autoritarisme (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981, 1988).  
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In het economisch-hiërarchische domein verschillen individuen in hun 
voorkeur voor intergroep dominantie, sociale en maatschappelijke hiërarchie en 
(ingroep) status, superioriteit en macht (versus gelijkheid en gelijkwaardigheid; 
Middendorp, 1978). Deze dimensie wordt vaak aangeduid als Sociale Dominantie 
Oriëntatie (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). De “conservatieve” 
polen van beide dimensies van sociaal-ideologische attitudes hangen sterk samen 
met minder harmonieuze en meer conflictgerichte opvattingen met betrekking tot 
uitgroepen in het bijzonder, en intergroep relaties in het algemeen. Doorheen dit 
doctoraat zullen we dus rekening te houden met de rol van dergelijke individuele 
verschillen in sociaal-ideologische attitudes. 
Toch leven individuen niet in een geïsoleerd sociaal vacuüm. In plaats 
daarvan zijn ze ingebed in bepaalde sociale omgevingen en gemeenschappen - de 
buurten, gemeenten, provincies of landen waarin ze leven. Sociologisch onderzoek 
heeft vaak betoogd dat deze contexten de ervaringen van mensen met en hun 
percepties van uitgroepen beïnvloeden. Sociologen hebben het thema van intergroep 
relaties daarom vaak benaderd vanuit een contextuele-verschillenkader en hebben 
een verscheidenheid aan omgevingsfactoren en situationele factoren voorgesteld die 
ertoe kunnen leiden dat individuen vooroordelen ten opzichte van uitgroepen 
propageren (e.g., Branton & Jones, 2005; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000). 
De Relatieve Deprivatie Theorie (Davis, 1959; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & 
Bialosiewicz, 2012) stelt bijvoorbeeld dat personen die in gevaarlijke, benadeelde, 
en verarmde gebieden leven, dreiging percipiëren in termen van hun veiligheid en 
welzijn, en deze dreiging kan spanning en vijandigheid tussen sociale groepen 
aanwakkeren (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Objectieve omgevingsfactoren zoals 
criminaliteit en werkloosheid kunnen dus een negatief effect hebben op de 
intergroep relaties. Zelfs de loutere aanwezigheid van uitgroepen zou conflict 
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kunnen oproepen, hoewel deze bewering fel is aangevochten (Hewstone, 2015; 
Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). 
Allport (1954) besprak meer dan vijftig jaar geleden de aanwezigheid van 
minderheidsgroepen als volgt: “Toenemende diversiteit is op zich geen voldoende 
voorwaarde om vooroordelen te verklaren. Wat er lijkt plaats te vinden is de 
toename van de vooroordelen die een individu reeds had” (p. 229). Deze verklaring 
kreeg aanvankelijk relatief weinig wetenschappelijke aandacht, totdat de politieke 
wetenschapper Robert Putnam (2007) deze stelling weerlegde en poneerde dat meer 
etnische diversiteit direct geassocieerd zou zijn met minder vertrouwen en meer 
vooroordelen tussen etnische groepen. Deze stelling, ook wel de “schildpad-
hypothese” genoemd, hield in dat individuen zich als het ware in hun schelp 
terugtrekken uit het sociale leven wanneer ze in een diverse omgeving wonen. 
Maar heeft diversiteit onvermijdelijk zulke verwoestende gevolgen voor de 
sociale samenhang binnen gemeenschappen? In een uitgebreid overzicht van 90 
post-Putnam studies concludeerden van der Meer en Tolsma (2014) dat de evidentie 
voor de claim van Putnam gemengd is. Desalniettemin heeft deze theorie het 
academische debat over etnische diversiteit en sociale cohesie in de samenleving 
beïnvloedt, en het blijft een heet hangijzer om te onderzoeken.  
Ten slotte staan objectieve omgevingskenmerken niet op zichzelf, maar zijn 
ze onlosmakelijk verweven met sociale omgevingsfactoren. Onze percepties van de 
objectieve omgeving, evenals de normen, waarden en overtuigingen van degenen die 
ons omringen doordringen alle sferen van ons sociale leven. Bovendien voorzien 
dergelijke “ideologische klimaten” individuen van normen en waarden die onze 
perceptie van de sociale wereld sturen, en daardoor ook een effect kunnen hebben op 
onze uitgroep attitudes. Een laatste thema dat we in dit doctoraat aankaarten, is dus 
de vraag hoe sterk de perceptie van deze normen en normatieve klimaten individuen 
leiden in hun standpunten betreffende verschillende facetten van intergroep relaties. 
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Huidig Doctoraatsonderzoek 
 
In het vervolg van deze samenvatting worden de onderzoeksdoelen, de 
methoden en de resultaten van de huidige doctoraatstudies kort toegelicht. Telkens 
bestuderen we een bepaald aspect van intergroep relaties vanuit een individuele 
verschillen en contextuele verschillenkader. Beide benaderingen dragen bij tot het 
attitudinale verhaal, en vaak loont het de moeite om te kijken naar de interactie 
tussen psychologische en sociologische voorspellers (zie Doise, 1986; Pettigrew, 
1991). Dit persoon x context perspectief biedt een aantal interessante nieuwe 
inzichten in de complexe samenhang tussen etnische diversiteit, ideologische 
klimaten, en intergroep relaties.  
Hoofdstuk 2  
In Hoofdstuk 2 vonden we evidentie voor de bewering van Allport (1954) 
dat een grote aanwezigheid van etnische en culturele minderheidsleden op zichzelf 
geen negatieve attitudes opwekt ten opzichte van deze uitgroepen. Onze resultaten 
bevestigden dat diversiteit alleen de negatieve uitgroep attitudes accentueert die al 
bij bepaalde individuen bestaan (i.e., personen hoog in rechts autoritarisme en 
degenen die hoge niveaus van bedreiging in hun lokale buurt waarnemen). 
De relatie tussen (objectieve en gepercipieerde) etnische diversiteit binnen 
een gemeenschap en de houding die meerderheidsleden ten opzichte van 
immigranten hebben, wordt dus gemodereerd door individuele verschillen in 
autoritarisme en door sociale dreiging in de buurt (objectief gemeten of als zodanig 
waargenomen). We konden onze bevindingen cross-valideren en deze op die manier 
plaatsen in het bredere kader van de persoon x context interactie benadering. De 
resultaten van dit hoofdstuk relativeren en nuanceren eveneens de nogal 
pessimistische veronderstelling van Putnam (2007) dat etnische diversiteit schadelijk 
zou zijn voor de intergroep relaties. 
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Inderdaad, niet iedereen reageert negatief op diversiteit, enkel bij mensen 
hoog in rechts autoritarisme en mensen die veel lokale dreiging waarnemen, merken 
we dat meer diversiteit samengaat met minder positieve attitudes ten opzichte van 
uitgroepen. Kort samengevat, om de complexe en veelzijdige relatie tussen etnische 
diversiteit en uitgroep attitudes beter te begrijpen, lijkt het cruciaal om rekening te 
houden met zowel individuele (zoals rechts autoritarisme) als contextuele 
moderatoren (zoals waargenomen en objectieve sociale dreiging in de buurt). 
Hoofdstuk 3 
In Hoofdstuk 3 was het de bedoeling om de onderzoekslijnen van etnische 
diversiteit enerzijds en politieke attitudes en partijsteun anderzijds samen te brengen. 
We pasten de claim van Putnam (2007) toe op het gebied van de politieke 
psychologie, en voorspelden dat diversiteit niet alleen een impact heeft op attitudes 
ten opzichte van uitgroepen, maar ook op attitudes over politiek en politici, en zelfs 
op steun voor populistische politieke partijen. Daarom hebben we een politiek-
psychologisch model afgebakend dat een nieuw perspectief biedt om de 
mechanismen te begrijpen waardoor hoge niveaus van etnische diversiteit burgers 
met rechtse sociaal-ideologische attitudes (i.e., personen hoog in rechts autoritarisme 
en diegenen met hoge niveaus van sociale dominantie oriëntatie) ertoe bewegen om 
populistische partijen te steunen. 
Onze primaire doelstelling was om de wisselwerking tussen etnische 
diversiteit en sociaal-ideologische attitudes te onderzoeken in de voorspelling van 
populistische partijsteun, via politiek cynisme en politiek vertrouwen. Onze 
resultaten leverden duidelijk bewijs op dat zowel objectieve als gepercipieerde 
diversiteit gerelateerd zijn aan meer cynisme en minder vertrouwen in politiek en 
politici, maar alleen voor degenen met een rechtse sociaal-ideologische instelling.  
Door beide dimensies van rechtse sociaal-ideologische attitudes op te nemen, 
konden we de robuustheid van de persoon x context interacties testen (door ze 
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afzonderlijk te analyseren), en hun unieke modererende invloed testen (door ze 
tegelijkertijd te analyseren). 
Een belangrijke conclusie hier is dat – met betrekking tot politieke attitudes 
en populistische partijsteun – etnische diversiteit veel meer de sociaal-culturele 
motieven van ingroep veiligheid (gemeten door rechts autoritarisme) bedreigt dan de 
economisch-hiërarchische motieven van ingroep superioriteit en macht (gemeten 
door sociale dominantie oriëntatie). Ten slotte ontdekten we dat “actieve” en 
vijandige gevoelens van politiek cynisme een betere voorspeller waren van 
populistische partijsteun dan een “passief” gebrek aan politiek vertrouwen, wat een 
interessant licht werpt op enkele recente successen van populistische politieke 
bewegingen in verschillende Westerse samenlevingen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 
Hoofdstuk 4 begon vanuit de veronderstelling dat de associatie tussen 
objectieve en waargenomen diversiteit zou kunnen gemodereerd worden door 
sociaal-ideologische attitudes. Omdat sociale dominantie oriëntatie minder relevant 
leek te zijn bij het vormgeven van diversiteitseffecten, hebben we ons alleen gericht 
op de rol van rechts autoritarisme in de associatie tussen de feitelijke proportie aan 
etnische minderheden (objectieve diversiteit) binnen een wijk en de subjectieve 
perceptie daarvan (waargenomen diversiteit). 
De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk toonden aan dat de perceptie van diversiteit 
niet alleen een functie is van de eigenlijke diversiteit in de buurt waar mensen 
wonen, maar ook van hun individuele niveau van autoritarisme, wat gevolgen heeft 
voor hun gevoelens van dreiging, angst en wantrouwen tegenover uitgroepen. Dit 
wijst opnieuw op het belang om de psychologie van individuele verschillen in 
sociologische en sociaalpsychologische theorieën over diversiteit te integreren. 
Concreet onthulden onze bevindingen dat de relatie tussen het feitelijke aandeel van 
minderheden in een bepaalde buurt en de perceptie van buurtdiversiteit door de 
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meerderheidsleden die in dit gebied wonen meer uitgesproken is bij mensen hoog in 
rechts autoritarisme. Bovendien kunnen dergelijke differentiële relaties tussen 
objectieve en gepercipieerde diversiteit op hun beurt resulteren in een verschillend 
effect op ervaren uitgroep dreiging, angst en wantrouwen voor mensen hoog versus 
laag in autoritarisme. In het bijzonder vonden we een direct effect van meer 
objectieve diversiteit op minder uitgroep negativiteit voor mensen laag in 
autoritarisme, terwijl we een indirect effect vonden van meer objectieve – via meer 
gepercipieerde – diversiteit naar meer uitgroep negativiteit voor mensen hoog in 
autoritarisme. 
Hoofdstuk 5 
Het hoofddoel van Hoofdstuk 5 was het persoon x context interactiekader 
toe te passen op intergroep contact en dreiging, de twee meest cruciale mechanismen 
die het verband tussen diversiteit en uitgroep attitudes lijken te verklaren. Ten eerste 
gaven onze bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk 2, Hoofdstuk 3, en Hoofdstuk 4 aan dat niet 
iedereen even gevoelig is voor diversiteit en dat de gevolgen van diversiteit 
afhangen van de mate van rechts autoritarisme van de waarnemer. De resultaten van 
het onderzoek in dit hoofdstuk gaven aan dat objectieve diversiteit niet samenhangt 
met vertrouwen of vooroordelen. Dit komt omdat in het licht van diversiteit zowel 
meer positief als negatief intergroep contact plaatsvindt, en deze processen in 
tegenovergestelde richting werken. Percepties van dreiging leken hier geen zinvolle 
rol te spelen.  
Het netto-effect van diversiteit op intergroep relaties lijkt met andere 
woorden het gevolg van individuen hoog in rechts autoritarisme die meer positieve 
en meer negatieve ervaringen met minderheidsleden hebben in diverse buurten. De 
longitudinale resultaten in Studie 2 toonden zelfs aan dat, ook doorheen de tijd, 
mensen met gemiddelde en hoge niveaus van autoritarisme meer positieve en meer 
negatieve contacten aangaan wanneer er meer diversiteit is in hun lokale omgeving. 
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Hoofdstuk 6 
In Hoofdstuk 6 onderzochten we aan de hand van twee studies een model 
dat de complexe wisselwerking tussen buurnormen en etnische diversiteit laat zien 
in de voorspelling van buurttevredenheid, waargenomen buurtverloedering en 
verhuisintenties. In het algemeen kunnen we concluderen dat positieve normen 
kunnen bufferen tegen negatieve diversiteitseffecten. We wilden verder gaan dan de 
vorige hoofdstukken, door een andere belangrijke moderator (i.e., positieve 
buurtnormen) te gebruiken en de persoon x context interactiebenadering toe te 
passen op het gebied van buurtattitudes.  
De resultaten van twee studies, gebruikmakend van verschillende 
indicatoren van diversiteit en verschillende indicatoren van normen, wezen erop dat 
het schadelijke effect van diversiteit ook van toepassing is op de opvattingen en het 
gedrag van mensen binnen hun lokale omgeving. In diverse buurten reageren 
namelijk vooral (of zelfs uitsluitend) degenen die negatieve lokale normen 
waarnemen met minder buurttevredenheid en een meer waargenomen 
buurtverloedering. 
Met andere woorden, de negatieve gevolgen van diversiteit kwamen niet 
voor bij individuen die positieve sociale normen percipiëren. Deze conclusie is 
cruciaal en kan bijdragen aan het huidige publieke en politieke debat over diversiteit 
en het sociale leven in onze snel veranderende maatschappij. Positieve normen 
kunnen de “sociale lijm” vormen die gemeenschappen bij elkaar houdt, met een 
reeks positieve resultaten voor het lokale buurtleven (zie ook Putnam, 1993). Sterker 
nog, zulke positieve lokale normen handhaven de sociale cohesie in een buurt, zelfs 
onder een potentiële dreiging zoals etnische diversiteit. Belangrijk is bovendien dat 
wanneer bewoners meer tevredenheid over hun buurt ervaren en wanneer ze minder 
verloedering in hun omgeving waarnemen, ze ook minder snel willen verhuizen en 
eerder in hun buurt en gemeenschap willen blijven. 
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Hoofdstuk 7 
In een laatste empirisch hoofdstuk hebben we ons nog meer gericht op de rol 
van normen. Sniderman, Hagendoorn en Prior (2004) ontwikkelden een theoretisch 
perspectief waarin ze stelden dat bepaalde sterke normatieve “klimaten” een 
mobiliserend effect kunnen hebben. Het zijn als het ware situationele triggers die 
sterke reacties oproepen bij alle burgers, en vooral bij degene die er oorspronkelijk 
geen probleem van maakten. Dergelijke ideologische klimaten met sterke 
normatieve signalen kunnen best begrepen worden als sociaal gedeelde standpunten 
over sociaal-culturele en economisch-hiërarchische dimensies van ideologie binnen 
een bepaalde maatschappelijke context. Ideologische klimaten kunnen sociale 
groepen, organisaties en zelfs hele samenlevingen voorzien van een set van 
collectief gedeelde normen en waarden die bepalen hoe individuen binnen deze 
contexten denken over andere sociale groepen, deze begrijpen en evalueren (Cohrs, 
2012). 
In Hoofdstuk 7 deden we daarom een grootschalig onderzoek naar de 
individuele en contextuele ‘norm’-basis van verschillende vormen van uitgroep 
attitudes. Ons doel was om het persoon x context interactieperspectief toe te passen 
op negatieve attitudes tegenover uitgroepen, en meer specifiek om de additieve en 
interactieve rol van rechtse ideologische attitudes en rechtse ideologische klimaten 
hierin te onderzoeken. Twee studies (de eerste gericht op regio's binnen Europa, de 
tweede gericht op landen over de hele wereld) testten dit persoon x context 
interactiemodel voor verschillende facetten van rechtse sociaal-ideologische 
attitudes (sociaal-culturele, economische hiërarchische en links-rechts politieke 
oriëntatie), voor verschillende types van uitgroep attitudes (i.e., op basis van leeftijd, 
etniciteit, en geslacht) en op twee verschillende contextuele niveaus (regionaal en 
nationaal). Hierdoor kunnen generaliseerbare patronen worden vastgesteld. 
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Onze bevindingen geven aan dat een rechts klimaat degenen die het minst 
waarschijnlijk bevooroordeeld zijn (i.e., degene laag in rechtse sociaal-ideologische 
attitudes), mobiliseert om ook negatieve standpunten in te nemen tegenover 
verschillende uitgroepen, ondanks hun persoonlijk wereldbeeld en hun waarden en 
overtuigingen. Onze studies toonden aan dat vooral personen met een lage rechtse 
sociaal-ideologische houding werden gemobiliseerd, wat wijst op de krachtige 
impact van rechtse ideologische klimaten. Individuen die zelf al rechtse sociaal-
ideologische attitudes hadden, leken op hun beurt weinig beïnvloed door relatief 
linkse ideologische klimaten. Deze bevindingen bieden een bepaald perspectief op 
hoe een dergelijk mobiliserend proces uit de hand kan lopen en in het ergste geval 
kan eindigen in een maatschappij die segregatie, gewelddadige repressie of zelfs 
genocide van uitgroepen tolereert. 
Algemene Discussie 
Dit doctoraat biedt enkele nieuwe en belangrijke inzichten in de 
wisselwerking tussen etnische diversiteit, sociaal-ideologische attitudes, 
ideologische klimaten, en verschillende facetten van intergroep relaties. In deze 
algemene discussie worden onze belangrijkste resultaten kort bediscussieerd en in 
een breder kader geplaatst. Wetenschappers in de sociale psychologie en 
aanverwante vakgebieden zouden idealiter hun onderzoeksresultaten rond intergroep 
fenomenen moeten aangrijpen om meer inzicht te verspreiden over de multiculturele 
aard van onze samenlevingen. Tegelijkertijd kunnen beleidsmakers dergelijke 
inzichten van onderzoekers toepassen en integreren binnen de huidige 
maatschappelijke debatten. In het licht van de aanzienlijke toestroom van 
vluchtelingen in Duitsland in 2015, bijvoorbeeld, stuurden meer dan honderd Duitse 
sociaal psychologen een petitie naar het Duitse parlement.  
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In dit “manifest” bundelden ze hun sociaalpsychologische kennis uit 
verschillende wetenschappelijke studies en boden ze duidelijke aanbevelingen voor 
een humanitaire verwelkoming van deze immigranten en een goed georganiseerde 
aanpak van deze abrupte toename van etnische en culturele diversiteit. Op deze 
manier verspreidden hun onderzoeksresultaten zich naar het politieke debat; en kort 
daarna uitte bondskanselier Angela Merkel haar beroemdste citaat: “Wir schaffen 
das” [“We kunnen dit”].  
Op diezelfde manier wil ik drie belangrijke lessen trekken die 
beleidsmakers, instanties en organisaties kunnen leiden in hun pogingen om 
vooroordelen te verminderen, tolerantie te verhogen, en meer harmonieuze 
intergroep relaties op te bouwen in hun lokale gemeenschappen. Het is belangrijk 
om op te merken dat deze drie lessen niet op zichzelf staan. Integendeel: ze 
interageren met elkaar; en beleidsinitiatieven zouden ze - idealiter - alle drie tegelijk 
in rekening brengen. 
 
Les 1: Diversiteit Polariseert Voor- en Tegenstanders! 
Ten eerste kunnen we concluderen dat etnische diversiteit in een lokale 
omgeving als zodanig niet schadelijk is voor intergroep relaties. Diversiteit is zelfs 
een potentiële bron van harmonie als het wordt erkend, gewaardeerd, en naar 
behoren wordt beheerd. In verschillende hoofdstukken gaven onze resultaten aan dat 
het feitelijke aantal etnisch-culturele minderheden in de lokale omgeving niet 
gerelateerd is aan intergroep attitudes. Over het algemeen lijkt de conclusie erg 
eenvoudig: diversiteit is op zich niet slecht of goed. In diezelfde lijn lijken ook 
percepties van diversiteit weinig te maken te hebben met onze standpunten ten 
opzichte van uitgroepen, hoewel ze wel degelijk een rol spelen in combinatie met 
reeds bestaande sociaal-ideologische attitudes (zie Hoofdstuk 2, Hoofdstuk 3 en 
Hoofdstuk 4). 
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In het bijzonder lijken degenen met lage niveaus van rechtse sociaal-
ideologische attitudes weinig (of zelfs positief) beïnvloed te worden door het 
aandeel etnisch-culturele minderheidsleden in hun onmiddellijk woongebied. Voor 
diegene met een sterke rechtse sociaal-ideologische houding lijkt diversiteit echter 
hun eerder ingenomen (negatieve) standpunten over intergroep relaties te versterken 
en te verergeren. Inderdaad, in het licht van diversiteit worden die individuen 
gedreven richting meer vooroordelen, meer negativiteit ten opzichte van uitgroepen, 
meer cynisme tegenover politiek en politici, meer wantrouwen (in politici, in 
uitgroepen en zelfs in het algemeen), meer populistische partijsteun, meer gevoelens 
van uitgroep dreiging, meer negatieve intergroep contactervaringen. 
Het feit dat de meeste individuen (en met name hoog-autoritaire personen) 
ook meer positieve ervaringen hebben met uitgroepen is een hoopvol en 
bemoedigend neveneffect van diversiteit. In diverse omgevingen (idealiter met 
positieve, inclusieve normen) zullen er voldoende contactmogelijkheden zijn, en 
zullen rechtse individuen degenen zijn die het meest waarschijnlijk intergroep 
contact zullen aangaan en zullen profiteren van de positieve gevolgen ervan (zie 
Brune, Asbrock, & Sibley, 2016).  
Als er weinig contactmogelijkheden zijn, kan de zichtbaarheid van 
minderheden worden vergroot, zodat de weinige contactervaringen die wel 
plaatsvinden gegeneraliseerd worden naar andere uitgroep leden. Dit kan 
bijvoorbeeld worden gedaan door etnisch-culturele minderheidsleden te betrekken in 
lokale evenementen, waarbij bewoners de kans hebben om elkaar te leren kennen en 
goed met elkaar leren opschieten. Dergelijke interventies versterken de lokale 
banden en de tevredenheid van bewoners (zie Kleinhans, 2009) en bevorderen 
tolerante intergroep normen binnen deze diverse gemeenschappen en samenlevingen 
(Allport, 1954; Blumer, 1958). 
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Les 2: Individuele Verschillen Zijn Belangrijk! 
Ten tweede kunnen we concluderen dat de sociaal-ideologische attitudes 
van sociale dominantie oriëntatie en vooral rechts autoritarisme solide en stabiele 
individuele voorspellers zijn van attitudes ten opzichte van intergroep relaties. In 
verschillende hoofdstukken (Hoofdstuk, 2, Hoofdstuk 3, Hoofdstuk 4, Hoofdstuk 5 
en Hoofdstuk 7) ontdekten we inderdaad dat individuele verschillen in sociaal-
ideologische attitudes tot op zekere hoogte verschillen in attitudes verklaren ten 
opzichte van etnisch-culturele uitgroepen, ten opzichte van andere gender- en 
leeftijdsgroepen, ten opzichte van politiek en politici, en zelfs ten opzichte van 
bepaalde partijprogramma's. Weten welk wereldbeeld een individu aanhangt, kan zo 
beleidsmakers wegwijs maken in hun zoektocht naar specifieke interventies.  
Een uitstekend voorbeeld hiervan is de eenvoudige intergroep 
contactervaring (Allport, 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998, 2008; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; 2008). Positieve contactervaringen verminderen 
vooroordelen, waarbij de meest gunstige effecten werden gevonden bij degenen met 
een hoge mate van rechts autoritarisme en sociale dominantie oriëntatie (Dhont & 
Van Hiel, 2009, 2011; Hodson, 2011). Meer zelfs, sociaal-ideologische attitudes zijn 
tot op zekere hoogte veranderbaar, en positief contact met leden van uitgroepen 
vermindert in de loop van de tijd zelfs niveaus van rechtse sociaal-ideologische 
attitudes (Dhont, Van Hiel, & Hewstone, 2014).  
Een tweede les die we kunnen trekken, is dus dat individuele verschillen in 
sociaal-ideologische attitudes van belang zijn. We moeten ermee rekening houden 
bij het implementeren van beleidsinitiatieven. Bewustzijn van dergelijke individuele 
verschillen is essentieel, niet alleen omdat ze bepalen hoe mensen reageren op 
diversiteit, maar ook omdat dergelijke kennis nuttige informatie biedt met 
betrekking tot de potentiële effectiviteit van persoonsgerichte interventies. 
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Les 3: Positieve Normen Als Gouden Standaard! 
Een derde en laatste conclusie is dat positieve normen de sleutel tot 
intergroep relaties. Of ze nu de percepties vertegenwoordigen van de lokale normen, 
of sociaal gedeelde standpunten binnen een bepaalde maatschappelijke context zijn 
(i.e., normatieve klimaten), ze oefenen een zekere invloed uit op ons dagelijks leven 
(zie Hoofdstuk 6 en Hoofdstuk 7). Mensen die bijvoorbeeld positieve normen in hun 
buurt waarnemen, zijn over het algemeen tevredener met hun buurt, ze zijn minder 
geneigd om hun wijk als verloederd en verwaarloosd te zien, en ze zijn minder 
geneigd om te verhuizen uit hun buurt - zelfs als er een groot aantal etnisch-culturele 
minderheidsleden in die buurt wonen. Dergelijke positieve normen vormen eveneens 
de basis van een optimaal intergroep klimaat (zie Aberson, 2010), waar inwoners 
van verschillende etnische en culturele achtergronden positief met elkaar in contact 
komen en tolerant zijn ten opzichte van elkaar.  
Langs de andere kant kunnen rechtse normatieve klimaten een vijandige 
intergroep atmosfeer veroorzaken, waardoor spanningen, conflicten en gevoelens 
van dreiging, angst en wantrouwen jegens “hen” (i.e., de uitgroep) worden 
aangewakkerd. Enigszins ironisch lijken dergelijke rechtse klimaten vooral degenen 
te treffen die uit zichzelf het minst geneigd zijn tot vooroordelen. Deze verhoogde 
uitgroep negativiteit in rechtse klimaten kan met name degenen mobiliseren met lage 
niveaus van rechtse sociaal-ideologische attitudes. Zo’n situatie geeft aan dat 
normen en intergroep relaties onlosmakelijk met elkaar verweven zijn, in voor- en in 
tegenspoed. Deze laatste les toont verder aan dat lokale beleidsmakers uiterst op hun 
hoede moeten zijn bij het verspreiden van initiatieven die zich richten op lokale 
normen. Inderdaad, mislukte interventies kunnen de meest tolerante individuen 
richting meer vijandige opinies over uitgroepen duwen. Zoals blijkt uit alle 
hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift, zijn intergroep dynamieken uiterst gevoelig en 
kwetsbaar, en moeten ze behandeld worden met zorg en voorzichtigheid. 
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Conclusie 
In dit doctoraat hebben we systematisch psychologische en sociologische 
voorspellers van verschillende facetten van intergroep relaties onder de loep 
genomen. We zijn hierbij vertrokken van de nogal negatieve en pessimistische kijk 
van Putnam (2007) op etnische diversiteit die de literatuur over intergroep relaties 
heeft gedomineerd. Ons doel was om deze complexe kwestie te onderzoeken vanuit 
een persoon x context interactieperspectief. In verschillende hoofdstukken vonden 
we consequent evidentie voor de meer genuanceerde hypothese van Allport (1954) 
dat diversiteit alleen maar de reeds aanwezige vooroordelen bij bepaalde individuen 
verergert. Daarnaast onderzochten we hoe ideologische klimaten als gedeelde, 
collectieve normen bepalen hoe individuen zich voelen, nadenken over, en zich 
gedragen tegenover andere sociale groepen. Waar diversiteit als een galvaniserende 
en polariserende context de invloed van individuele verschillen leek te vergroten, 
verzwakten rechtse ideologische klimaten dit verband door iedereen te mobiliseren 
en te sturen in een bepaalde richting  
Als zodanig biedt dit proefschrift belangrijke nieuwe inzichten in het 
complexe en fascinerende onderzoeksdomein van etnische diversiteit, ideologische 
klimaten en intergroep relaties. Zoals Thomas Pettigrew (2017) recent opmerkte: 
“Nieuwe theorieën en methoden hebben de sociale psychologie geholpen om 
bepaalde fenomenen in hun brede sociale context te situeren. Dit is een belangrijke 
stap vooruit die moet worden gevierd en voortgezet.” Ik ben het volledig met hem 
eens: nu wetenschappers in staat zijn om de attitudes, waarden en overtuigingen van 
individuen in hun grotere normatieve context op te nemen, zijn we een stap verder in 
het vinden van manieren om vooroordelen effectief tegen te gaan en inclusie te 
bevorderen. Alleen zo kunnen we beleidsmakers bijstaan in het creëren van een 
betere wereld waarin harmonieuze intergroep relaties niet langer een delicaat 
onderwerp maar een evidentie zijn. 
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Appendix  
 
Data Storage Fact Sheets 
 
 
In this Appendix, a data storage fact sheet for each empirical chapter of the 
dissertation is included. 
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 2 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 2  
 
% Name/identifier study: Diversity and out-group attitudes in the Netherlands: The 
role of authoritarianism and social threat in the neighbourhood.  
% Author: Jasper Van Assche 
% Date: 14/11/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jasper Van Assche 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Jasper.VanAssche@UGent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Prof. Dr. Arne Roets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Arne.Roets@UGent.be 
 
 
 
APPENDIX: DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS 
 
321 
1c. Research group  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: pp07-soc@lists.UGent.be  
- website: www.vopspsy.ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Study description and information about the dataset to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the dataset is reported: Van Assche, J., 
Roets, A., Dhont, K., & Van Hiel, A. (2014). Diversity and out-group attitudes in the 
Netherlands: The role of authoritarianism and social threat in the 
neighbourhood. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(9), 1414-1430.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
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If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntax files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ...  
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 3 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 3 
% Name/identifier study: Ethnic diversity and support for populist parties:  
The “right” road through political cynicism and mistrust 
% Author: Jasper Van Assche 
% Date: 03/01/2018 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jasper Van Assche 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Jasper.VanAssche@UGent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Prof. Dr. Arne Roets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Arne.Roets@UGent.be 
 
 
APPENDIX: DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS 
 
325 
1c. Research group 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: pp07-soc@lists.UGent.be  
- website: www.vopspsy.ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Study description and information about the dataset to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the dataset is reported: Van Assche, J., 
Dhont, K., Van Hiel, A., & Roets, A. (in press). Ethnic diversity and support for 
populist parties: The “right” road through political cynicism and lack of trust. Social 
Psychology.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
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If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntax files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ...  
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 4 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 4 
 
% Name/identifier study: The association between actual and perceived ethnic 
diversity: The moderating role of authoritarianism and implications for outgroup 
threat, anxiety, and mistrust  
% Author: Jasper Van Assche 
% Date: 14/11/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jasper Van Assche 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Jasper.VanAssche@UGent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Prof. Dr. Arne Roets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Arne.Roets@UGent.be 
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1c. Research group  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: pp07-soc@lists.UGent.be  
- website: www.vopspsy.ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Study description and information about the dataset to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the dataset is reported: Van Assche, J., 
Roets, A., Dhont, K., & Van Hiel, A. (2016). The association between actual and 
perceived ethnic diversity: The moderating role of authoritarianism and implications 
for outgroup threat, anxiety, and mistrust. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 46(7), 807-817.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
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If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntax files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ...  
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 5 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 5  
 
% Name/identifier study: The diversity challenge for high and low authoritarians: 
Multilevel and longitudinal effects through intergroup contact and threat  
% Author: Jasper Van Assche 
% Date: 03/01/2018 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jasper Van Assche 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Jasper.VanAssche@UGent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Prof. Dr. Arne Roets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Arne.Roets@UGent.be 
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1c. Research group  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: pp07-soc@lists.UGent.be  
- website: www.vopspsy.ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Study description and information about the dataset to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the dataset is reported: Van Assche, J., 
Asbrock, F., Dhont, K., & Roets, A. (in press). The diversity challenge for high and 
low authoritarians: Multilevel and longitudinal effects through intergroup contact 
and threat. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 and Study 2 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
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* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
MPlus and SPSS syntax files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: MPlus and SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: Methodology file in Word and raw tables in Excel 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ...  
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
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  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 6 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 6 
 
% Name/identifier study: Positive neighborhood norms buffer ethnic diversity 
effects on neighborhood dissatisfaction, perceived neighborhood disadvantage, and 
moving intentions 
% Author: Jasper Van Assche 
% Date: 03/01/2018 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jasper Van Assche 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Jasper.VanAssche@UGent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Prof. Dr. Arne Roets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Arne.Roets@UGent.be 
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1c. Research group  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: pp07-soc@lists.UGent.be  
- website: www.vopspsy.ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Study description and information about the dataset to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the dataset is reported: Van Assche, J., 
Asbrock, F., Roets, A., & Kauff, M. (in press). Positive neighborhood norms buffer 
ethnic diversity effects on neighborhood dissatisfaction, perceived neighborhood 
disadvantage, and moving intentions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 and Study 2 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
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If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntax files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: Methodology file in Word and raw tables in Excel 
  - [X] other files. Specify: OSF link: https://osf.io/pe2fg.  
APPENDIX: DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS 
 
339 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 7 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 7 
% Name/identifier study: The mobilizing effect of right-wing ideological climates: 
Cross-level interaction effects on different types of outgroup attitudes 
% Author: Jasper Van Assche 
% Date: 14/11/2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jasper Van Assche 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Jasper.VanAssche@UGent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Prof. Dr. Arne Roets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: Arne.Roets@UGent.be 
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1c. Research group  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: pp07-soc@lists.UGent.be  
- website: www.vopspsy.ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Study description and information about the dataset to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the dataset is reported: Van Assche, J., 
Roets, A., De keersmaecker, J., & Van Hiel, A. (2017). The mobilizing effect of 
right-wing ideological climates: Cross-level interaction effects on different types of 
outgroup attitudes. Political Psychology, 38(5), 757-776.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 and Study 2 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
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If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntax files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ...  
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
